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In our paper we introduce three main areas of social ontology that correspond with the 
sections structuring the current issue of “Phenomenology and Mind”: non-institutional 
life, institutional life and ethical-political life. We argue three points about these areas, 
which are represented in the accounts published in this issue: levels of social life and 
reality; normative levels of life and reality; hierarchical levels of life and reality. Finally, 
we introduce two interviews, to which the last special section of the issue is devoted. 
The interviews were conducted by the editors with Martha Craven Nussbaum and by 
Valentina Bambini, Cristiano Chesi and Andrea Moro with Noam Chomsky. 
EMANUELE CAMINADA
Universität zu Köln
emanuele.caminada@gmail.com
BARBARA MALVESTITI
Università degli Studi di Milano
barbaramalvestiti@virgilio.it 
NORMS, VALUES, SOCIETY:  
A BRIEF PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
OVERVIEW
The current issue (vol. 3) of “Phenomenology and Mind” deals with social 
facts.  Social facts include many different subjects: persons, groups, norms, 
values, political systems, economical powers, etc., that are the domain of 
different theoretical and practical disciplines, such as social and developmental 
psychologies, empirical sociologies (both quantitative and qualitative), political 
sciences, legal theories, ethics, economics, etc.  
What exactly are phenomenological and ontological approaches to these subjects?
Social facts have historically been the subject of several phenomenological 
studies: in the early German movement (Max Scheler, Adolph Reinach, Edith Stein, 
Alexander von Hildebrand, Nicolai Hartmann, Gerda Walther, Theodor Litt, Herbert 
Spiegelberg, Felix Kaufmann); and its development in Europe (in Spain José Ortega 
y Gasset; in France Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, 
Paul Ricoeur; in Italy Norberto Bobbio, Enzo Paci; in Germany Bernard Waldenfels; 
in Brasil Antônio Luís Machado Neto); and in the United States (Alfred Schutz, Peter 
Ludwig Berger, Thomas Luckmann). Phenomenological sociology is now recognized 
as a school of its own in contemporary social sciences.     
On the other hand, ontological approaches to social facts declined 
in popularity not only in postmodernist culture, but also within 
phenomenological sociology itself, since one of its most famous pioneers, 
Schutz, disregarded the ontological research of the early phenomenological 
movement because of their static essentialism: i.e., the belief in universal 
and constant structures of social entities independent of the dynamics 
of the concrete subjectivities of the life-word. Contemporary social and 
cultural studies presuppose the anti-essentialist refusal of constant 
features, for example, in the domain of group structures, sex orientation 
and gender, individual and collective identities, normality and pathologies1.
1  Some phenomenologists (like Scheler) spoke about individual essences, such as the essence 
of a nations or a person, going far beyond the ontological assessment that personhood implies 
absolute individuality (haecceitas). His pretension to have direct access to the metaphysical obscure 
individualities of Germany, Britain, or Europe cast a cloud over his bright ontology of the individual 
person, justifying more skeptical approaches in cultural studies and Schutz’s mistrust of ontology. 
Husserl’s methodological distinction (finally edited in Hua XL) between ontology and the essence 
of individuals, however, stressing that eidetic, the ontological study of essences (greek ‘eidos’, ‘eide’), 
deals with classes and not with individuals, as well as his distinction between ontological eidetics and 
monadological metaphysics could reset long-lasting prejudices about the role of ontologies in cultural 
and social sciences. 
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Still, in the last few decades, apart from these influential debates, analytical 
philosophers began to struggle with the (formal) nature of social facts, 
looking for their constitutive features, their invariants, and their properties 
and trying to systematize the results of these meticulous analyses into a 
particular branch of general metaphysics: social ontology. In doing so they 
found unexpected echoes among scholars working on and furthering the 
phenomenological projects, through the pioneering work of the “Seminar 
for Austro-German-Philosophy” and the reassessment of “realistic 
phenomenology” (especially Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith).     
In the last three years, the Research Center in Phenomenology and Sciences 
of the Person has invited several scholars working in this field to discuss 
their current research. The discussions were held in the lecture halls of 
the San Raffaele University (Milan), and on the virtual platform of this 
research laboratory (www.phenomenologylab.eu). The main goal of the 
lab is to give voice to an authentic phenomenological spirit in both its 
analytic (in the sense of conceptual clarity and of the attention for formal 
logic and ontology) and synthetic (in the sense of openness to the best 
of the philosophical traditions, including the contemporary intellectual 
debates and the material or regional ontologies). The best contributions 
on social ontology that preceded and followed the Spring School 2011, and 
the International Conference Making the Social World, devoted to John R. 
Searle’s Making the Social World. The Structure of Human Civilization (2010), are 
collected in this issue of the journal under the title “Norms, Values, Society: 
Phenomenological and Ontological Approaches”.
We speak about phenomenological and ontological approaches both in the 
disjunctive and conjunctive sense, because this issue testifies to ontological 
approaches within phenomenological and other different philosophical 
frameworks (e.g. Plural Subject Theory, Speech Act Theory, Constitutive 
Rules Theory, Theory of Justice) and because, the contemporary dialogue 
between phenomenology and social ontology occurs mainly on genuine 
ontological levels, although phenomenological approaches to social facts do 
not only consist  in phenomenological ontology.
Phenomenological approaches to social facts can in fact be divided into three 
main areas (Nam-Im-Lee 2006): first, empirical phenomenological sociology, 
concerned with the qualitative description of social facts in the first and 
second person perspectives (e.g. Berger’s Sociology of Religion or Harold 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology); second, ontological phenomenological 
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sociology as a kind of regional ontology dealing with the essential structures 
of social realities (Reinach, Stein, Walther, Hartmann, Spiegelberg, Kaufmann, 
Bobbio); and third, “transcendental” or constitutive phenomenological 
sociology, which finally aims to clarify the condition of the possibility of social 
reality and its structures2.
The main “axiom” of all these branches of phenomenological sociology 
is that social facts are products of intentionalities, said by Husserl to be 
constituted in lived experience, and by Searle to be mind-dependent. 
This general assumption is nowadays widely shared in the contemporary 
ontological debate (although not in wider cultural and social studies), with 
particular attention to the constitutive role of collective intentionality and 
its different modes.
The working hypothesis of our Lab was that the individual person is the last 
bearer of properties in the ontological region of the social. She is individuated 
in her intentional positions and attitudes (both theoretical, axiological 
and practical) toward her social environment, which is necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for her concrete personal development. On one hand, she 
relies on her natural, biological and psychological faculties, which, together 
with her material and social environment, give her the possibility to develop 
her individual personality in early childhood socialization. On the other hand, 
the mature and autonomous flourishing of her being-person requires the free 
capability to emerge from the level of her social environment through the 
execution of spontaneous and rational acts, both shaping her individuality 
as well as offering her personal contribution to social and institutional 
life. Personhood, therefore, is at the same time rooted in and transcending 
sociality. Moreover, the individual person, as the last bearer in the region 
of social ontology, does not coincide with her natural and psychological 
support, although she is founded on it. As highlighted by Norberto Bobbio 
(1948), a human being is definable by three traits, which coincide with its 
progressive levels of individuation: human being as natural being or biological 
individual, human being as social being or socius, human being as personal 
2  Nam In-Lee (2006) claims, that we don’t have any phenomenological attempts of 
transcendental sociology. Maybe Schutz and his heirs Berger and Luckmann  (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966, Schutz and Luckmann 1975/1984) could be considered as transcendental 
sociologists, although they didn’t. Yet since they looked for invariant but dynamic structures 
of the life-world, and Husserl considered the description of these the phenomenological way to 
transcendental philosophy, as the research on the condition for the possibility for something 
(in our case, social facts), we can consider them in these frame. Thereby Berger and Luckmann’s 
metaphysical sympathies for constructionism could be revisited within Husserl’s approach to the 
realism and constructivism debate.
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being or person. Curiously, positive law has historically recognized (although 
not everywhere) the correlative rights in the opposite order: firstly, civil and 
political rights; then social and economic rights; and finally, contemporary 
ecological rights as well as biological or psychological or even cultural self-
determination rights , as Jeanne Hersch stressed (1990).
Further, individual persons are not the only objects of the ontological 
region of the social, which is inhabited also by organizations consisting 
of a plurality of persons (such as clubs, states, churches, universities…), 
immaterial objects (such as promises, marriages, juridical persons, titles, 
…), and social subjects (such as documents, money, monuments and meeting 
halls for clubs, parliaments and governments, churches and universities), 
whose material founders cannot explain their irreducible social meaning, 
although the constitution of social objects is limited by materiality (Roversi 
2012,  Terravecchia 2012). Hartmann (1933) defined these three domains 
as the domain of the person or subjective mind (Person bzw. subjektiver 
Geist); the domain of the common mind or objective mind (Gemeingeist bzw. 
objektiver Geist); and the domain of the cultural objects or objectified mind 
(Kulturwerke bzw. objektivierter Geist).
Three main topics emerge from the accounts presented here. They 
correspond to three main areas of social reality: 
1. Non-institutional life
2. Institutional life
3. Ethical-political life 
Therefore, the issue is structured in three sections corresponding to these 
areas. We will argue for three points about the aforementioned areas, which 
are supposed to be shared by the accounts presented in this issue:
(i) They are levels of social life and reality
(ii) They are normative levels of life and reality
(iii) They are hierarchical levels of life and reality
Let us present the main features of each point.
The contemporary ontological debate presupposes a sharp distinction 
between natural and social facts. Phenomenological ontologies recognized 
in nature and “social mind” (Gemeingeist) two cardinal domain of reality. The 
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general ontological and metaphysical question about the relation between 
these two domains transcends the special ontological topic of the present 
issue. Some scholars, like Searle, embrace naturalism for both domains, 
others see in naturalism an approach that is consistent only with the 
domain of nature. Phenomenology is more sympathetic to the relativization 
of the universal claim of naturalism. Husserl explored nature and mind as 
different forms of reality given to corresponding attitudes, the naturalistic 
and the personalistic (Hua IV). Finally, he viewed both attitudes as rooted 
in the concrete (and social) life-world. Thus, his ontology sees a direct 
foundation between natural and social life, while the objects of natural 
sciences (such as atoms, waves, energies, neurons, dna-informations, 
etc.) have to be clarified in the scientific process that led from every-day 
experience to the conceivability of these objects (Hua VI). 
Without taking a position on these different approaches, we stress the 
following shared conviction of both transcendental phenomenology, as well 
as phenomenological and contemporary ontologies: that non-institutional 
life, institutional life, and ethical-political life are levels of social life. Social 
life is characterized by two cardinal features, which distinguishes it from 
both natural life, and from non-social intentional life: 
1. In contrast to natural life, social life needs the intentionality of 
individuals in order to exist. It is mind-dependent.
2. In contrast to non-social intentional life, social life needs, 
in order to exist, the intentionality of a plurality at least of two 
individuals3. It is plural-minds-dependent.  
The question of whether social ontology should admit intentional but not 
social forms of life is to be left open4.
Non-institutional life, institutional life, ethical-political life are not only 
different areas of social life, they are also normative levels of life. What we 
mean is that social reality as such is a normative dimension of life. 
In particular, we make two claims:
3  As Francesca De Vecchi says, social entities do not depend on solitary intentionality; they 
involve “heterotropic intentionality” (De Vecchi 2012, pp. 17-18).
4  Gilbert claims for such a position, Williams addresses in the present issue his criticism to 
her opinion.
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1. Social reality has its own eidetic laws, which differ from the 
causal laws of nature and the motivational structures of mere 
individual minds (if they exist). 
2. Social reality is characterized by different types of normativity, 
which vary depending on the level of social life we meet5.
Non-institutional life, institutional life, and ethical-political life are not 
only levels of social life, nor are they only normative levels of life. They 
are also hierarchical levels of life: non-institutional life, institutional life, 
and ethical-political life are levels of social life in ascending order of 
complexity. This implies that social-ontology has also to answer the formal-
ontological question about the type of relation among its components. 
In the contemporary debate, different solutions have been proposed 
to formalize the inner hierarchy of social reality (e.g. Supervenience 
Theory, Constitution Theory, Emergentism). We distinguish at least three 
hierarchical domains of social life: non-institutional, institutional life and 
ethical-political life.     
Non-institutional life is the basic level of social life. It is the domain of social 
life precedent or besides its institutional normation. The first section of this 
issue is devoted to the topic of non-institutional life.
Institutional life is the level of social life that is characterized by the 
phenomenon of norm stricto sensu: it is the social life in the typical 
institutional forms. The second section of this issue is devoted to the topic of 
institutional life.
Ethical-political life is the level of social life that implies the translation of 
values and duties in political and juridical systems. It represents, in some 
sense, the apex of the phenomenon of normativity. It is concerned with 
the level of both social and institutional life regarded in their ontological, 
deontic and axiological components. Meta-ethical and political topics are 
discussed in the third section.
The first section presents contributions exploring the social world besides 
its institutional types, focusing on early imitation (Zhok), the embodied 
constitution of normality (Spina), the relations between individual persons and 
personal groups (Ssonko, Williams), and the nature of cultural objects (Salice).
5  See Zaibert&Smith (2007). 
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Zhok attempts in A Phenomenological Discussion on Early Imitation to apply 
Husserl’s phenomenological approach to early imitation, makes an 
interesting comparison with empirical researches in developmental 
psychology (especially by Meltzoff), and questions their theoretical 
premises concerning the nature of the mind. Finally, he sketches 
a phenomenological theory about embodied access to feelings and 
expressions, stressing the relevance of rhythmic structures of experience 
for the attunement of interpersonal fields that enable the first steps of 
socialization.     
Spina’s paper Norm and Normatility. Starting from Merleau-Ponty shows the 
conceptual tension and ambiguity of Merleau-Ponty’s description of 
normality and norm by analysing his phenomenology of perception and 
facing the task of abnormality. 
Kisolo-Ssonko and Williams both work against the background of Gilbert’s 
Plural Subjects Theory6. Kisolo-Ssonko deals with the social-ontological 
relevance of love. Following Westlund’s account, he claims in Love, Plural Subjects 
and Normative Constraints that lovers become a plural subject. But if Westlund 
refuses Gilbert’s theory of a direct normative constraint claiming that love 
liaisons are much more flexible, Kisolo-Ssonko argues against this rejection, 
still claiming for a revision in Gilbert’s account, and suggests the distinction of 
various levels of possible identification of the lovers with the plural subject they 
form.       
In Against Individualism in Plural Subject Theory Williams tests the plausibility 
of Gilbert’s assumption that non-social individuals can autonomously form a 
plural subject by applying Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory. He shows 
that communication already presupposes some forms of communality among 
the players. Therefore, he concludes that Plural Subject Theory needs the 
notion of an already socialized individual as its primary methodological unity, 
rather than the atomic individual. This conclusion implies that Gilbert’s Plural 
Subject Theory can be maintained as a sub-regional description of social-
ontological group phenomena, but that we need a more comprehensive theory 
in order to describe socialization itself, since only socialized persons can join 
in the form of plural subjects.  
6 Also in phenomenology we find descriptions of superindividual subjects or plural subjects: 
Scheler’s term Gesamtperson (Scheler 1913; 1916), Stein’s überindividuelle Persönlichkeit (1922), and 
Husserl’s Personalität höher Ordnung (Hua XIV).
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Salice draws in Social Ontology and Immanent Realism the distinction 
between social and cultural facts, claiming that, while the former are 
culturally universal, the latter are individuated in singular cultures. 
Salice suggests that cultural objects, being context-dependent, have to 
be seen as being “immanent objects” of collective beliefs of the members 
of the contextual culture. Thus, his contribution, after a historical 
confrontation with Brentano’s position, gives insight into his current 
work on a theory of cultural entities in the framework of what he calls 
a “pseudo-Brentanian immanent realism”. Paying particular attention 
to Searle’s theory of social construction, he tries to show its limits 
regarding this particular form of cultural objects, and to sketch a way 
to explain these phenomena. 
The second topic, “Institutional Life”, is concerned with the level of social 
life characterized by the phenomenon of norms or rules stricto sensu. 
Although the distinction between the institutional level of social life and 
the non-institutional level of social life is not always adequately pointed out 
in the literature, we consider it very important. 
According to us, the distinction between the institutional level of social life and the 
non-institutional level of social life is illuminated by the fundamental distinction 
between nomic regularity and anomic regularity, pointed out by Amedeo G. Conte (2004, 
2011)7. Anomic regularity is the regularity of actions which are performed regularly, 
but without a rule – anomic regularity is a regularity without rules – nomic regularity 
is the regularity of the actions which are performed regularly with a rule – nomic 
regularity is a rule-related regularity.
While the non-institutional level of social life is characterized  by anomic 
regularity, the institutional level of social life is characterized by nomic 
regularity. Typical examples of anomic regularity are iterative imitation acts 
such as what happens in early imitation; cooperative actions characterized 
by collective intentionality but not by status functions assignment (e.g. in 
tribal hunting or in a tribe’s use of a boundary wall, Searle 1995); uses and 
customs. These last ones have social normative powers, but they are not 
explicitly governed by rules: some families use to have a particular dinner on 
7 Conte highlights three forms of nomic regularity – nomonomic regularity; nomophoric regularity; 
nomotropic regularity – and he distinguishes them from anomic or nomological regularity. Nomonomic 
regularity is the regularity of actions which are performed for the sake of a rule. Nomophoric 
regularity is the regularity of the actions which are performed according to a rule. Nomotropic 
regularity is the regularity of the actions which are performed as a function of a rule.
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a particular day, partners use to devote themselves particular moments of the 
day. Uses and customs have their own anomic normativity, since they involve 
implicit commitments, which can be expressed in the form “we are used to 
A” or “A is normal”z. Therefore it is important to distinguish in the domain of 
normativity between normality (anomic) and norms (nomic). If not normal 
behaviors happen, it could be that a rule is imposed: regularities become 
rules. For example if kids do not help to clean after dinner (given the case they 
did it normally in ideal “innocent” times), parents could institutionalize the 
use (maybe through sanctions or premia).    
On the opposite side, typical examples of nomic regularities are the habit of a 
community to pray for the sake of a rule; the habit of a person to remove the cap 
entering the church because of the fear of social blame or the habit of a person 
to observe traffic rules because of the fear of police sanctions (to perform 
action according to a rule)8; the habit of the cheat to cheat as a function of a rule 
–  a rule of a game – to which he does not conform his behavior, etc.9. 
The fact that non-institutional level of social life is characterized by anomic 
regularity does not therefore imply the absence of normativity. As much 
as they share normativity, both non-institutional levels of social life and 
institutional levels of life have deontic powers: they both imply duties, claims, 
and commitments. But while non-institutional duties are motivated by 
values and commitments, institutional ones are primarily ruled by norms.
According to Searle’s seminal insights, institutional life is characterized by 
constitutive rules and status functions, while non-institutional social life 
is not. Let us clarify this distinction. The institutional level of social life 
contemplates both constitutive rules and status function. Constitutive rules 
are those rules which create the possibility of the entity they rules (Searle 
1969). For example, the rules of chess or rules which regulate Parliamentary 
8 Distinction between nomonomic regularity and nomophoric regularity is instantiated 
by Kantian distinction between morality and legality: while nomonomic regularity is the 
regularity of actions which are performed for the “goodness” of the rule itself (for the sake of a 
rule), nomophoric regularity is the regularity of the actions which are performed not necessarily 
for the goodness of the rule (according to a rule). As highlighted by Amedeo G. Conte, while “for 
the sake of a rule” translates the Kantian “um des Gesetzes Willen”, reformulated by Conte as “um 
einer Regel Willen”, “according to a rule” translates the Kantian “gemäss dem Gesetze”, reformulated by 
Conte as “gemäss einer Regel”.
9 While non-institutional level of social life is a case of anomic regularity – it would be cases 
of anomic regularity that are not examples of social life, such as the habit of a person to wash the 
teeth before sleeping – institutional level of social life exhausts the cases that are characterized 
by nomic regularity. 
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acts are those rules without which the game of chess or Parliamentary 
acts would not exist. They differ from regulative rules, which simply rule 
behaviors pre-existing to them, such as the rule that prohibits smoking. 
According to Searle, social entities are essentially status functions, i.e. 
entities created by constitutive rules or, according to some revisions of his 
theory, by Status Function Declarations (Searle 2010).  
Now, the existence of institutional facts, such as “the President of United 
States”, the “owner of a property in Berkeley”, “the 20 Euro note” depends 
on constitutive rules and Status Function Declarations. On the contrary, 
the existence of social facts, such as love, friendship, solidarity phenomena 
and so on, seems not to depend on constitutive rules and Status Function 
Declarations. It sounds very strange to argue for the existence of rules in 
absence of which love, friendship, solidarity phenomena and so on, do not 
exist. These phenomena seem to be more spontaneous than institutional 
ones.  Similarly, it seems difficult to consider such phenomena as Status 
Functions: lovers or friends are supposed to be for each other something 
different from mere Status Function.
The distinction between constitutive rules and regulative rules gave rise to a 
great deal of research on the topics of constitutive rules, such as, in Italy, 
those of Gaetano Carcaterra and those of Amedeo G. Conte’s School10, which 
distinguished between eidetic constitutive rules and anankastic constitutive rules 
(Conte 2007). While eidetic-constitutive rules are a necessary condition for 
their object, anankastic-constitutive rules impose a necessary condition for 
their object. Eidetic-constitutive rules create the type of their object, such as 
the type of the game “chess” and its praxems (example of rule: “one cannot 
castle when the king is under the check”); anankastic-constitutive rules 
determine the tokens of pre-existing types, such as the tokens of the type 
“wills” (example of rule: “wills ought to be signed by the Testator” (Conte 
2001, 73). 
While eidetic-constitutive rules are context-independent, anankastic-
constitutive rules are context-dependent. Eidetic-constitutive are typical of 
games, anankastic-constitutive rules are typical of juridical systems. 
10 The distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules (Searle 1969) have an important 
precursor in the Polish philosopher Czesław Znamierowski’ s distinction between “coercive 
norms” (normy koercytywne) and “constructive norms” (normy konstrukcyjne). See Znamierowski 
(1924).
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Nevertheless, there is a level of human juridical systems at which context-
independent rules are expected to be recognized. It is the level of common 
values. At this level neither constitutive rules nor regulative rules are 
enough to define human juridical system: an inquiry into values is open. 
The second section of this issue, “Institutional Life”, regards the question of 
what essentially characterizes institutional entities. Differently from the previous 
section, which primarily involves research on modalities of the constitution 
of non-institutional life, the present section does not correspondently involve 
research on modalities of the constitution of institutional life. Contributions 
of this section welcome institutional reality as already constituted and focus 
on what essentially characterizes it.
We would like to mention each contribution, which points out very relevant 
aspects about institutional reality, as well as about the phenomenon of 
constitutive rules. Some of them are also critical of the classical paradigm of 
constitutive rules and of Searle’s institutional reality account.
Lorenzo Passerini’s Institutional Ontology as an Ontology of Type formulates the 
hypothesis that the ontology of institutional phenomena is primarily an 
ontology of types, while the ontology of natural phenomena is primarily an 
ontology of tokens. In detail, the author shows four essential characteristics of 
institutional phenomena. 
Wojciech Żełaniec’s On the Constitutive Force of Regulative Rules argues for 
the constitutive force of regulative rules, although he maintains that they 
remain a genus of their own. The author points out four main reasons in 
virtue of which regulative rules have a constitutive import; one of these is 
that regulative rules define new forms of behavior, the behavior compliant 
with them. The behavior is not new in itself, but it is new depending on what 
the motives are: abstaining from smoking since we have no wish to smoke is 
not “doing the same thing” whether we acts out of respect for the law.
Guglielmo Feis and Umberto Sconfienza’s paper Challenging the Constitutive 
Rules Inviolability Dogma tries to challenge the dogma of the inviolability of 
constitutive rules. The authors develop an interesting parametrical approach 
to constitutive rules, according to which it is possible to violate a constitutive 
rule. Finally, they also introduce two different ways of exiting a game.
Emanuele Bottazzi and Roberta Ferrario’s paper Appearance Counting as 
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Reality? Some Considerations on Stability and Unpredictability in Social Institutions 
argues for a revision of Searle concept of objectivity. According to their view 
objectivity has a crucial role in institutional systems as a requirement, but 
objectivity is not a necessary condition for them to be institutional systems. 
Finally, Gaetano Albergo’s Does Ontogenesis of Social Ontology Start with 
Pretence? considers the case of pretend play. The author claims that, like 
the other games, pretend play depends on status function assignment and 
constitutive rules. Nevertheless, in order to consider the new scenario as 
a possible world and to abandon the natural necessity implicit both in the 
stipulation and in successive possible implications, we should admit that 
rules of pretend-inference have a robustly objective status.
The third topic, “ethical-political life”, concerns the level of translation of 
values and rules in political and juridical systems. It represents the apex of 
the phenomenon of normativity. In what sense?  
Following Husserl’s masterful universal-ontological project values and 
norms are integral parts of both formal and material ontologies. Formal 
logic and ontology are therefore to be integrated by formal ethic and formal 
deontics (see Hua XXX, Mulligan 2004). Material ontologies should be 
further integrated by corresponding material ethics (Scheler, Hartmann) 
and by the desideratum of scientific policies or (Praktik, see Hua XXX). 
Regarding the region of social ontology research a lot is still to be done on 
the systematization of its peculiar substrates, relations, wholes and parts 
and on their respective axiological and deontic characters. 
Values are not a specific object of social ontology. Other regional ontologies 
show values: unorganic material and natural life, for example, can carry 
own values. Every realm of reality can be a bearer of values. Concerning 
the nature of values, phenomenology stands within metaethics for a 
realistic, objectivistic and cognitivistic position. There are plausible 
phenomenological reasons to argue for an enlargement of the rationality 
sphere to emotional life, which provides the possibility of an ethics of 
values, integrating the Kantian formal rational view of ethics (see Scheler 
1913-1916, Hartmann 1925). Although values, as such, are not specific to 
social ontology, to this region correspond specific regional values, such as 
sincerity, fidelity, fairness, human dignity, etc. and their corresponding 
normative features, such as duties, commitments, claims. Furthermore, 
specific values emerge at the level of institutional life: institutional life 
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coincides with the social life step in which the constitution of norms or 
rules – obligations, duties, rights, permissions, prohibitions, authorizations, 
licenses, etc., is given. Norms are, in opposition to values, specific social 
ontological objects. The constitution of norms could be given without any 
relation to an order of values, like the rules of a game: norms are ideally 
independent from values, as Hume teaches. Otherwise, peculiar duties 
correspond to every value, since the nature of values founds affordances in 
the form of “to-be-ought”, and therefore motivates and justifies actions. If 
norms are independent from values, duties are not.
Nevertheless, there is a level of social reality in which the inquiry into 
the truth of norms, their relation to duties stands out: it is the level of life 
together, i.e. the ethical-political level, which demands the translation of 
values and claims into norms. It is the level of life in which the fundamental 
principles of our Constitutions, the political debates about the reasons for 
both regulative and constitutive rules are involved. If we are willing to 
consider values not as what enjoys critical immunity, but as what is liable 
to discussion and review, we can rely on a possible inquiry into the truth of 
norms11. In this sense, another big task is open for social ontology: not only 
the study of relation between values and duties, but also the study of relation 
between values and norms. Two main research areas for social ontology stand 
out: “axiology”, which contemplates the study of values and their grounds – 
“what make good things good” – (Spiegelberg 1947); and “praktology”, which 
contemplates not only duties and claims, but also rights (Spiegelberg 1933). In 
this view, rights are conceived as the institutionalized recognition of claims, 
which are then motivated by values (Spiegelberg 1939).
The contributions of this section have the merit to reconstruct the classical 
paradigm of rationalism, in ethics and politics, and to criticize or integrate it, 
providing interesting directions of research, worth of developments.
Massimo Reichlin’s The Neosentimentalist Argument against Moral Rationalism: 
Some Critical Observations deals with the clarification of neosentimentalist 
approaches to metaethics, according to which our moral judgments are the 
expression of our sentiments and affective reactions, without any intentional 
and cognitive character. After having illustrated a sophisticated formulation 
of the neosentimentalism, which make it possible to overcome weaknesses of 
11  The opposite point of view is argued by Max Weber, who claims that  ethical-normative 
beliefs have the status of  ultimate value axioms (letzte Wertaxiome), which enjoy critical 
immunity and  so they are not liable to discussion. See Weber (1917) and see Fittipaldi (2003, 263). 
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a naive formulation of neosentimentalism, the author still suggests that such a 
formulation weakens neosentimentalism attacks against moral rationalism. Then 
the author outlines a personal proposal which tries to integrate rationalistic and 
sentimentalist approaches, leading to a cognitivistic approach to ethics.
Christian Blum’s Determining the Common Good: a (Re-)Constructive Critique of 
the Proceduralist Paradigm reconstructs the classical proceduralistic paradigm 
in politics and provides a revision of the paradigm. Arguing that traditional 
proceduralism cannot explain the citizens’ possibility to be in error about 
the common good, the author proposes to integrate democratic procedural 
criteria with specific substantive and objective standards of adequacy that 
should be determined by experts.
Finally, Roberta Sala’s Reasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. 
Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism criticizes Rawls’ proceduralistic 
account of reasonableness, since it assigns to the “reasonable” only a place 
in the political debate, while the “unreasonable” are expected to become 
reasonable or to be paid control. The author maintains that, in order to 
realistically deal with pluralism, political liberalism should open public 
debate to those persons who are not “reasonable” – they offer reasons that 
are neither public nor shared by other reasonable citizens – but who do not 
represent a danger for the just society.
Given the above phenomenological account on the rationality of norms, since 
they are understood as liable to be related or not related to truth (related or 
not related to true or false statements about values), it seems to us that Rawls’ 
Theory of Reasonability risks cutting the source of the rationality of the 
norms, their possible relation to truth. Doing this, his position could be liable 
to become in practice tyrannical in the exclusion of non-reasonable opinions 
(according to which criteria?) and in theory relativistic, denying to the plurality 
of public opinions the dignity of their pretension to be true. Otherwise, his 
move could be understood as the request to public actors to switch from the 
modality of certainty in the pretention of truth, to the modality of plausibility, 
from rationality to reasonability, in order to avoid fundamentalisms in public 
debates. Sala pleads for paying attention also to the opinions that refuse this 
pragmatic attitude, motivated by liberal values to not exclude, but to include 
non-liberal opinions in the public debate.       
Finally, we are very happy to present in the last, special section of the 
current issue two interviews that were conducted by the editors with 
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Martha Craven Nussbaum and by Valentina Bambini, Cristiano Chesi and 
Andrea Moro with Noam Chomsky.
In her interview, Nussbaum gives us some insight into her current research 
project, that will be published as “Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for 
Justice” by Harvard University Press in 2013. Moving to her liberal account, 
she stresses the role of emotions and liberal arts in the educations of the 
citizens of a decent liberal society. Rationality and reasonability are not 
enough in her account, since every person has to learn to master her passions 
and to educate her sensitivity in order to have cognitive access to social 
values. This project is linked with the general Nussbaum’s attempt to discern 
human capabilities in order to formulate the fundamental constitutional 
principles, that are always liable to be reviewed and improved. Here the role 
of emotions and liberal arts stands out: they refine human sensitivity and 
allow us to have cognitive access to renewable interests and claims, playing a 
role in their recognition through rights, in the limits of  what is ought by each 
to everyone.  The interview was held in Cologne, at the time of her Albertus 
Magnus Lectures 2012 (June 19th-21st). For this opportunity, we would like to 
thank the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne (http://artes.phil-
fak.uni-koeln.de/), which is an international partner of our Research Centre 
PERSONA.
In his seminar conversation Chomsky starts from the mathematical 
properties of language and discusses theoretical and epistemological 
consequences of the research on the biological foundation of language. 
He also poses new questions that such rational inquiry opens up and that 
can possibly get an answer in a future. The seminar was held in Pavia, on 
occasion of Chomsky’s visit to the Institute of Advanced Study (IUSS) on 
September 15th, 2012, and was based on questions proposed by graduate and 
undergraduate students and reorganized by the staff of the IUSS Center 
for Neurolinguistics and Theoretical Syntax (NeTS). We thank for this the 
NeTS and the IUSS (http://www.nets.iusspavia.it/), and we welcome them as 
scientific partner of our Research Centre PERSONA.
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The following pages are devoted to an attempt to examine Andrew Meltzoff’s discoveries 
concerning neonatal imitation in the light of Husserl’s discussion of Fremderfahrung. 
We criticise Meltzoff’s explanatory model AIM (Active Intermodal Mapping), which 
is introduced to account for his empirical findings, for two main reasons. First, the AIM 
model does not seem to properly reconcile the vindication of the intermodal character 
of imitation with the idea that early imitation is based on organ identification: these 
two claims seem to be reconcilable only at the cost of sacrificing the active, non reflex-
like character of imitation. Secondly, the account of AIM does not fit in with the ordinary 
first-person experience of adult imitation. In its stead we propose a different explanatory 
approach, which is consistent with a basic phenomenology of imitation and does not 
depend on organ identification, but on the “rhythmic resonance” of gestures.
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISCUSSION  
OF EARLY IMITATION
ANDREA ZHOK
Università degli Studi di Milano
andrea.zhok@unimi.it
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The question of intersubjectivity in Husserl’s thought is one of the most 
important and controversial issues in phenomenological debate. At the same 
time, the question of intersubjectivity, with special reference to empathy and 
imitation, has been the object of cognitive science analyses, some of which 
have also received the attention of the general public. Our aim in the following 
pages will be to provide a discussion of a well-known scientific finding in 
the light of, and in sight of, a phenomenological approach to the question of 
intersubjectivity. There are remarkable methodological difficulties in allowing 
the naturalism embraced by cognitive sciences and the fierce antinaturalism 
of Husserlian phenomenology to interact. We will not try to properly settle 
here this intricate question, but we just intend the following analysis as a 
tentative exemplification of a phenomenological use of experimental results 
in psychology. More specifically, we will briefly re-interpret Andrew Meltzoff ’s 
experimental discoveries concerning neonatal imitation by providing them 
with a phenomenologically inspired interpretive framework, alternative to 
the one proposed by Meltzoff.
Husserl devotes great attention and thousands of manuscript pages to the 
problem of the foundation of intersubjectivity, and we cannot try to provide 
here any plausible resume of such formidable analysis. We will limit ourselves 
to recall the special role played by the question of Fremderfahrung (the 
experience of the Other). In one of the crucial theoretical steps of his analysis, 
Husserl tries to explore our primal intuition of the Other, understood as 
an alter ego, an other-subject-like-me. The leading question is: how can we 
recognise the Other, so that we can discern at the same time the Other’s 
extraneousness and the Other’s identity with the Ego that we ourselves 
are? According to Husserl we cannot have an immediate primordial access 
to the alter ego, because this would not allow for our intuition of the Other’s 
alterity: we could not distinguish the Other from ourselves. Husserl tries to 
explain our intuition of the Other by resorting to the idea of an apperception 
supported by an analogy between our body and the Other’s one (Hua I, 140-
141). Apperception in Husserlian terms is an association which pre-delineates 
the completing traits of the perceived entity. Apperception is an association 
of essential and not merely psychological character. This means, among other 
things, that the “analogy” between our body and the Other’s body cannot 
be traced back to a contingent external “resemblance”. Husserl does claim 
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that there is a kind of resemblance at the roots of the constitution of the 
“pairing” (Paarung) that supports our identification of the Other as such, but 
the nature of such resemblance is clearer as to what it is not, than with regard 
to its positive traits. It is commonly acknowledged that Husserl’s treatment 
of the issue of Fremderfahrung remains partially unfulfilled. Our present 
purpose is to see if it is possible to draw from known empirical investigations 
some suggestions relevant to that Husserlian problem, while preserving the 
methodological constraints that phenomenology requires.
Over the last thirty years Andrew Meltzoff and colleagues have produced a series 
of pathbreaking studies, which have deeply influenced our understanding of 
children’s imitation. Meltzoff’s experiments have shown that a sort of imitative 
process, which we will call proto-imitation, can be found even in neonates few 
hours after birth; such imitation concerns also gestures, like tongue protrusion, 
which do not allow any visual coupling of the gesture to be imitated with the 
imitating one (in the absence of mirrors).
The most crucial experiments devised by Meltzoff et al. (1977; 1979; 1983) 
show what follows: after the display of some gestures (tongue protrusion, lips 
protrusion, mouth opening, and, to older infants, finger movements and side 
movements of the head) a majority of newborns were showing a greater amount 
of repetitions of the displayed gesture than of other gestures. For instance, 
in an experiment where the experimenter alternately performed sessions 
of tongue protrusions (TP) and mouth openings (MO), the infants were 
performing more often MO than TP in the MO session (on average 7.1 vs. 5.4), 
and they were more often performing TP than MO in the TP session (9.9 vs. 6.5) 
(Meltzoff and Moore 1983, 705). Also the duration of the infant’s gestures was 
correspondingly greater for the displayed ones than for the others (ibid. 706). 
These results may appear weak, because of their merely statistical consistency, 
but thenceforth they have been repeated many times, by different researchers 
and with further methodological caveats. It is important to note that the 
displayed gestures (TP and MO) belong to the ones that newborn infants 
spontaneously perform. Therefore, the relevant imitation does not produce the 
institution ex novo of an unfamiliar gesture after an exemplification. What 
happens is rather conceivable as the summoning of a propriocepted gesture 
by means of a visually perceived gesture. These experimental results must be 
qualified by the following limitations:
1. Most infants are always producing some (even wholly 
incongruous) responses and, in a minority of cases, even responses 
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akin to the alternative exemplification (e.g., TP responses  
to MO examples). 
2. The responses of the newborns are not immediately emerging in 
an accomplished fashion, but are gradually approximating a clearer 
and clearer replication over the course of the experiment. 
3. Many infants (more than 60%) do not respond at all or interrupt 
their responsive involvement, because of greater urges, in the course 
of the experiment.
As Meltzoff notices, the looseness in responding (1 and 3) and the apparent 
dependence on learning (2) are incompatible with responses governed by 
fixed action patterns or reflexes. Responses do not appear to be “ballistically” 
triggered  from appropriate stimuli. Unlike reflexes like the palmar grasp 
reflex and the sucking one, the working of proto-imitation rather seems to 
show the character of a primitive response of “sociability”, requiring a relaxed 
situation and an exploratory attitude.
At this point Meltzoff tries to provide a causal explanatory account of the 
mentioned experimental outcomes. He does so by resorting to an explanatory 
model called Active Intermodal Mapping (AIM), whose general traits are the 
following:
[I]mitation is a matching-to-target process. The active nature of the matching 
process is captured by the proprioceptive feedback loop. The loop allows infants’ 
motor performance to be evaluated against the seen target and serves as a basis 
for correction. According to this view, the perceived and produced human acts 
are coded within a common (supramodal) framework which enables infants to 
detect equivalences between their own acts and ones they see. (Meltzoff and 
Moore 1997, 180)
These general traits of the AIM seem to be required by the descriptive basis 
of the experiment: the idea that proto-imitation is a “matching-to-target” 
process is supported by the fact that apparently proto-imitative acts 
progressively approximate to the exemplified ones. And the supramodal 
dimension to which proto-imitative acts must refer is required by the 
fact that apparently imitation can take place between gestures belonging 
to different sense modalities (e.g. vision and proprioception). As we will 
see, this part of Meltzoff ’s proposal is consistent with phenomenological 
descriptions. But Meltzoff goes beyond this explanatory level. He tries 
to discern the “core mechanism” of imitation by postulating a system of 
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“organ identification” active at birth. The idea is that the newborn is able 
to identify her own body parts as “corresponding” to the Other’s parts 
and limbs. This idea is introduced by Meltzoff in order to explain both 
the general transmodal ability to imitate and the appearance that babies 
sometimes start the imitating process just by activating the relevant body 
part (e.g. unspecific activation of the tongue in imitation of TP) (Meltzoff 
and Moore 1997, 183). And how is supposed such organ identification to take 
place? Meltzoff formulates two hypotheses. The first one is that organs are 
innately identified on the basis of their form, which we are evolutionarily 
predisposed to recognise. This hypothesis is suggested by the apparently 
analogous discovery that neonates are innately sensitive to human faces, 
that is, to general face-like configurations. This option is the one that 
Meltzoff prefers and is also an interpretation that has been later endorsed 
by Shaun Gallagher (2005) in support of his idea of “body schema”. An 
alternative option mentioned by Meltzoff is that organs could be identified 
through their unique spatiotemporal pattern of movement (“kinetic 
signature”): the ways in which tongues, fingers or arms respectively move 
have specific kinematic constraints that may be sufficient to identity each 
organ.
At this point, we have to observe in passing that the explanatory proposal 
that Meltzoff embraces (the first hypothesis) departs from any possible 
consistency with phenomenological analyses. The reason for this departure is 
the naturalistic assumption that in the last instance explanations must take 
the form of a reduction to spatiotemporal causes. Meltzoff rightly remarks 
that imitation must take place at a supramodal level (that is, at a level common 
to different sensuous modalities), but then he takes for granted that the roots 
of both modal and supramodal levels must be causally traced back to events in 
physical space (brain mechanisms). Husserlian phenomenology would object 
that spatial determinations as such are not modally innocent, since they are 
constituted with reference to specific modal acts (visual and tactile kinestheses). 
Insofar as we assume that spatiality and causality are beyond the scope of 
experiential constitution, we just enrol in the mainstream naturalistic club.
But this observation is wholly internal to the phenomenological horizon 
and is destined to sound unconvincing to naturalistically oriented ears. 
Let us therefore try to show the limits of Meltzoff ’s explanatory proposal 
from within. Let us take his first option: here imitation as a matching-to-
target should be guided by organ identification, which in his view implies 
the identification of forms and relations between forms. He calls such innately 
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cued responses “organ relation (OR) end states”: they are the propriocepted 
innate responses that correlate with visual configurations like tongue-to-
lips, tongue-between lips, etc. (Meltzoff and Moore 1997, 184). Here however 
we have a problem: how can the identification of seen and propriocepted 
organs (or OR end states) be conceived if they are all to be considered 
“forms”? Such “forms” cannot be visual (spatial) forms, as the mentioned 
case of the neonatal recognition of faces might misleadingly suggest. But if 
they are not forms in a visual sense, how else should we understand their 
formal nature? If we look for supramodal roots of protoimitation, the model 
of the inborn sensitivity to facial traits is inapplicable. Such forms cannot 
unilaterally belong to any single modal dimension.
But could we not just say that some visual forms are simply able to prompt 
appropriate propriocepted responses? Could we not just suppose that unknown 
evolutionary developments led our organism to produce appropriate couplings 
between different modal percepts like seen OR end states and propriocepted 
OR end states, and that there is nothing more to ask? Of course we could, but it 
is not what we need either to account for Meltzoff’s findings or to account for 
the mature forms of imitation that we experience in the first person. Inborn 
immediate coupling of responses is pertinent to physiological reflexes, but 
could not support the active and generative character of imitation. There is no 
doubt, as Husserl has often argued, that we rely on countless passive responses 
that are not in the power of our conscious activity, but ordinary imitation is an 
activity guided by an attempt to approximate a target, and such target cannot 
be the particular sensuous exemplification that we have in front of our eyes. It must 
be a supramodal or transmodal type. Strangely enough, although Meltzoff is 
perfectly aware of the necessity to resort to a dimension of active representation 
in order to account for imitation, he does not see that an innate coupling of 
organs (or OR end states) would never provide such a dimension: even if the 
visual appearance of eyes, tongue or lips would elicit immediate activation of 
eyes, tongue or lips, this could not account for the imitation of gestures. Inborn 
organ identification of a kind may be an initial cue that eases early imitation, 
but cannot explain imitation and much the less can support the recognition of 
Otherness. In fact, it is precisely the focus on organ identification that seems 
to be misplaced. While it is well possible that some reflex responses contribute 
to an early bodily orientation in some newborns (recall that the majority of 
babies subjected to the experiments do not provide results, either positive 
or negative), immediate matching of seen and felt organs (or organ relations) 
cannot support the imitation of gestures. 
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Meltzoff ’s idea seems to be that a series of identifications of relative position 
between organs (OR end states) could work somehow like dots to be connected 
by pencil: if I proprioceptively know what corresponds to visual tongue-in-
mouth and tongue-between-lips, then I could perform imitation as drawing 
a line between such end points. But this idea, in the absence of essential 
supplements, would be clearly inadequate: if the relevant “dots” are reflex 
responses, they do not take place in any unitary representational space, as dots on 
paper would do. This means that we have no guide telling us how to “fill the 
gap” between reflex responses (which, by assumption, display correlations 
between visual events and propriocepted ones), because such responses 
just do not belong to a common representational space: in the experiential 
“content” of my eye-blinking and of my knee-jerk respectively there is nothing 
that posits them in specific spatial relations, which can be attributed only by 
reflecting on my body image. Meltzoff, it must be noted, is apparently aware of 
this problem and thinks that such “connective tissue” between innately cued 
spots could be originally provided by “body babbling”, by which he means the 
spontaneous repetitive motion of limbs and facial organs that babies produce 
even before birth. Body babbling should enable the subject to learn how to 
connect the propriocepted innate responses (“OR end states”) with each other 
and with spontaneous muscular activity so that a kind of body map obtains. 
This reasonable hypothesis, however, shifts the weight of the argument from 
the role of innate responses to that of the proprioception of spontaneous 
muscular activity (“kinaestheses”, Husserl would say).
Indeed, if the problem is the one of the transition from the perception of the Other’s 
body to the proprioceptive awareness of my body, the idea of an innate mechanism 
producing a static mapping of visual positions to propriocepted positions does not 
do. This model would give priority to the replication of static configurations, which 
in Meltzoff’s own experiments appear to be the exception, rather than the norm. 
But this model appears to be especially awkward if we consider our first-person 
experience of imitation, which is after all the ground from which we draw the 
intuition that neonates may be producing proto-imitative acts.
What happens when we, as adults, try to imitate a facial expression? Except 
for professionals who may train in front of a mirror, the majority of people 
are able to immediately grasp a sort of “overall style” of the expression and 
to reproduce it, even if they do not have any idea about how their face looks. 
Actually, if our imitative attempts are shown to us (they were filmed, say) 
we are often baffled by how our face looks. The same could be seen in the 
imitation of dance steps: uneasiness aside, we can easily imitate the general 
style of the dance, the rhythm of moves, their lightness or tension, etc. without 
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any specific awareness of the precise position of our feet, of the lines that we 
are following, etc. True enough, this primary level of imitation can lead to 
outcomes sadly distant from the model, as any amateur dancer can recognise 
with the merciless help of a mirror; nevertheless something essential has 
been grasped and can be recognised by others. It is important to observe that 
this stylistic or rhythmic factor can be recognised and transposed even in the 
absence of any organ identification. We can imitate even the joyful attitude of a 
tail-wagging dog, although no obvious matching of organs is available. We can 
imitate human, animal and even inanimate motions with limbs that do not 
belong to the model to be imitated. And our tentative dancing movements can 
spontaneously coordinate with musical features in an instance of supramodal 
“imitation”. It seems that there is an imbalance between the spontaneity 
with which mature imitation can relate to the rhythm/style of perceived 
motion and the difficulty in picturing to ourselves where our bodily parts and 
what their spatial relations are. In the following this “rhytmic” or “stylistic” 
dimension will be named rythmòs, after the ancient Greek term, which has 
an appropriately comprehensive meaning including ordinary rhythm, 
proportion and style of patterns; (for an extensive discussion on rythmòs see 
Zhok 2012, 123 et seq.).
Coming back to Meltzoff ’s hypotheses, we should ask whether the second 
hypothesis that he formulates, without subscribing to it, is more satisfactory. 
This option implies that organ identification would be obtained by detecting 
not forms but “kinetic signatures”. This idea relies on the discovery of the 
peculiar human sensitivity to biological motions, whose multifarious features 
are recognised with spontaneity and surprising swiftness (Johansson 1973). 
This idea, however, does not seem to be adequately exploited by Meltzoff, who 
is pursuing organ identification as a necessary step towards early imitation. 
Indeed, it is conceivable that the “kinetic signature” of some gestures is 
characteristic enough to lead to the supramodal recognition of specific 
body parts. This is especially possible if we think that newborn infants 
have a limited repertoire of propriocepted gestures in their command and 
therefore do not need to perform many refined distinctions in order to find 
correspondences between seen and propriocepted gestures. The pre- and post-
natal body babbling involves few stereotypies and this means that the child 
does not need a high level of discrimination in order to discern, for instance, 
MO from TP. Two problems, however, remain: first, this would not amount to 
organ identification, but to gesture identification (with incidental identification 
of the relevant organs), and second, if the correspondence is still read as an 
immediate elicitation of specific organ activation, then we remain closer to 
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reflex responses rather than to active imitation. Nevertheless, the analysis of 
early imitation in terms of a kinetic correspondence between gestures opens 
up a new and more promising view on imitation and its tie to empathy.
It must be noted that the “kinetic identity” between perceived and 
propriocepted gesture must not properly concern movement as it is ordinarily 
understood. Although in the third person (i.e., for objective representation) 
the gestures that I perform and experience in the first person can be described 
as motions (i.e. changes of position over time), they are not propriocepted by 
me as something taking place in objective space and time. This means that 
the propriocepted gesture does not have ordinary “motion” in common with 
the perceived gesture. But then what do they have in common? We must take 
seriously the demand that the dimension where imitative matching can take 
place be supramodal. The representational space where motions are placed is 
inescapably tied to visual aspects (motions are represented as events in an ideal 
visual field), whereas our disposition to “feel in resonance” with seen gestures 
does not belong to such representational space: we can spontaneously perceive 
the “similarity” between the lowering pitch of a whistle and the approaching 
trajectory of a falling object. Such similarity is no exterior congruence of 
sensuous traits. Seen motions, propriocepted muscular activations and 
unfolding sounds can have in common a “way of changing”, an instance of 
rythmòs, to which we must not attribute any particular sensuous aspect: it 
does not occupy either a visual space or a tactile space or any other sensuously 
qualified dimension, since its “substance” is rather a temporal form. It must be 
noted that a truly supramodal dimension is necessarily superindividual: it 
must be possibly valid for an indefinite plurality of sensuous instantiations. 
Furthermore, it should be stressed that rythmòs must also be a motivating 
dimension, in the sense that instances of rythmòs are apparently salient for the 
newborn perceiver, whose corresponding gestures are called forth.
A notion like a supramodal motivating rythmòs can account for the early 
imitative response better than any organ identification, which can be either 
derived from the correspondence between instances of rythmòs (as “kinetic 
signatures”), or attributed to inborn reflex-like cues inessential to the 
imitative process. From this point of view some of the results of Meltzoff ’s 
experiments become more easily interpretable. 
As we said above, many newborn babies did provide apparent responses to 
the exemplified gestures, even if they were the “wrong” answers. But, if we 
take organ identification to be explanatorily prior and dynamic gesture 
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correspondence to be a secondary achievement derived from the former, 
then responses that get the pertinent organs wrong (TP instead of MO) are 
not exactly what one would expect. On the contrary, if we reckon that at 
first babies respond to instances of rythmòs as such (primarily conceivable 
as biological motion), we can account for the “statistic” trend toward proper 
matching of gestures. The majority of babies respond just to instances of 
rythmòs, and the more the corresponding process unfolds, the better some of 
them refine the dynamic pattern of their responses, down to the appearance 
of imitation proper.
The character of motivating salience of the instances of rythmòs accounts 
also much better for the paradoxical nature of imitation and empathy, such 
that we experience ourselves at the same time as identical with and different 
from the Other. What is proximately felt, what is “mine”, is rythmòs, whereas 
its contingent modal realisations are irreducibly “other”, extraneous. 
What is in common is what enables communication, primarily emotional 
communication through the style of gestures (softness, regularity, abruptness, 
violence, etc. are immediately detectable) (see Stern 2000, 48 et seq.). What 
remains ineradicably different is the specific sensuous implementation of the 
gestures as well as the relevant character of reactivity or spontaneity of each 
implementation.
Finally, the notion of rythmòs is not a mere hypothesis consistent with, but 
superimposed to, phenomenological observations: rythmòs is intuitively 
available in a plurality of phenomena which go well beyond (early or mature) 
imitation. The idea that imitation could be the primary access leading to 
empathy with the Other and her “state of minds” seems now somewhat 
misleading. Our primal access to the Other does not go either through direct 
coupling to the Other’s body parts, or through direct access to the Other’s 
feelings (in this case we would be the Other). We have direct access to the Other’s 
expressions of feeling, which are embodied in specific instances of rythmòs. In 
other terms, we need not think that we first produce a more or less faithful 
copy of the Other’s behaviour, on the basis of a structural correspondence of 
bodies, and then gain a mediate access to the meaning of the Other’s gestures. 
Rythmòs in the gestures is primarily evident and is expressively intelligible 
even in the absence of the recognition of specific body correspondences: this 
is the reason why we need no mediate introduction to grasp the expressive 
motions of animated objects in cartoons (brooms, cars, haunted houses, etc.). 
The way of moving is enough to define the object’s “emotional dispositions” 
as well as its targets and spatial orientation, even in the absence of any clear 
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reference to eyes or limbs. This perspective could be critically applied to 
theoretical views like the one recently proposed by Gallagher (2005), where 
a body schema endowed with the same structure of the average body image 
is used as explanatory key for cross-modal and intersubjective relations (see 
Zhok 2012, 202 et seq.).
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The present work pursues two main objectives. The first is to pinpoint, by means of a 
series of philosophical arguments, the meaning of the word “norm” and, specifically, to 
explain the tension between normality and normativity in detail. The second, closely 
related to the former, hinges on Merleau-Ponty’s personality, and aims at putting the 
“space” of the norm and the key notion of normality in a new form, starting from some 
essential elements of his writing. This effort is particularly significant in The structure 
of Behavior, Phenomenology of Perception and in The Primacy of Perception and 
its Philosophical Consequences. 
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The starting point for our dissections is an essay entitled Normalité et normativité. 
Entre phénoménologie et structuralisme, written by Bernhard Waldenfels, one of the 
most important living exponents of phenomenology. In this essay Waldenfels 
discusses the question of the norm on the basis of the pair normal/normativity:
le terme “norme” originariament destiné à dénoter un instrument de mesure, 
un cordeau ou une équerre dont se sert l’architecte, se divise en “normalité” et 
“normativité”. Les deux termes se ressemblent fortement, comment peut-on 
alors expliquer leur différence? Depuis Hume ou Kant, on tend à concevoir la 
normalité comme un complexe de règles descriptives, et la normativité comme 
un complexe de règles presciptives. Les unes portent sur des questions de fait, 
les autres sur des questions de droit. Le comportement humain est soumis aux 
deux dimensions: normalité et normativité (Waldenfels 2005)1.
In Waldenfels’s opinion, such an alleged antinomy between normality 
and normativity succumbs to two serious failings. The first concerns the 
incarnation of the norms, the second concerns their genesis. On the one hand, 
what is omitted is the entrenchment of each norm in the world of life: the 
norms become incarnated as habits, usages, and customs. What comes out is 
consequently not assessed as right or wrong, good or bad, functional or not 
functional, but as convenient or inconvenient. On the other hand, what is 
left out is the fact that norms cannot exist unless they have been learned and 
appropriated, and that they therefore originate through a genesis revealing 
itself, to some extent, as an event of Stiftung (foundation), even if the latter 
settles into a pre-history of which no trace can be found anymore. 
A similar position is presented by Norberto Bobbio, notably in his 
formulation of the entry Judicial Norm in Bompiani Encyclopedia of 1964, 
where the Italian philosopher of law describes the relationship between the 
categories of judicial normativity and of normality as follows:
Del significato comune di “norma”, come del resto di “regola”, sono elementi 
1 “The term ‘norm’ originally denotes a measuring instrument, such as the cord or the 
square that is used by architects. The ‘norm’ is divided in both ‘normality’ and ‘normativity’. 
These two are very similar. So what are the differences between them? Following Hume and 
Kant, normality is conceived as a plethora of descriptive rules, and normativity as a complex 
of prescriptive rules. The descriptive rules lead to questions of fact, whereas the prescripted 
ones lead to questions of law. Human behavior is subject to two dimensions: normality and 
normativity”.
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caratteristici, rispetto alla funzione, il fine prescrittivo (donde viene l’aggettivo 
“normativo”); rispetto al contenuto, la tipicità del comportamento (donde 
viene l’aggettivo “normale”). Una norma è, si potrebbe dire, una proposizione 
normativa che tende a riconoscere e stabilire un comportamento normale: il 
carattere della normatività riguarda il fine, quello della normalità il risultato 
(Bobbio 1994)2.
Even if a distinction is made between normative--all that relates to the 
purpose of the norm--and normal--all that concerns the content and the 
effect of the norm--in Bobbio’s definition the relationship between the 
categories of normal and of normative is manifest: every judicial norm 
“tends to identify and establish a normal behaviour”. Therefore, every 
norm seems to imply a normality, pre-existing and giving legitimacy to 
the same norm: the normativity of the normal. Likewise, every norm sets 
the conditions of normality, “normalizing” the receivers’ behaviours: 
the normality of the normative. Nonetheless, a problem arises from this 
context.
Normality is one of the most difficult-to-define and most polyhedric of 
concepts, and certainly one among those which have given rise to the 
most heated debates. It is a tricky and ambiguous notion, surrounded by 
an aura of social dangerousness, because it can easily spread pressures, 
inhibitions, and discrimination within a community. The fact that in the 
deconstructionist and post-modern ambit the pluralistic perspectivism 
of “discursive formation” and language games has prevailed over “meta-
narratives” and over the establishments made of universal and eternal 
truths, has progressively led to condemnations and attempts at total 
elimination of the concept of normality, meant as an instrument of power 
and of oppression, of the institutional and established power - the ruling 
class - and as the different, the dissident, the Other (Foucault 1970; 
Lyotard 1984). 
On the contrary, everyday language has continued to resort to 
substantives and adjectives referring to normality, being evidently 
legitimated by the existence in the common view of the world of 
something matching the notion of normality, beyond any theorization 
and ideology. 
Referring to language as the legitimating foundation of normality may 
2  “The common understanding of ‘norm’ and ‘rule’ is characterized by prescription regarding 
its function (from where the adjective ‘normative’ derives), and by the typicality of the behavior 
regarding its content (from where the adjective ‘normal” derives). One could say that ‘norm’ 
must be intended as a normative proposition that tends to recognize and establish a normal 
behavior: normativity is linked to its aim; normality pertains to its result”.
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seem quite risky because of the imprecision and ambiguities its use 
reveals. The adjective normal and the substantive norm, from which the 
former comes, have, in different contexts and perspectives, completely 
different meanings. In Italian, for instance, the word norm shifts from 
the most settled use, namely the ethical and juridical one as rule, to the 
medical one as physiological standard meaning, e.g., “to be up to/below 
standard”, to the social one as usage and custom. The adjective normal 
wavers in a wide semantic range, according to the context in which it is 
used, as synonymous with clear, logical, right, habitual, coherent, customary, 
usual, common, and natural. Nonetheless, beneath this multivalence it is 
possible to trace a common characteristic of the different meanings, all 
together describing an attitude clearly based on a mutual and shared logic, 
which occurs almost regularly. 
The concept of normality concerns the behavioural relationship between 
the subject and the environment, or rather between the subject and 
the world, and in the subject-world polarity the norm that determines 
normality takes shape.
Therefore, it can be supposed that the problem of normality and of its 
elusiveness lies concealed in the subject-world dualism that derives from 
the dualism of the Cartesian subject. As a consequence, it is necessary 
to reconsider the concept of normality on the basis of the supersession 
of the Cartesian dualism and on the basis of a notion that reintegrates 
the subject and the world into an organic whole and redefines them 
in relation to one another. In considering all of this, light will be cast 
on some themes of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, pointing out their salient 
characteristics, to find the necessary elements to answer to the question 
we have hereby raised: what is a norm? What is normality? In what way 
can we talk about it?
Leaving aside for the moment the observations made by Merleau-
Ponty in The Structure of Behaviour and Phenomenology of Perception, it is 
important to focus in the first place on another crucial passage of his 
work, thus making the questions we are discussing come out even more 
drastically. 
On November 23, 1946, Merleau-Ponty gave a lecture at the Société 
française de Philosophie, wherein he illustrated the outcomes described in 
Phenomenology of Perception, which he had published the year before. The 
text of this report, together with the transcript of the heated debate it 
sparked, was later published under the title The Primacy of Perception and 
its Philosophical Consequences (Merleau-Ponty 1964). 
1.2 
Where is 
the Norm?
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The thesis of Merleau-Ponty is firm: “The perceived world is always the 
presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value, and all existence. 
This thesis does not destroy either rationality or the absolute. It only 
tries to bring them down to earth” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 13).
It is a thesis which is even more relevant now than it was at that time. What 
is at stake is a kind of philosophy which is able to relate that which is human 
without relinquishing what makes him human, namely “rationality and the 
absolute”. This really is a current matter for at least two reasons. 
On the one hand, because the naturalism of cognitive science and 
biotechnology has really tried to “bring” the human being “down to 
earth”, but at the price of stripping him of everything that makes him 
human. According to classical cognitive science, in fact, thought is an 
immaterial and abstract calculation, while according to biotechnologies 
it is some kind of effect resulting from the human genome. In both the 
cases, it is manifest that no space is left for the human, at least as it has 
been conceived from the Greek age until now.
On the other hand, the lecture of Merleau-Ponty is useful since 
it perfectly depicts the problems each materialism has posed: its 
formulation, in and of itself, shows it clearly when taking on the strange 
task of “bringing” the human world “down to earth”. Now, such a 
demand can be put forward only if it is believed that that world, itself, 
would f loat and be unrelated to real life. In Merleau-Ponty’s opinion it 
is precisely so: the human world needs a foundation and this foundation 
cannot be other than “the perceived world”, the world of body and 
of its senses. “We can only think the world because we have already 
experienced it; it is through this experience that we have the idea of 
being, and it is through this experience that the words ‘rational’ and 
‘real’ receive a sense simultaneously” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 17).
The statements by Merleau-Ponty, anyway, face an apparently 
insuperable problem: if my body is the basis and the unit of 
measurement of my experiences, and contrariwise your body is the 
basis and the unit of measurement of your experiences, how can we 
succeed in creating a common world where we can meet, discuss, 
produce science, etc., if science, ethics and everyday experience assume 
the existence of a common and collective world, the existence of an 
objective world? 
It is exactly what one of the participants in Merleau-Ponty’s lecture, 
Bréhier, commented on from an ethical point of view: “the other is 
‘reciprocable to me’ by reason of a universal norm. Where is your 
norm?” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 31). To be able to consider the other as 
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someone having his own rights, as someone whose point of view is as 
valid as mine, I have to manage to detach myself from my body and to 
think of my perspective as equal to his within a universal and objective 
norm, which is neither mine nor his. How does Merleau-Ponty reply 
to this criticism? Depreciating the universality of the norm in the 
relativism of the norms: “there is no given universality; there is only a 
presumptive universality” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 31). 
The fact that the norm can change and sometimes indeed has to change 
does not mean that a norm cannot be objective; a subjective norm is no 
more a norm. But if it is objective, how can it find its foundation in a 
subjective body?
From this question, you can get to the bottom of Merleau-Ponty’s works.
The definition of the subject and of his relation with the world is gradually 
developed in Merleau-Ponty’s works, through many phases which follow 
each other, overlap, and merge into one other. 
The first phase is closely related to the influence of K. Goldstein. Goldstein’s 
studies on subjects affected by neuromotor disorders highlight a unitary 
system of distinction with progressive levels of disintegration of the 
behaviour within an organism conceived as a living totality (structure) 
inseparable from its environment. In this perspective, disease is defined 
as loss of liberty with respect to the environment, impotence in escaping 
from fortuitous circumstances and from their drives, and, consequently, in 
projecting oneself into the future. 
In The Structure of Behaviour Goldstein’s themes cross with Husserl’s 
phenomenology and with Gestaltpsychologie. The criticism of Husserl’s 
pure consciousness and absolute subjectivity, based on the irreducibility 
of body, leads Merleau-Ponty to reformulate the consciousness-world 
relation starting from corporeality and perception, meant as the initial 
relationship between consciousness and the world, beyond the antithesis 
between idealism and empiricism. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis goes beyond 
the subject-world couple to consider behaviour as the initial unitary 
phenomenon where the subject and the world are continuously grasped one 
after the other. The Gestalt influence allows him to formulate a definition 
of behaviour as structure; in other words, as a totality equipped with an 
internal principle of diversification. 
Behaviour as structure varies according to its belonging to the organic or 
the inorganic world, on the basis of a different normative structure which is 
somehow its essence. In such an ambit, Merleau-Ponty enunciates two definitions 
of norm, both referring to the organic structure. The first one reads the norm 
2.
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as the essence of the species, namely as a system of personal constants, which 
express the ideal conditions of relationship to the environment and of activity: 
an experienced norm which corresponds to one’s own being. The second one 
reads the norm as the biological a priori of an individual: “by ‘norm’ here one does 
not mean a ‘should be’ which world make it be, it is the simple observation of a 
preferred attitude statistically more frequent, which gives a new kind of unity to 
behavior” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 159).
In The Structure of Behaviour the concept of norm is meant as the structure 
by means of which the behavioural constants of an organism appear to 
an observer. Or, in Goldstein’s words, the norm is the structure; in Husserl’s 
words, the norm is the style of behaviour. As a result, it can be asserted 
that the perception and the observation of a subject “X” have to reveal the 
structure of his behaviour, that is, his norm. In phenomenological terms, 
it may be defined as some kind of eidetic reduction: in this sense it can be 
maintained that the norm of behaviour of “X” is the essence of “X”, caught 
through perception and based on the certainty of the cognitive act, whose 
actuality is direct. Anyway, it is important to specify that it is not only 
defining the norm of “X” but the norm of his behaviour, according to a 
course already followed by Jaspers, Binswanger and Minkowsky.
This means that the norm, far from being an abstract, fixed and immutable 
behavioural parameter, takes on its sense only in connection with a 
“ground”, that is to say, with an environmental condition, and defines the 
best adaptation possible of man to the environment and, consequently, his 
ideal living conditions. Then, the fulfilment of the norm should lead to a 
satisfying relationship with the environment and to the adoption of the so-
called--by Goldstein--“privileged behaviours”. 
To the extent that human behaviour is characterized by the supremacy 
of the symbolic form--which organizes and involves the other forms in its 
dialectic, thus giving them peculiar sense and significance--its particular 
way of being in the world is essentially marked by transcendence. The norm 
of human behaviour, in fact, does not consist in merely searching for a stable 
equilibrium with the environment. Rather it is, indeed, seeking for something 
which still is not, for some kind of striving for the virtual, for an effort which 
is at the same time power of denial and transformation of the real, and which 
is vehiculated by a symbolizing and conceptualising power, going hand-in-
hand with the integration of spiritual activity with corporal activity. 
This initial structural definition of norm, transpiring from the pages of the 
first work of Merleau-Ponty, finds a better and more extensive elaboration in 
his Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty 1962). The phenomenological 
2.2 
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analysis of perception puts the pre-reflective aspect of the existence into 
the foreground, thus localizing the latter in a broader behavioural norm 
including both the dialectic of forms, so the body-soul integration, and the 
world-consciousness-work dialectic, which, in The Structure of Behaviour, is 
considered as a privileged behaviour of man. As a result, the norm, far from 
disregarding its structural characteristic, starts out to become the essential 
structure appropriate to embrace the whole variety of the Erlebnisse, on the 
general ground of being-in-the-world. Let us have a look at this more closely.
The common feature of the pathological behaviours examined by Merleau-
Ponty is the loss of the categorial function, namely, in a few words, the 
loss of the symbolic-virtual openness to the world. In this case the subject 
has shrunk away and positioned himself on a private behavioural norm 
of a “minority” kind, where the structure of transcendence is blocked or 
invalidated. This means that the whole “capability of disposing of a past, a 
present, and a future” is nullified, that is to say, that the transcendence of 
the empirical subject to the world is stricken, together with all the essential 
structures relating to it: intentionality, perception, cogito, it’s own pre-
history as open and retrievable control over body workability.  
Basically, next to the temporality-transcendence, the very essence of the 
subject has been hit, which leads us to conclude that temporality is the 
fundamental norm of human behaviour and is defined as temporal style, and 
that normality consists in human behaviour taking place according to the 
structure of temporality. 
The “normal” disposal of temporality means offers of chances, multiplicity 
of worlds and of horizons, and fluent integration of the past with the future 
in a present which is the operational grip of a body exactly on the world. 
The block of temporality thus signifies the destructuring of the present, 
not a pure and simple blockage of the future, as suggested by Minkowsky, 
but the sticking of existence to a behavioural arrangement which cannot 
be defined as normal in any way and whose most essential feature is being 
apraxic. The normal subject in his deep structure is, as we are attempting 
to demonstrate, an I can, namely an active subject, mainly defined by a 
working intentionality and a pragmatic openness. In this sense a behaviour 
being chronically apraxic must be considered far from the style of the 
normal behaviour. Moreover, further to the disgregation of temporality, a 
destructuring of personality and a fragmentation of the subject occur. 
Assuming the temporal style of existence as norm generates a structural 
notion of norm, which does not determine the content of the behaviour but 
its how. Set down like so, the norm can govern the individual-environment 
relationship, in each variation in its own terms, without having a specific 
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content, and can express the sense organising at the same time the life of 
a species, of a collectivity or of a single man, all of them being structures. 
Through this perspective, the question of the temporality of the norm has to 
be coped with, wondering if it is eternal and immutable or historic. 
The norm, devoid of content, invariable in its expressions of the temporality 
of the subject, on each occasion takes on the content required by the 
situation. So it is what changes, even though always remaining the same. 
What varies is the way in which behaviour expresses the norm, this relation 
defining the normality. The norm is therefore atemporal, it being structure. 
Nevertheless, since it also conveys the sense of a behaviour, the norm cannot 
dodge the reference to the fortuitous situation in which this sense expresses 
itself and the relation such a sense has with the general sense of the world. 
Normality in this meaning is outlined according to the ambiguous aspect of 
temporality, as intersection of what is historic and what is atemporal, thus 
defining two axes of normality: the first (atemporal) is one of individual 
disposal of temporality; the second (historic) is one of articulation of the 
sense of the individual behaviour within the general sense of the world, one 
of the gears of individual time in collective time. The latter makes us refer 
to the inter-subjective dimension and to the central question of normality. 
Every subjective paradigm of normality has to find confirmation in the 
intersubjective dimension, as in the same way the individual norm cannot 
be flattened into the environmental norm. The judgement of normality is at 
the same time judgement of the individual on himself and judgement of the 
other on the individual, articulated synchronically and diachronically. 
Particularly on this last topic we can observe that as a matter of fact, 
following the pathway of Merleau-Ponty more closely, it can be noticed 
that the supersession of the Cartesian subject based on the notion of 
body precisely opens at once, according to the author, an intersubjective 
dimension which leaves out any sort of solipsism. Man finds himself, 
among other men, as already given in the world, and his perception 
discovers typicalities similar to his ones. Subjects set up, with one 
another, a working knowledge, where a common way of experiencing the 
world is expressed. Communication is behavioural and is immediately 
understood by the perception of the others.
The body of the other, by virtue of its symbolizing power, is significant and 
reveals itself as a cultural object, and it is just for this reason that perception 
can perform an intentional transgression with regard to it, thus avoiding 
intellectual mediation and thereby winning access to the sphere of the other. 
The intersubjective relationship has always lain in an interworld, it being the 
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place of meeting of two ipseities that disclose themselves in a reciprocity of 
styles, rhythms, and time. Said reciprocity is not an absolute transparency, 
but an initial possibility of communication and immediate understanding, on 
which the possibility of speech and dialogue itself is based.
The relation between ego and alter-ego bursts on the scene of the common 
world, where both have always been involved and have always met, and 
demands a necessary character. This is a physical and social world, full of 
collective cultural meanings in which anyone can cooperate in creating and 
destroying. In this socio-cultural world, which is man’s “natural” world, 
non-material beings can be found. Said beings originate in the interworld as 
world validities having a universal value and which, belonging to the they, go 
beyond the individual in space and time and preconsciously live with him as 
modes of (co)existence. 
In this ground of settled and experienced validities, the subject’s 
evaluative and interpretative approach, from which he derives his 
parameters and his legitimacy of judgement, has put down its roots. 
And it is right on this ground that the question of normality has to be 
brought back and placed, if the ambiguities that usually characterize 
it are to be extirpated. Every objective definition of normality is given 
as ambiguous and paradoxical, due to the fact that its parameter is 
the world’s pre-logical logos, materialized in the they and not in the 
commensurate evaluations of any science. 
The normal is the pre-reflective and normality, thought as pre-reflectivity, 
cannot be caught by means of the scientific objectifying instruments of 
thought, but it manifests itself surrounded by an aura of ambiguity in the 
first step of perception. This perception is not an arbitrary intuition.
One’s own personal history as experience, the history of the other as 
behaviour, and the social history as typical of the human behaviour converge 
in the perception of normality and are grafted onto the validity of the 
normality as an intersubjectively-determined value.
Perception throws open for us the door onto the existence of the other 
through his body; what the abnormal individual expresses through his 
behaviour is his constraint in a private world and his impossibility of 
communication, whereas his body openly communicates what he would 
rather not reveal. Who stands in front of us is not the inhabitant of 
an unknown world, but an exile from our world. His own existence is 
globally connoted by a kind of suffering which has nothing in common 
with the ordinary trials we are used to feeling, even thought in their 
worst forms; it is a radical and incommunicable suffering. Such suffering 
is incommunicable, but not totally incomprehensible from the outside. 
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The possibility of understanding an abnormal form of existence is left 
open by the common world foundation, which binds individuals together, 
and by the willingness to “get in the game” and take on the “centrifugal” 
norm of the abnormal behaviour. This possibility of getting in the 
game does not disconcert my being in the world. An abnormal form of 
existence cannot put our world at stake completely, since it represents 
but a minority form. Rather, when we get in the game to understand this 
form of passing existence, we reassert our possibility of transcending its 
constraint. 
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Andrea Westlund’s account of love involves lovers becoming Plural Subjects mirroring 
Margaret Gilbert’s Plural Subject Theory. However, while for Gilbert the creation of a plural 
will involves individuals jointly committing to pool their wills and this joint pool directly 
normatively constraining those individuals, Westlund, in contrast, sees the creation of a 
plural will as a ongoing process and she rejects the possibility of such direct normative 
constraint. This rejection appears to be required to explain the flexibility that allows for a 
central place for reciprocity in loving relationships. However, this paper argues against the 
existence of such flexibility and presents instead the case that variance in the normative 
pain of rebelling against the collective will should be understood by replacing Gilbert’s 
notion of all-or-nothing pooling of wills with an account that sees wills as becoming 
entangled through levels of identification with the plural subject.
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“Whenever infatuation begins, if given the opportunity 
it transforms itself into a continuing romantic love .... 
With this continuing romantic love it feels 
to the two people that they have united to form 
a new entity in the world, what might be called a we.”
 (Nozick 1995,  232)
Two strangers kissing on a hedonistic night out drinking may well remain 
nothing more than lustful individuals, however on many accounts of love 
(such as that of Robert Nozick quoted above) moving beyond such initial 
stages of desire involves becoming united in some real sense; a move from 
a mere set of separate Is into a combined we. Marriage might be thought to 
be the clearest form of such a move, with its formal vows and declarations, 
however such relationships are possible without legal ties and for want 
of a name I will dub this kind of  relationship a “committed romantic 
relationship”, for brevity henceforth referred to as a CRR1. Talk of becoming 
a we may well fit with our experience of love but is it literally true? Even when 
we are most deeply in love  we remain distinct biological entities; never 
actually becoming one creature with two heads. To meet the challenge 
of making sense of this it seems obvious to look to the growing literature 
around what has been called “Collective Intentionality”. Of particular 
relevance to Nozick’s work is the “Plural Subject Theory” (PST) of Margaret 
Gilbert; for his talk of forming a we mirrors her focus on “... the central sense 
of the pronoun ‘we’” (Gilbert 1992,  152) but I will start with the account 
of CRRs proposed by Andrea Westlund as, while in some ways similar to 
Gilbert’s PST account2, it poses some illuminating challenges to it.
Westlund suggests that CRRs (or as she calls them relationships of “companion 
love”) (Westlund 2008,  558) involve the formation of a plural subject with a 
particular structure; a structure that respects the reciprocity that she sees 
as essential to love. While Westlund invokes the idea of a plural subject she 
1 I do not want to claim that my description of CRRs stipulates the only way people can be in 
love, rather just that it describes a kind of loving relationship we commonly form.
2 In her paper on marriage (2008) Westlund does not explicitly state that she is attempting 
to apply a Gilbert-esk framework, indeed she makes reference to an number of other authors 
(Bratman, 1999, Roth 2004, Searle, 1990, Tuomela & Miller, 1988, and Velleman, 1997) and seems to 
imply that her account is relatively neutral between them. However, the way in which she invokes 
the notion of “pooling of agency” and sets out the notion of a “shared practical perspective” does 
appear to be particularly fitting with Gilbert’s framework. Her engagement with Gilbert is more 
explicit in an earlier draft of her paper (published as a “working paper”, Westlund, 2005). She does 
not appear to have read the work where Gilbert most explicitly deals with love (Gilbert, 1996) 
though she does appear to be acquainted with a great deal of Gilbert’s work.
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rejects the claim that normative constraint arises directly from being part of 
one. She thinks this necessary to account for the flexibility between parties 
she sees at the heart of loving relationships. This normative constraint is a key 
element of Gilbert’s theory and I will challenge Westlund’s rejection of it but 
in doing so I will argue that CRRs do demonstrate a related phenomena that 
might be confused with  
Westlunds flexibility i.e. variability of the pain of resisting such constraint. 
My tentative solution will be to urge the replacing of Gilbert’s discrete (i.e. 
all-or-nothing) voluntary pooling of the wills with a continuous (i.e. open 
to various degrees) notion of wills becoming entangled through levels of 
necessary identification with the plural subject.
Westlund worries that the union view of love insomuch as it seems to 
suggest that lovers become psychologically or ontologically melded 
appears to be contrary to something fundamental to her understanding 
of CRRs: reciprocity. Reciprocity seems to require each agent to value 
the other’s interests. The union view appears to dissolve the interests of 
each into the we. What we can call the “problem of reciprocity” is the worry 
that it is not possible to value the interests of the other if they have been 
dissolved into a we. Rather than give up on the union view Westlund 
believes this problem can be overcome by developing an account of 
the union in question that does not entail melding. She takes this to be 
possible if the union is of the form (à la Gilbert) of the creation of a plural 
subject.
For Gilbert plural subjects are the willed creations of individual agents; 
they are the result of those agents jointly committing to, within a certain 
scope of activity, pool their agency. Imagine a couple taking a trip together, 
for Gilbert what makes their travelling together stronger than merely 
travelling in proximity (temporal and/or spatial) is that the agents can be 
said to have jointly manifested and accepted “... willingness to constitute 
with the other a plural subject with the goal that they travel in each others 
company” (Gilbert 1992, 163). Plural subject-hood thus involves agents 
remaining as individuals, i.e. merely placing some of their agency into a 
shared pool, a pool with a specific goal or stance, rather than becoming 
psychologically or ontologically melded. Westlund is not entirely clear on 
how introducing the notion of plural subjectivity helps but I believe we 
can read her as saying that it avoids the problem of reciprocity because 
forming a plural subject need not destroy the self and thus the interests of 
each individual remain intact.
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Plural agents can be transitory; e.g. the travellers in Gilbert’s example 
may have met for the first time at the train station and travel together 
solely for one trip, or they can have more open-ended/extended scopes; 
e.g. the travellers may be regular fellow commuters. Clearly CRRs are of 
the latter type, indeed in marriage the participants pledge to be as one 
until death parts them. So far so good, but we might ask, given that plural 
subjects can have all kinds of implementations, what is the specific scope 
of a committed romantic relationship? Gilbert suggests that it might be 
“... a specific primary goal: something like the well-being of both parties 
equally”(Gilbert 1992). While Westlund sees reciprocity as a vital part 
of what it is to be in a CRR she does not think that it is the direct goal of 
CRRs rather she claims that it characterises the nature of how CRRs try 
to achieve their main goal, which is simply living as one. Living as one 
will involve all sorts of immediate shared goals; to go for a walk, to buy 
a sofa, to discipline their child etc. but always “... the projects and plans 
undertaken by companion lovers are ways of realizing an overarching 
desire to be (and do) together” (Westlund 2008,  558).
 
For Westlund achieving the goal of living together in a loving way has two 
elements; firstly,  sharing reasons as well as sharing ends, and, secondly, 
sharing these in a way that engages with the individual interests of each 
party. Sharing in ends means together aiming at doing particular things as 
a couple. Sharing in reasons, means together taking certain considerations 
to count in favour for them as a couple to do those things. Together these 
can be thought of as a process of forging a plural will. Take a couple who are 
planning to go on holiday; on Westlund’s account this can be contrasted 
with strangers who, having won a game show, are negotiating a single 
location to be whisked away to – the important difference is that the 
couple’s aim is not just to come to independently converge on a single 
destination, rather, their aim is to make the decision jointly. So, rather 
than weighing up all their individual preferences and trying to find a 
holiday that merely maximises these as far as possible, the couple will 
try to find reasons that they can agree count in favour of a holiday for 
them jointly; e.g. “I love culture and my partner loves beer but we want to 
go to Majorca because we want to go somewhere hot”3. All of which is not 
to say that joint considerations about what counts as a reason for them 
jointly cannot take each individuals preferences into account, just that 
what counts as their collective preference is not automatically given by 
3 The example with a slightly different presentation is Westlund’s (2009,  1)
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finding the point of maximum cross over between individual preferences. 
Thus discussion ends not with the discovery of shared reasons but rather 
in their creation through joint acceptance (Westlund 2009, 6). In this sense 
the plural will is a “... joint product of collective deliberative agency” 
(Westlund 2008, 567). 
For Gilbert the plural will is created by individuals pooling their 
personal wills. Doing so does not mean that they are then left with no 
individual will, for our wills are not finite substances, but it does mean 
that (within the scope of the area of concern of the we in question) they 
are rationally committed to whatever the plural will is committed to; by 
voluntarily taking part in the plural will they become joined to it. The 
joint nature of this plural will means that it is under the control of the 
participants together; no one participant is individually in a position to 
unilaterally reject its demands by a simple personal change of mind or 
declaration. For example, Gilbert says of a couple walking together that, 
if one abandons the walk, the other might well rebuke them by saying 
“You can’t turn round, we said we would walk to the top!” The normative 
authority of the plural will arises directly from the nature of the joint 
commitment required for the construction of a plural subject – the plural 
will, formed collectively, can only be changed or rescinded collectively 
(see Gilbert 2008, 504). This gives rise to the following two criteria. Firstly, 
the obligation criteria which says that each participant has a pro tanto 
obligation to promote fulfilment of that which is intended by the plural 
will. Secondly, the permission criteria which says that participants 
understand that they are not (ordinarily) in a position to unilaterally 
“by a simple change of mind” remove the constraints imposed on them 
by the obligation criteria4. For Gilbert this normative constraint is not 
some additional feature of morality, peer pressure or politeness, rather 
it arises directly from the collective will – it is akin to the normative 
constraint that as individuals we face with our own intentions; e.g. if I 
intend to give this paper today but I actually stay in bed, then I have done 
something normatively wrong – likewise if we intended to together give 
a paper today but we stay in bed then we have done a similar wrong. The 
key difference between the plural will and one’s individual will is that we 
are in a position to unilaterally change our individual wills however each 
4 Gilbert (2000,  17) Though note, Gilbert allows that background conditions may allow an 
individual to control the plural will, e.g.“If one partner is discovered to have engaged in sexual 
activity with a third party, the offended partner may aver, ‘We’re through!’ and the other may 
not question that point” because of “... the existence of an established [background] condition” 
(2006, 110).
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individual is not in a position to unilaterally change the plural will.
Westlund does not give a direct argument against the general possibility 
of such normative constraint5. However it is, she believes, contrary to her 
account of CRRs. In contrast to a plural will that each participant becomes 
joined to, Westlund’s (not fully spelled out) view is that the creation 
and maintenance of a plural will involves an ongoing ‘dance of union, 
separation and reunion’, that is, it involves individuals being engaged in an 
“evolving framework” of plural stances to which they must “continuously 
reaffirm”. Westlund does not discuss Gilbert’s scenarios of dissent, such 
as the two walkers above – if she did she would have to reject the picture 
Gilbert paints for her view implies that with regard to collective plans 
each participant must have “ …some discretion over her own follow-
through” (Westlund 2009,  14). That is not to say that Westlund wants 
to claim that the plural will does not have any kind of sway over each 
individual. If this were the case then it would be hard to see how it could 
play the role of making the reasoning of couples in CRRs fundamentally 
different from that of the game show bargainers. However, Westlund 
explains such sway by claiming that it exists because there is a further 
commitment to a robust form of mutual accountability.
We might think that Westlund needs to differ from Gilbert in this way in 
order to solve the problem of reciprocity. The concept of plural subjects 
is supposed to solve the problem of reciprocity because it allows the 
possibility of forming unions without losing each partner’s individual 
autonomy. Further, for Westlund a key part of this is that the joint 
deliberative agency, by which the couple form their collective, necessarily 
involves an ongoing sensitivity of each to the will of the other. This, it 
might be thought, rules out each party being directly constrained by the 
collective will, for their being so constrained might be seen as a block 
on each having such sensitivity. So for Westlund  “... any balance that is 
struck between the parties must be regarded as defeasible in the face of 
further reflection and experience, such that a shared practical perspective 
is always a work in progress” (Westlund 2008, 568). I will refer to this in 
what follows as the requirement of flexibility.
There are two reasons to reject Westlund’s rejection of direct normative 
constraint; firstly because of its importance to Gilbert’s overall project, 
5 Merely suggesting that Gilbert’s claim is “controversial” and pointing to others (Bratman 
1999, McMahon, 2005) for a general argument (Westlund 2009, 14, footnote 26).
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and secondly, because direct normative constraint does seem to be part 
of the actual phenomenology of being in a CRR. On the first point, a full 
defence would require an overall defence of Gilbert’s project that is beyond 
the scope of this paper but it is worth noting that the ability to explain 
the normative authority of plural subject attitudes as arising directly from 
the nature of joint commitment is what makes Gilbert’s account distinctly 
collectivist and thus able to explain the phenomenology that (she claims) 
individualistic accounts cannot.
On my second claim; it seems to me disputable that we experience CRRs 
as necessarily having the flexibility that Westlund describes. It is true 
that when a relationship is healthy each party tries to take the needs of 
the other into account when engaged in joint deliberation. In the holiday 
example we would say that if the couple, Mary and Clare, are in a well 
functioning CRR then each party should try to accommodate the desires 
of the other and to compromise when these do not fit with their own. 
Even once they have come to their collective decision, i.e. once they have 
constructed their collective will, then if they truly care for each other each 
will be open to the possibility of further deliberation over its content. This 
doesn’t mean that the collective will itself must be automatically reflective 
of any change in each individuals perspective. If Mary comes to realise 
that she hates hot nights, then this does mean that (given Clare’s love for 
her) Clare ought to be open to re-engaging in joint deliberation and to 
their jointly changing their mind, but it does not imply that the collective 
will must automatically cease to hold sway. In parallel with Gilbert’s 
walkers I suggest that if on the way to the airport Mary turned round and 
stated walking back home, Clare would be justified to say: “You can’t go 
home, we said we were going to Majorca!”
Further to Westlund looking for flexibility in the wrong place in healthy 
CRRs, she also idealises love by ignoring the fact that unhealthy CRRs still 
count as CRRs6. Feelings of being a we do not necessarily disappear with the 
failure of each party to treat the other with reciprocity. Once we allow 
the phenomenology of badly functioning CRRs into our picture then the 
fact that there is no necessary flexibility at the level of the collective will 
becomes all the more apparent. Given that Westlund seems to believe 
that being bound to the collective will requires an additional personal 
commitment she would have to say that the shared perspective merely 
dissolves in the face of one, or both, parties ceasing to continuously 
6 A similar point (though not directed at Westlund) is noted by Gilbert, 1996.
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reaffirm the framework which takes the other into account; but this is 
misguided as even in bad relationships we can feel the constraining force 
of the collective will.
While Gilbert gets closer to the phenomenology of love than Westlund, I 
will now argue there is something overly restrictive in her set up, just that 
it is not what Westlund thinks it is. My claim is that there is variance in 
the levels of what we might call “normative pain” when rebelling against 
the plural will of different CRRs. Just as we can understand physical pain 
as a negative feeling, of variable strength, experience of which indicates 
bodily damage, normative pain is negative feeling, of variable in strength, 
experience of which indicates normative transgression. This is, I believe, 
evident in the cases described below. Unfortunately, for showing this to 
be the case, the direct normative commitment of the will that Gilbert 
describes is not the only thing that provides reasons for the individual 
to feel tied to the we in cases of love – there are of course also moral, 
romantic, practical and further reasons in play. My claim is not that these 
other reasons do not matter – only that direct normative constraint of the 
will plays an important part in the mix. I’ll proceed by contrasting three 
examples to illustrate the variability of normative pain:
Early days: Imagine a newly formed couple, Bill and Ted. They have been 
together for a few months, seeing each other once or twice a week. They 
see themselves as very much in love, they are full of the strong feelings of 
lust and desire, but live in separate houses, have separate groups of friends 
and different hobbies.
Long term and going strong: Now contrast this with our couple from the 
example above, Clare and Mary. Let’s say that they have been together for 
25 years, bought a house together, adopted and raised a child together, 
share friends and have the same hobbies. They feel still very much in love.
Coming apart: Patrick and Madeleine have been in a relationship longest 
of all, 30 years. They do live together, and pay bills jointly and have raised 
children. But they also do an increasing amount of things apart, have 
separate friendship groups and enjoy different social activities. They don’t 
really feel much romance toward each other and often find themselves 
attracted to other people.
Now imagine that each of these couples is on their way to the airport and 
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one of each of them turns round and starts walking back home. Each rebel 
will be open to a rebuke of Gilbert’s form: “You can’t go home, we said we 
were going to Majorca!” However, I suggest that the act of rebelling, will 
feel different (in a relevant way) to each; When Ted turns round to Bill 
and announces that he is not going, the wrong that he is committing by 
violating the collective will feel less normatively painful than that which 
will be felt by Mary in doing the same. Similarly, the wrong of Madeleine’s 
doing so will feel worse than Ted’s, though not as normatively painful as 
Mary’s deviation.
I am not claiming that any of the couples face no obligation towards their 
collective wills, rather that the degree of normative pain of breaking these 
obligations will vary. It is the existence of this phenomenon and the way 
in which it mimics a certain aspect of Westlund’s description of flexibility 
that accounts for a certain level of intuitive plausibility to Westlund’s 
rejection of Gilbert’s account of direct normative constraint. Of course 
this could all be a function of variance in other factors; the different level 
of moral, romantic, practical obligations felt by each party. However, that 
the rebuke may feel more normatively painful to Madeleine (who is not 
getting that much out of her relationship any more) than to Ted (who is 
infatuated) suggests to me that the difference lies in the nature of the we 
rather than the personal feelings of each party. Further, given that the 
rebuke makes direct reference to the will of the we, I think we should look 
for variance towards this relation to explain this phenomenon.
So, how can we make sense of the variability between the couples? In what 
follows I give a rough sketch of the type of account I think could do this7. 
Such an replaces Gilbert’s discrete, all-or-nothing, voluntary pooling of 
the wills with a continuous notion of wills becoming entangled through 
levels of necessary identification with the plural subject. The variance in 
the three holiday cases will thus be explained by variance in the amount 
to which the individuals cannot help but identify with the collective, 
where this variance will in turn be explained by how much of their own 
lives have been lived, and thus only fully make sense, within the scope of 
the collective agency.
The background to this claim is an understanding of what it is about 
commitments of the will in general that bind us. What is wrong, one 
7 The argument here is condensed because of limitations of space, I proving an extended 
account in Kisolo-Ssonko (forthcoming).
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might ask, with agentive anarchism, i.e. doing whatever one feels the 
compulsion to do at any time and not feeling committed by what one 
has willed? According to Michael Bratman our seeing ourselves as being 
constrained by the commitments’ of our wills is necessary for us to be able 
to understand ourselves as agents who can govern our own lives8. This is 
because the commitments of our wills provide the scaffolding necessary to 
construct a place “where-I-stand stand” out of the  multiple of elements of 
our psychological stew. I propose that we can extend this claim to explain 
the normative power of commitments of the collective wills for couples in 
CRRs; i.e. that each lover must see themselves as constrained by the will of 
the we that they are part of in order to see that we as a unified agent that 
can act9.
The case is not completely symmetrical between individuals and 
collectives. For individuals one always needs to have a where-I-stand as if 
we can’t see ourselves as individual agents there is nowhere left to retreat. 
It follows that there is no variability in the normative pain of breaking 
with our own wills10. For a collective we do always need to have a where-
we-stand for the possibility of collective agency. However, there is at least 
some possibility of retreating back to our own individual agency. What 
stops such a retreat being too easy is that part of our understanding of 
ourselves will be bound up in being able to see the collective as acting. 
Insofar as we have already lived part of our lives through the collective 
we can only continue to understand our contributory action as the kind of 
thing we set it out to be if we are able to see the collective as an agent, and 
because this requires its commitments of will to constrain, we must see 
them as doing so11. This difference between the foundation of the power 
of the individual will and the collective will is, I believe, what explains the 
variability in the three holidaying couples. The variability comes from the 
fact that though we will always have some part of ourselves bound up with 
the we, the amount of this entanglement can vary (with length of time of 
collective etc.).
Acknowledging variability in the experience of normative pain requires 
a re-understanding of Gilbert by moving away from voluntary wills being 
8 Bratman (1999, 2007).
9 Note that this is not a use that Bratman has need to employ for he rejects the idea of direct 
normative constraint by a collective will.
10 Or at least if there is variance it is not of this sort.
11 Post-hoc reconceptualising our contributions is logically possible but seems to be a kind of 
inauthenticity for that is how, at the moment of our actions, we set them out to be.
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pooled to wills becoming entangled over time perhaps in a sub-voluntary 
way, but I contend that this fits better with our phenomenological 
experience of being in love. Imagining one’s life without one’s significant 
other, imaging the non-existence of this we, is thus a conceptual issue 
rather than just an epistemic one – and this is how it grounds normative 
constraint. 
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Within much contemporary social ontology there is a particular methodology at work. 
This methodology takes as a starting point two or more asocial or atomic individuals. 
These individuals are taken to be perfectly functional agents, though outside of all social 
relations. Following this, combinations of these individuals are considered, to deduce what 
constitutes a social group. Here I will argue that theories which rely on this methodology 
are always circular, so long as they purport to describe the formation of all social 
groups, as they must always presuppose a pre-existing collectivity. Such methodology 
also produces various distortions in our theories, such as voluntarism. I focus on the 
workings of Plural Subject Theory as laid out by Margaret Gilbert in On Social Facts 
(1989). I show that the formation of a plural subject always requires communication, and 
that communication always requires a pre-existing collectivity. I examine the elements 
within Plural Subject Theory which protect Gilbert from these accusations of circularity, 
and argue against them. I finalise by suggesting that what Plural Subject Theory, 
and social ontology in general, requires as a theoretical starting point is not atomic 
individuals and their combinations, but rather combinations of already socialised or 
embedded individuals. 
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“A brief hypothetical account of the transition from the state of nature to a 
social state ... First nature (or God) produced a rational or reasoning being. 
Such being moves by virtue of acts of will ... This being was endowed with ideas 
of its own desires such that ‘I want a drink’ was understood to provide reason 
to move towards a drink. Now more than one being of this kind was produced. 
What ideas could these beings be endowed with that might enable them to live 
together harmoniously?” 
(Gilbert 1989, 414).
Theorisation necessitates abstraction: to gain traction on the messiness and 
complexities of reality we must abstract away from it. Not all abstraction 
is legitimate however, and one must be assured in an investigation 
that the chosen abstractions do not distort the aspect of reality under 
examination. This paper argues that such a distortion is at work within 
the methodology most common in contemporary analytic philosophy of 
society. The abstraction in question is neatly demonstrated in the epigraph: 
though its story is “crude” it is none the less taken to “make sense” (OSF, 
415). Such methodology relies on the assumption that one can legitimately 
abstract away from society a primordial atomic individual, and then see  what 
combinations of these individuals create a social group.
“Methodological Individualism” was first suggested by Weber as a scientific 
and “un-ideological” basis of a science of society (Weber 1922/1978, 13-
16). It was simply the assertion that society should be understood via 
the intentions, actions and beliefs of individuals. In actual fact, the 
methodology at work within much contemporary philosophy of society is 
more akin to methodological atomism understood in a Hobbesian sense, 
which see s human beings as capable of coming into full maturity outside 
of any societal interaction (Hobbes 1651/2003, 102). Whether individualism 
or atomism the important methodological assumptions I am questioning 
are these: (i) that we can feasibility consider an asocial human agent as our 
primary unit of investigation, and (ii) that we can consider combinations 
of these individuals to deduce what is intuitively required to produce a 
“social group”. With these methodological commitments, the main question 
of societal philosophy becomes: “What makes a collectivity out of a sum of 
living beings?” (Gilbert 1989, 2).
I take it that, by definition, the majority of “summative accounts” take this 
methodology to be correct. Summative accounts argue that all talk of groups 
can be reduced to talk of individuals, and that groups don’t really exist as 
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anything other than a combination of individuals1 . Methodological atomism 
makes the summative theory of groups very plausible – a methodology that 
places such weight on the atomic individual will be more likely to produce 
an individualistic ontology of society as an output.  In this paper however, I 
focus exclusively on the “Plural Subject Theory” (PST) forwarded by Margaret 
Gilbert. PST is a rarity: a non-summative account of social groups achieved 
through investigative atomism of the kind sketched above. A plural subject 
is a kind of collective intentionality, a subject made by a “unity”, a “pool or 
sum of wills dedicated, as one, to a certain ‘cause’’’ (Gilbert 1989, 409). Plural 
subject-hood is not reducible to the singular intentionality of the persons so 
connected2. I focus on Gilbert’s account precisely for this reason, for I take it 
that if I can show that Gilbert’s non-individualistic account shows distortions 
due to her atomistic methodology, then summative accounts certainly will. In 
particular, focus will be on Gilbert’s On Social Facts (1989), which stands as the 
formation and bedrock of PST3. 
Finally, I must indicate the nature of the distortion such methodology creates. 
Here I focus mainly on a distortion which can be called voluntarism within 
Gilbert’s theory. As shall be shown, the methodology at work leads Gilbert 
to investigate almost exclusively small voluntaristic groups of two or three 
people, who perceive themselves to be a unit. Examples include mushroom 
pickers (Gilbert 1989: 36-41), social travellers (Gilbert 1989, 161-164) and – 
importantly – conversers (Gilbert 1989,  433). Gilbert takes these small groups 
as “paradigmatic” of all social groups (Gilbert 1990), and as the origins and 
beginnings of all larger groups (Gilbert 1989,  235)4. The formation of these 
groups are the formation of plural subjects (See  §2). Thus the conclusions 
drawn from investigating these small, voluntaristic groups can be extended 
to all social groups (Gilbert 1989,  149). Gilbert accepts this voluntaristic nature 
as a necessary part of PST: “if there is a plural subject, then each set of persons 
has volunteered his will for a sum of wills” (Gilbert 1989,  413, emphasis mine). 
See ing as all social groups are plural subjects (Gilbert 1989, 204, 233), this 
means all social groups are voluntaristic. This leads to odd theoretical
1  Summative accounts include Quinton (1976), Keeley (1981) and Bratman (1999). See  Gilbert 
(1989, 257-288)  for discussion on the nature of summative accounts in relation to a plural subject 
account.
2  Plural subjects will be better defined in section 2. Gilbert forms PST against the 
assumptions of “singularism”, which see s individual intentionality and agency as the only kind 
of intentionality and agency there can be (Gilbert 1989, 12).
3  Readers will be referred to more recent examples of Gilbert’s work when necessary.
4  Gilbert maintains this dedication to the importance of small groups in more recent work 
(Gilbert 1990; 2000, 14-36; 2008, Chapter 6). Due to the methodology under question, such small units 
of investigation are common in contemporary philosophy of society (see Bratman 1999, 93-108).
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conclusions such that we can always leave a group (Gilbert 1989, 426), and that 
those in power are always somehow representative of the people (Gilbert 1989, 
206). Gilbert admits and highlights this conception of society with frequent 
comparisons to Rousseau’s social contract theory (Gilbert 1989, 198, 206, 415-6; 
2008: Chapters 4, 5 and 10). At best such voluntarism creates a theory that is 
bias towards the ideal of western, democratic societies, and at worst it avoids, 
trivialises or removes from investigation families, organisations and societies 
that are repressive, coercive or dictatorial.
At a theoretical level, such distortions may see m harmless, but Gilbert’s 
primary aim is to develop a collectivity concept that can be applied in the 
social sciences (Gilbert 1989, 2-3), and which can be extended to (at least) 
sociology, anthropology, political philosophy and psychology (Gilbert 1989, 
436-41). Indeed, such distortion is carried over into Gilbert’s more recent 
work developing a PST account of political obligation (2008). The PST account 
argues that membership to a group is always at some level intentional (2008: 
168), that any form of government can be backed by joint commitment 
(2008,  180) and that a population has an obligation to comply with political 
institutions whatever they are (2008,  256). As such, these distortions should be 
taken seriously.
Primarily, I focus on conversation as an example of the formation of the 
plural subject. I combine contemporary linguistics with Gilbert’s theory, to 
show there is a circularity inherent in her notion of plural subject-hood (§2). 
I argue against Gilbert’s objections that language is an asocial phenomenon 
(§3), and suggest in conclusion that the best way to break the circularity in 
question is to concede that society is not a plural subject (§4). Throughout, 
I attack the notion of the atomic individual, and suggest that instead, PST 
should take the already socialised individual as its primary investigative unit.
When discussing the formation of plural subjects, Gilbert investigates how “normal 
human beings with whatever capacities these have” combine to form plural 
subjects, the proper referent of “we’’ (Gilbert 1989, 175). This is methodological 
individualism in action: an investigation into how human agents outside of a 
plural subject combine to form one. I focus on the example of conversation for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is an oft used example (Gilbert 1989, 170, 200, 410, 433; Gilbert 
2008, 101, 118, 173) of the small and “ephemeral” (Gilbert 1989, 215) nature of 
the social groups Gilbert investigates. Secondly, Gilbert makes it a requirement 
that agents must have “made certain things clear” (Gilbert 1989, 162), prior to 
the formation of the plural subject. This indicates she needs some notion of 
2. 
Conversations 
and Actions
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communication prior to the plural subject, or for conversation to be the primary 
plural subject. This being the case, problems with conversational plural subject-
hood will resonate through Gilbert’s theory.
There are four stages to the formation of the plural subject, each of which 
must be met in turn for the plural subject to be formed: 
1. Quasi-readiness: Each agent must be independently prepared 
or “set up” to engage in a joint action A with another agent. This is 
“a state or disposition of the will, a kind of readiness to act when 
appropriate conditions obtain” (Gilbert 1989, 186).
2. Common Knowledge: The quasi-readiness of each participant must 
be communicated, must be what Gilbert terms “open*” (asserting 
that humans have the concept of “openness*” by default (Gilbert 
1989, 191)). “It is common knowledge among A, B and C that p, if and 
only if (by definition) the fact that p is open* to A, B and C, and (2) A, 
B and C have noticed this” (Gilbert 1989, 195).
3. Joint Readiness: An addition of (1) and (2): “a set of persons are jointly 
ready to share in action A in circumstances C if and only if it is common 
knowledge among them that they have mutually expressed their 
quasi-readiness so to share” (Gilbert 1989, 198).
4. Pooling Wills: This is the creation of a plural subject: “[O]ne who 
expresses quasi-readiness to do A in C in effect volunteers his will for a 
pool of wills to be set up so that in certain circumstances, that pool 
will be dedicated to a certain end” (Gilbert 1989, 198)5.
With these stages in mind, I turn to a contemporary theory of 
communication, Relevance Theory (RT), forwarded by Sperber and 
Wilson (1986/1995). In RT communication occurs by a speaker making 
information accessible in the audience’s “cognitive environment”. The 
cognitive environment is a combination of the agent’s cognitive abilities (the 
biological, perceptual, linguistic and conceptual abilities that agent has) 
with the physical/sensory environment that agent is located in. The cognitive 
environment is the set of facts and assumptions accessible or “manifest” to 
the individual. Communication occurs in the overlap between two or more 
cognitive environments. It works by making certain things mutually manifest, 
which is a useful way of thinking of Gilbert’s “openness*” requirement (See  
Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 36-45).
5  More recent incarnations of PST keep these distinct stages (Gilbert 2008, 96).
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The combination of the two theories is illuminating. To begin a conversation, 
agents must be receptive and ready to engage one (1). This quasi-readiness 
must be communicated in order to attain (2) and (3). RT, as an ostensive 
theory of communication, see s any act of communication as carrying with 
it a necessary recognition of the participant’s intention to communicate. 
Communication is not accidental; by beginning to communicate we make our 
readiness to communicate mutually manifest. Something mutually manifest 
is common knowledge (2)6. The overlapping of cognitive environments 
is an excellent account of “joint readiness” (3). This creation of a mutual 
cognitive environment perhaps explains Gilbert’s contention that we need to 
be considered an “us” in a sense before we embark on a full “pooling of wills” 
and a shared goal (“I suggest that A and B must need to be in a position 
appropriately to think of themselves as ‘us’ in order for A to intelligibly to 
set out to tell B something” (Gilbert 1989, 215)). The two agents can then 
embark on the joint goal: to converse (4) (Gilbert 1989, 170). Conversing is the 
manipulation of this shared cognitive environment, the making mutually 
manifest certain facts, assumptions, problems, and so on.
This account transfers to non-conversational joint action. Take moving 
a sofa together. The sofa must be manifest in my individual cognitive 
environment as something that I am ready to move with you (1). I must then 
make this intention manifest to you, and vice versa (2). The fact that this 
is manifest to both of us means it is mutually manifest – we have created an 
overlap of cognitive environments (3) and can proceed to the joint action of 
moving the sofa together (4).
Considering contemporary theories of communication sheds much light on 
Gilbert’s account. RT not only fits with PST, but it elaborates the notions of 
communication that PST requires for its account of plural subject formation 
to be plausible. However, RT works on the basis that communication 
presupposes a commonality in cognitive abilities which allows participant’s 
cognitive environments to be similar enough for overlap to occur. Such 
cognitive abilities are usually considered linguistic or conceptual and require 
a society to bestow such commonality. For PST a society is a plural subject, 
and so for the formation of a plural subject to presuppose society would entail 
circularity. To avoid this circularity, PST must show that the cognitive abilities 
required for plural subject formation are asocial.
6  Common knowledge is a complex topic, but I take it this RT account of common knowledge 
can be successfully applied to most, eg Lewis (1969, 52-57).
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For a plausible assessment of Gilbert’s methodology, one must first 
distinguish what cognitive abilities an asocial human agent would possess, 
and what such an agent can only gain through societal interaction. Searle 
(1995 , 127-47) distinguishes between Deep and Local “Background” in this 
regard, using the terminology to separate the capacities and abilities we 
have naturally (Deep) and those which we have culturally (Local). Though 
Searle focuses on capacities, abilities and predispositions, I focus solely on 
which concepts (or “cognitive abilities”) can be considered to be natural. It is 
the placement of certain concepts into Deep or Local Background which is 
crucial to this discussion7.
Deciding which concepts are natural, and which cultural, is a matter of 
discussion and discovery8. But, to prevent us from simply placing concepts 
where our theories need them to be, we can present certain feasible criteria. 
I suggest that the primary candidates for “natural” concepts would be (i) 
something which can be said to arise from the ordinary use of our biological 
and/or sensorimotor abilities. Lakoff and Johnston (1980, 56-60) call these 
naturally emergent concepts, and suggest spacial and temporal concepts as 
paradigm cases (UP, DOWN, FORWARD etc.). To this I would add (ii) concepts 
which could arise through the perception of and interaction with a non 
social environment (LIGHT and DARK, perhaps DAY and NIGHT or natural 
kinds such as MOUNTAIN). Deep Background will contain the concepts that 
are indicated by these criteria. Local Background will contain the concepts we 
can only gain by virtue of being in any society, or a particular society.
The majority of Gilbert’s dyadic examples presuppose conversation, and 
thus language. I will assume, for the moment, that a language presumes 
a society (See  §3). What possible plural subject-hood is possible without 
language? That is, what shared cognitive environments are possible? If I teleport 
a tribesman from a tribe as yet unaccountably and blissfully ignorant 
of Western culture, could I get him to enter into a plural subject with 
the simple joint intention to move a sofa? See ing as we share only Deep 
Background, how could I communicate my intent, and so get from quasi-
7  I borrow Searle’s terminology but not his notion. There are deep flaws in Searle’s conception 
which I do not wish to inherit. Suffice to say, I am committed to at least a significant part of the 
Background being conceptual and linguistic, which Searle’s non-representational Background 
does not allow for.
8  I am drawing a theoretical line here, not an actual one. It see ms “Local” Background will 
always shape and effect “Deep” Background. Recent empirical data shows that different cultures 
have radically differing conceptions of see mingly asocial concepts such as SPACE (Nisbett and 
Miyamoto 2005). Mallon et al (2009) recently used such evidence to argue against contemporary 
philosophy’s reliance on intuition, an argument which would find much purchase in Gilbert’s 
theory. 
AGAINST ATOMIC INDIVIDUALISM IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY
NEIL W. WILLIAMS University of Sheffield
72
readiness (1) to a plural subject (4)? Perhaps by some fluke of gesture, or by 
virtue of recognition of shared Deep Background, I could make my intention 
mutually manifest, and so entreat him to “join forces”  (Gilbert 1989, 163). 
Beyond this most rudimentary physical joint action, what actions could we 
participate in without significant education on his part or mine?
The majority of Gilbert’s dyadic examples presuppose that agents have 
previously been in a society, which is even more of a problem. The teleported 
tribesman and I shared one salient piece of Local Background: that we both 
had a Local Background. We were both born and raised within a society. If I 
instead teleport a Wildman, who has never before see n a human soul, how 
would I go about entering into a plural subject with him? Would he know 
what it is to cooperate or communicate? Had I accidently teleported him into a 
tiger’s pen, and was forced to communicate the salient fact that there was a 
tiger sneaking up on him from behind, could I? Communication relies on the 
recognition of intention. Would the Wildman have even this concept? Would 
he know that my desperate gestures and shouts were the act of a human 
agent intended to convey something? Judging from the prior criteria, the 
answer would be no. Cooperation, communication, recognition of intention, each 
necessary to even begin thinking about joint intention (1), have no reason to 
emerge spontaneously in the Wildman’s Deep Background. We would have to 
(somehow) embark on a great deal of education before this poor man and I 
could even begin to make things mutually manifest to one another. But what 
would this education be if not socialisation?
This then, is my central point: in order for PST to work it must presuppose 
that participants are (or have been) inhabitants of a larger, societal, plural 
subject. In order for PST to describe anything but the most rudimentary 
joint actions, it must presuppose participants live in the same, or relevantly 
similar societies. Simply put: the more cognitive overlap we share, the more 
joint actions we can engage in, and the easier it is to form a plural subject. If 
there is no cognitive overlap, we cannot engage in the formation of a plural 
subject. 
Gilbert is quite comfortable with the notion that conversation (Gilbert 
1989, 154), or at least communication broadly construed (Gilbert 1989, 
215), is prior to and required for group formation. This does not lead to a 
“paradox” for Gilbert, who see s the possibility of a linguistic social isolate 
quite plausible (Gilbert 1989, 217, See  §3). However, what investigating PST 
through the lens of contemporary communicative theory has revealed is 
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that all communication requires an overlap of “cognitive environment” 
which requires salient commonalities in the Background. PST cannot 
account for shared Background without presupposing that the inhabitants 
already inhabit a social collective of the type PST was meant to explain. 
What this circularity reveals is that for PST to work it needs, and in some 
sense already takes, the notion of an already socialised individual as its 
primary methodological unit, rather than the atomic individual. I now turn 
to objections to the claim that communication is necessarily social, before 
sketching a non-circular PST in the final section.
The plural subject theorist could answer my accusation of circularity with 
two objections. Firstly, one might say that a participant does not need to 
have inhabited a society (or other plural subject) in order to form a plural 
subject. A participant needs only the concept of a plural subject. On this 
claim the concept of a plural subject is hard-wired into us, part of our Deep 
Background. Gilbert suggests that the benevolent creator of the epigraph 
would need to bestow “an innate concept of a plural subject” (Gilbert 1989, 
167), or a certain kind of “mutual recognition” (Gilbert 1989, 217) to move 
from an asocial state to a social one. The role this innate concept of plural 
subject-hood plays in group formation is implicit through most of Gilbert’s 
work, but occasionally emerges explicitly:
I do, of course, posit a mechanism for the construction, so to speak, of social 
groups. And this mechanism can only work if everyone has a grasp of a subtle 
conceptual scheme, the conceptual scheme of plural subjects. Given that all 
have this concept, then the basic means for bringing plural subject-hood into 
being is at our disposal (Gilbert 1989, 416).
Gilbert needs to assert the nativism of a plural subject concept because it is 
the only way her account of group formation can work without circularity. 
There is no argumentation for this position, only assertion. I assume that 
we cannot simply assert innate concepts to save our philosophical system 
unless we have a reasonable causal story for how they would emerge 
naturally. Such an assertion is certainly not a defence against a claim that it 
is the methodology which creates the theoretical gaps which these nativist 
assertions are made to plug.
“Plural subjecthood”, as a concept, does not meet the criteria I sketched 
above for naturally emergent concepts. It is not a result of our sensorimotor 
abilities, and an asocial agent has no need or ability to produce it in 
engagement with an (asocial) environment. For Gilbert’s account to work 
3. 
Objections and 
Abstractions
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the concept must just be a “given”. The burden is on Gilbert to explicitly 
argue why this is the case. Moreover, assume for a moment that Gilbert is 
correct. Asserting that human beings have an innate concept of collectivity 
is tantamount to asserting that human beings, qua human beings, are 
social creatures. Human beings have evolved within, or are otherwise 
specifically adapted for, social groups. Why then should philosophy take as 
the methodological unit of investigation an atomic and asocial human? Is it 
not bound to create distortions in a theory if the primary methodological 
unit is an animal outside of the habitat it is adapted to, a human normally 
considered at best an oddity and at worst pathological?
The second, more substantial objection that the plural subject theorist could 
offer is the assertion that language is not necessarily social. If language is 
not necessarily social, then the fact that communication is necessary for 
plural subject formation does not have to be circular. Gilbert clearly saw how 
crucial it was for PST to develop an asocial theory of language, dedicating a 
whole chapter to the task (Gilbert 1989, 58-146). This chapter is split between 
attacking Wittgensteinian arguments against private language, and asserting 
a PST account of group language formation. Here I pick out only one strand of 
the argument: the congenital Crusoe intuition. The congenital Crusoe figure 
is a social isolate with full grasp of a private language. For Gilbert’s account 
of language to function this figure must be plausible. Moreover, this fully 
functioning but socially isolated individual is precisely the atomistic individual 
which I am arguing against. If this figure is plausible, then the methodology in 
question is unproblematic.
The Crusoe figure, perhaps because it is presupposed in her methodology, is a 
conceptual certainty for Gilbert: 
the claim ... that it is logically impossible to have a language if one has not 
participated in group life ... [is] counterintuitive on the face of it. It appears we can 
at least conceive of a congenital Crusoe – a being socially isolated throughout his 
life – who was initially endowed with, or invented, a language of his own (Gilbert 
1989, 59).
Gilbert assures us this is pre-theoretical or “untutored” intuition. It is “intuitive” 
for her that this figure can use language (Gilbert 1989, 73), and often if an opposing 
argument reaches the “counter-intuitive” “anti-Crusoe conclusion” then this 
“counts against it” (Gilbert 1989, 89-90), and one should become “immediately 
suspicious” (Gilbert 1989, 95) of such a theory. This intuition works as a motivating 
feature also: on developing what she finds to be an “intuitive” or “natural” model 
of language (Gilbert 1989, 93-4) – essentially Platonic – “one datum” in its favour is 
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its avoidance of the anti-Crusoe conclusion (Gilbert 1989, 95).
The first question is to ask is whether the Crusoe figure is in anyway actually 
possible. Recent empirical evidence suggests that it is not. Evidence indicates 
that children who do not learn language during the “critical period” of 
development (around 3-13) do not develop full linguistic ability (Pinker 1994: 
38-9). Without learning a language within this period, we lose the ability to 
learn any language completely, even when subsequently placed in a linguistic 
environment (Pinker 1994, 290-2). Pinker cites the case of “Genie”, a so 
called “wolf-child” who was discovered at the age of 13. Genie was without 
language and severely impaired in her ability to learn one (Pinker 1994, 291). 
Generative linguistics suggests that though we have a biological ability to 
develop language when in a linguistic environment, and within a certain key 
time frame, children that cannot interact with a language during this time 
cannot and do not develop one independently, spontaneously or by intellectual 
effort alone. Though Gilbert’s argument is primarily conceptual rather than 
empirical, I suggest we should at least be sensitive to empirical facts in our 
theorising, especially when developing concepts for use in the social sciences. 
Though the Crusoe figure may be a conceptual possibility, it is not a nomological 
possibility.
Indeed, the Crusoe figure may not be as conceptually possible as Gilbert thinks. 
When imagining the conceptual Crusoe figure, one imagines a socialised 
individual, like us, but without society. Of course it see ms plausible that such a 
figure could develop language independently. Equally, if we picture the social 
isolate as just like us but outside of society, it see ms very plausible to imagine 
that they could form groups with ease when other humans are introduced. Now 
try and consider someone with only Deep Background. Is it plausible that this 
person would spontaneously develop the tendency to attribute signs to objects? 
Can a human entrenched in society imagine the mental life of someone who 
has never before interacted with another human? It would be, doubtless, not at 
all like us. In order to even ascertain whether the Crusoe figure is conceivable, a 
great deal more fleshing out of this figure is required by Gilbert9. 
Despite empirical invalidity, and conceptual inadequacy, Gilbert perhaps 
deserves an answer as to why she finds the Crusoe-figure so intuitive. I 
take it that Gilbert’s view, and that of Winch whom she argues against, fall 
down either side of the same hurdle. Winch gives us an individual incapable 
of intentional action outside of society. This is clearly undesirable, but in 
response Gilbert gives us an individual with a fully functioning vocabulary 
9  Considering Gilbert’s earlier paper on asocial language (1983), Sharrock and Anderson have 
a similar response: “Doubting whether someone can invent a language for themselves involves 
raising rather more deep and complex questions than those which can be met by the response 
‘Well, I can imagine someone doing it!’” (1986, 554).
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and conceptual apparatus, despite having never see n another soul. This 
is an equally radical view. I suggest that if we make a simple distinction, 
between concept and language, we gain a much more feasible picture. With 
this the appeal of the private language argument falls away. If one conflates 
concept, language and intention (Gilbert 1989, 68), the conceptual Crusoe 
argument becomes more plausible simply because it is unintuitive to deny 
the Crusoe figure all of these. But separate concept and language and one 
finds that we can have a plausible Crusoe figure possessing concepts and 
intention (with Deep Background) but not necessarily language (without Local 
Background). Gilbert requires an argument for a conflation which is simply 
assumed.
The account of group language formation that Gilbert gives is very similar 
to the plural subject formation already looked at. It simply involves social 
isolates, each with their own private language, figuring out what words 
they shall use publically (Gilbert 1989, 132-142). Language formation, like 
group formation, is voluntaristic and intentional10. It only makes sense if 
we already assume the linguistic capacities of the social isolate. Gilbert 
then begs the question when she assumes that the congenital Crusoe “has a 
language”. Against a similar accusation Gilbert answers:
If we start from the standpoint of what is acceptable intuitively, however, there is 
no need of an argument to show that those who write off language-using isolates 
have no right to do so. In other words, this question may indeed be begged, until 
it is shown that such statements are incoherent or otherwise inadmissible. More 
precisely, some flaw must be clearly shown in the picture [of congenital Crusoe] that 
I have sketched (Gilbert 1989, 99).
Such a statement amounts to little more than an assertion that her intuition 
is correct. I am now in a position to answer the challenge here laid out with 
not one but three “flaws” in the congenital Crusoe conception. Firstly, it goes 
against contemporary empirical evidence. Secondly, it is not conceptually 
motivating without more work. Thirdly, it rests without argument on a 
conflation of concept and language. Though it is plausible to assume that 
humans are conceptual and intentional creatures outside of society, there is 
no reason to think that they are linguistic or communicative creatures outside 
of society, which is what Gilbert needed to provide to avoid the circularity 
10  Chomsky, in particular, has staunchly denied the empiricist conception that language 
formation is an intellectual achievement, preferring the notion that it is akin to organ growth 
(See  Pinker 1994, 297-332). Chomsky’s ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument focuses on why it is 
implausible to consider language an intellectual creation (See  Chomsky 1980, 310-24 and 2000, 
3-19; Cook 1991; Pinker 1994, 262-297). 
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I identified. This places the burden of proof rather forcibly back onto the 
plural subject theorist.
This examination of the implausibility of the congenital Crusoe figure doubles 
as an argument against methodological atomism. Taking an empirically 
impossible and conceptually flawed unit as the basic building block of a theory 
is going to lead to the distortions I have illuminated, and (no doubt) others. 
Once again I suggest that what PST and other theories of social ontology 
require as the primary methodological unit is the already socialised individual. 
This amounts to accepting the circularity I have shown. Plural subjects 
require an already present collectivity for their formation. In the final section 
I offer one plausible way for PST to diffuse this circularity, and the distortions 
the methodology entails11.
The primary methodological unit needed for PST to work must be the already 
socialised individual. As this is conceptually and nomologically plausible, I 
take it to be preferable to that which it replaces: the non-plausible atomic 
individual that much philosophy of society presupposes. This ultimately 
amounts to little more than the argument that we should take human 
beings as they have always existed – as entrenched in social reality – as our 
primary investigative unit in the social sciences12. I take it such a position 
would be uncontentious if it wasn’t for the circularity which it apparently 
11  In order to clarify the argument here it will serve to compare it with the useful distinctions put 
forward by Pettit (1993). Pettit suggests that there are two separate issues that are often conflated in social 
ontology: the individualism/collectivism issue (1993, Chap 3), and the atomism/holism issue (1993, Chap 
4). The collectivism/individualism question revolves around whether our intentional agency is impaired 
by social regularities (the collectivist position), or unimpaired (the individualist position). As I understand 
it my paper is neutral on this issue. I am concerned here about the issue of voluntarism only in as far as it 
pertains to the suggestion that we in some real sense choose to enter the society or family we find ourselves 
in. I am neutral here as to whether our ability to act autonomously within these social groups is impaired 
in any way. This being said, I think there are many issues that come to the fore when we consider our lack 
of choice in this regard, which may affect our autonomy. Pettit avoids these questions by narrowing his 
investigation to “autarchy”, or the minimal requirements for an agent having rational intentional states 
(1993, 120). It may surprise the reader to learn that the paper is also neutral on the atomism/holism issue, 
at least as it is described by Pettit. Pettit’s concern is whether interaction with others is required for full 
human rationality (the holist position), or whether an asocial creature can develop full rationality outside 
of human interaction (the atomist position) (1993; 1998). Though we both argue against atomism, we do 
so for different reasons. It may be plausible to suggest that a truly asocial individual is still fully capable of 
thinking, even if impaired in any number of other ways. I have suggested that an asocial individual would 
still have the resources to be an intentional individual (“I see  no way of arguing that a Robinson Crusoe, 
even a Robinson Crusoe isolated from birth, could not think or follow rules” (Pettit 1993, 179)). The point 
at issue within this paper is whether or not such an asocial individual would have the cognitive resources 
to form, or participate within, a social group. The answer to that, I have argued, is no. In this sense I am a 
holist about group formation and participation, even if I am not (necessarily), one about human rationality. 
There is, no doubt, reason to believe that holism about one leads to holism about the other, but this is a 
discussion best left for another day.
12  The position I have arrived at here is, as I take it, not dissimilar to the intuitions relating to embedded 
individuals which drive the phenomenological investigations of (for instance) Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty, as well as the work of the Pragmatist John Dewey.
4. 
Options 
and Conclusions
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entails. So I now finalise by sketching a non-circular and non-distorted 
research possibility for PST.
I suggest that the simplest way to break the circularity inherent in Gilbert’s 
PST is to deny that society is a plural subject. This is not to say that PST 
doesn’t pick out an interesting, important and useful notion for the social 
sciences. It is to deny that all the social sciences need is PST, or that all social 
groups are plural subjects (Gilbert 1989, 413; 2008, Chapter 8). PST describes 
exactly what it proclaims to describe: small, voluntaristic, united and self 
aware groups. Social groups of the sort united by goals or actions. But, as 
argued above, a) such groups presuppose collectivity, so they cannot be the 
sole collectivity concept, and b) understanding all of society in terms of PST 
leads to distortions such as voluntarism (1). 
So how does the formation of a society work, if it is not described by PST? I take 
it this is a question that philosophy of society does not have to answer: human 
beings and society evolved together, and the two are inextricable in a real 
sense. A human (somehow) born or raised outside of social interaction is – as 
poor Genie shows – severely linguistically, socially and emotionally disabled. 
The question should not be “how do societies form, given atomic individuals?” 
but rather “how do societies function and develop given the interactions of 
embedded individuals?”
So what is society, if it is not a plural subject? Well, this is hardly a question I 
am expected to answer here, but this exegesis of PST gives some idea of how to 
move forward. Society is not a “social contract” (Gilbert 1989, 198) in the way 
that Rousseau and PST formulate. Society is something we are born into, not 
something we choose. Society is better understood as the systems, structures, 
institutions and hierarchies in place. These affect those individuals born into 
the environment by shaping their subjective values, expectations, language 
and concepts: creating the Local Background. Already socialised individuals 
who share overlapping Backgrounds are capable of forming plural subjects. 
Plural subjects are the agents of group action within a society. Society is not a 
plural subject, but a different kind of collectivity which is the pre-condition of 
plural subjecthood. Society is not a plural subject but a system of overlapping 
and interacting plural subjecthoods. This is the merest suggestion, but 
shows how one might progress in incorporating PST into a less distorted 
investigation of social interactions.
In response to this picture, the plural subject theorist might offer two 
objections. The first is to claim that our society does show distinctive “plural 
subject” tendencies, where the population as a whole has collective goals or 
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actions. A prime example often given is voting13. This could be construed as a 
more normative claim: “Okay”, the plural subject theorist may concede, “most 
actual societies are not plural subjects. But they ought to be plural subjects, 
on the basis of our common collectivity concepts, when they are functioning 
properly”14. This would then be a theory which distinguishes between political 
institutions at the theoretic level, and can only recognise and investigate 
more (idealised) democratic societies as social groups. This would mean that 
the vast majority of existent societies could not be investigated by the social 
sciences, which is not a desirable consequence15.
The second objection stems from Gilbert’s investigation of the “Kafkaesque” 
company. Such an organisation – full of employees unaware of one another 
and without collective thought – is simply not a “social group or human 
collectivity” on Gilbert’s account (Gilbert 1989, 231). The analogous society 
would be an incredibly dictatorial or repressive regime. If one reads Gilbert 
as saying that the alienating organisation and dictatorial regime are not social 
groups then the above criticisms apply. If one reads Gilbert as saying they are 
not plural subjects then this essentially agrees with my claim: many (most) 
societies and organisations are not plural subjects.
I conclude that methodological atomism leads to distortions in PST, which are 
overcome when the atomic individual is denied. Without this atomic individual 
the voluntaristic plural subject model of society is no longer plausible. A 
narrowed but undistorted PST is then free to describe the formation and 
activity of voluntaristic social groups embedded within society. A final note is 
required for the plural subject theorist who may concede that I have identified 
and overcome the circularity and distortion within PST, but at too high a 
cost. For the picture now is a truly un-voluntaristic account, an account that 
is in danger of losing the agency the original model granted the individual 
by definition. In response, I suggest that this is not a theoretical problem, 
but a practical one. Individual agency within a collectivity is not a given, but 
something which must be strived for, part of that “ancient problem of how to 
live” (Gilbert 1989, 436)16.
13  Considering the percentage of the population that actually votes decreases with each 
election, I believe the claim that society is functioning as a plural subject at these times is not 
without significant empirical problems.
14  Gilbert (2008, 180-181) offers a similar suggestion.
15  I leave open the possibility that our common collectivity concept is that of the plural 
subject, and that society is not a plural subject, but through misapplication or even manipulation 
we often mistakenly think of society in plural subject terms.
16  A shorter version of this paper was delivered at the Collective Intentionality VIII conference 
(Manchester, 2012), and I am grateful to the comments which it received. I am indebted to 
Dominic Gregory and especially Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko for their assistance with earlier drafts.
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What are the intentional objects of groups’ beliefs? This paper claims that they are 
immanent facts, i.e., facts which exist only within groups’ minds. Since in relevant literature 
the notion of immanent object and the related theory of “immanent realism” arise in 
connection with the work of Franz Brentano, the paper begins by briefly sharing historical 
information on Brentano, making clear why – contrary to common belief – Brentano did 
not argue for immanent realism in his work. In a second part, I then look more closely at 
groups’ beliefs and illustrate why the insight of immanent realism – despite its historically 
inadequate reconstruction – can bear on my initial question. In doing so, I pay particular 
attention to John Searle’s theory of institutional facts, using it as a conceptual basis to 
develop my own pseudo-Brentanian approach. This approach allows me to introduce a 
further class of social entities in the last part of the paper: contrary to institutional facts 
the immanent entities of collective beliefs presuppose neither the assignment of functions 
nor the generation of deontologies, but they do presuppose groups’ beliefs for their existence. 
Being the precipitates of collective experiences, such entities are intrinsically related with 
the first plural person perspective and hence play an important role in what we may call the 
“cultural layer” of social reality.
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“[…] Dornröschen und Rotkäppchen sind Gestalten der deutschen 
Märchenwelt, die zur gemeinsamen Umwelt unseres Volkes gehört. 
Keinem von uns wird es einfallen zu behaupten, daß jeder sein 
eigenes Dornröschen habe. Es hat seine fest umrissenen Züge, seine 
persönliche Eigenart und Schicksale, an denen so wenig zu rütteln 
ist wie an denen einer historischen Persönlichkeit. Wir würden sehr 
energisch Verwahrung einlegen, wenn ihm jemand Züge andichten 
wollte, die ihm nicht zugehören. Unsere Märchenwelt nun hat eine 
gewisse Topyk, eine Eigenart, die sie von der anderer Völker, z.B. der 
chinesischen, charakterisitisch unterscheidet.”
(Stein 1922, 134-135)
In this paper I am mainly interested in the ontological status that the 
intentional objects of groups’ beliefs bear. Suppose that I am a member 
of, e.g., a religious community and that I share with the members of this 
community the belief that, e.g., only someone with divine powers can be the 
leader of the community. In this scenario, what does it mean for a collective 
to share this belief? What is the object of the belief? On the one hand, the 
belief is false simply because nothing in the world makes it true. On the 
other hand, the non-existing fact that the leader has divine powers – if 
believed – produces some effects, e.g., the community respects him and/or 
only he has the right to perform given actions within the community. 
One of the assumptions that drives my argumentation is that within 
social ontology there is a distinction to be drawn between sociality and 
culturality. Sociality comprehends all those entities, practices and dynamics 
which are intrinsically social and which are not culturally modifiable. In 
this sense, social notions like sincerity, victory, obligations, etc., seem to fall 
within the domain of sociality: they are not context-relative (see Smith 2003) 
or do not bear “essential properties” (as phenomenologists would prefer 
to say, see Salice 2012). On the contrary, culturality comprehends all those 
social entities which are intrinsic to a given culture and hence cannot exist 
outside or apart from this culture. In accordance with this idea, here I will 
claim that the objects of social and cultural beliefs belong to an ontological 
category of its own kind, i.e., they are the “immanent objects” of social 
beliefs, and that these objects partly constitute the domain of culturality.
The present article is organized as follows: since the notion of immanent 
object and the related theory of “immanent realism” arise in relevant 
literature in connection with the work of Franz Brentano, I begin (§1) by 
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briefly sharing relevant historical information on Brentano, making clear 
why – contrary to common belief – Brentano did not argue for immanent 
realism in his work. In a second part (§3), I then look more closely at cultural 
beliefs and illustrate why the insight of immanent realism – despite its 
historically inadequate reconstruction – can bear on issues related to 
the main question raised above: what are the objects of collective beliefs? 
In doing so, I pay particular attention to John Searle’s theory of social 
construction, using it as a conceptual basis to develop my own pseudo-
Brentanian approach to cultural reality (§4).
The literature has employed the phrase “immanent realism” to characterize 
to characterize a phase in Brentano’s thought which more or less 
corresponds to the period in which Brentano published his groundbreaking 
monograph Psychology from Empirical Standpoint (1864). Among other 
merits, in this book Brentano reactivates the Aristotelian-medieval 
notion of intentionality and puts it at the center of philosophical debates. 
According to Roderick Chisholm and a number of other commentators, the 
intentionality thesis – as Brentano introduces it in that book – strictly taken 
entails two different theses. The first is a psychological thesis which states 
that reference to an object is the distinguishing element between psychic 
and physical phenomena. All psychic phenomena, and psychic phenomena 
alone, are directed towards something. The second is an ontological thesis 
which concerns “the nature of certain objects of thought and of other 
psychological attitudes”, i.e., it concerns the ontological status of that 
“something” to which the mind is related (see Chisholm 1967, 201).
According to this second thesis, for Brentano the object of an intentional 
act is an ontologically subjective entity which exists only in the mind. 
Brentano allegedly reached this insight when attempting to offer a solution 
to the problem raised by the so-called “objectless presentations”. Indeed, 
immanent realism can easily account for all those cases in which an act is 
directed towards a non-existing entity: the act of thinking of Pegasus shows 
no structural difference from the act of thinking of Barack Obama – in both 
cases the act of thinking is directed towards an object existing merely in the 
mind. With regard to the latter, however, it happens to be the case that this 
inner object corresponds to an actually existing object.
Recently, convincing evidence has been delivered that Brentano did not 
claim such a position. Scholars have presented several arguments to show 
that Brentano never accepted immanent realism (see Antonelli 2012, Sauer 
2006). Among the reasons adduced by these authors, probably the most 
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important is that Brentano’s position did not share the modern view of 
relations as n-place predicates or properties. If the intentional relation were 
a dyadic property, then the inference from the existence of the relation to 
the existence of its relata was indeed justified. However, Brentano denies 
that the intentional relation has to be analyzed in terms of a dyadic relation 
into which the subject and the object enter, and so he was not committed to 
the idea that all intentional acts have an object of a sui generis ontological 
status. In other words, for Brentano, it does not follow that if a thinks of b, 
then both relata, a and b, exist in whatever sense of the term “existence”.
Rather, Brentano understood relations in an Aristotelian sense, namely 
as monadic predicates. Accordingly, the fact that I think of Obama, is not 
constituted by my mind, the relation of thinking and Obama as object 
existing in the mind. This fact only includes my mind and the monadic 
property thinking-of-Obama and it obtains regardless of whether Obama 
exists or not (i.e., it does not entail the existence of an object in my mind). To 
put this point in Brentanian terms, I think of Obama and not of the thought-
Obama, I hear the sound and not the heard-sound, I see the object and not 
the seen-object, etc. Obama, the sound, the object, etc., can be called – and 
are actually called by Brentano – the “immanent” objects of the act, but it 
should now be evident that this expression does not imply that these objects 
are in the consciousness.
To be sure, Brentano reserves an ontological niche to what he calls the act’s 
“correlates” (German: Korrelate) – that is, the aforementioned thought-
Obama, heard-sound, seen-object etc. Such correlates are indeed parts 
of my mind, but they are not the objects of the act. But if so, then in what 
sense are these correlates in my mind? A clear answer to this question can 
be found in Brentano’s lectures on Descriptive Psychology given in Vienna 
during the 1880s and 1890s (see Brentano 1982). In these lectures Brentano 
reinforces a statement he already made in his Psychologie that all acts are 
conscious acts. Not only are all acts directed towards an object, they are also 
directed towards themselves. Insofar as they occur, they simultaneously 
grasp themselves and hence are conscious. Suppose I am thinking of Obama, 
then at the same time I know that I am thinking of Obama. And the same is 
valid for all intentional acts: if I perceive or imagine Obama, I know that I 
perceive or imagine Obama. Looking now at this second intentional relation 
in which the act grasps itself, the act encounters, on the one hand, the act’s 
component or mode (I know whether I am merely imagining Obama or if I 
perceive him, etc.). But, on the other, it also encounters Obama-qua-object 
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of this act, that is, it also grasps the thought-Obama or the perceived-
Obama. So the correlate does indeed play a role in Brentano’s theory of 
intentionality, but only a secondary one, as it were.
But if Brentano did not advocate immanent realism, then questions arise 
as to why it is important to deal systematically with this theory and why 
it is relevant for social ontology. What follows should hopefully clarify the 
answers to both questions. In short, the idea is that the beliefs of individuals 
cannot create reality. It does not follow from the fact that individuals 
take something to be true, that this something has to exist in any sense. 
The same does not hold, however, for group beliefs. If a group believes 
something, then what the group believes does exist in a perspicuous sense. 
Of course, this reality is not that of brute facts; rather, what the group 
creates is a social or – probably more precisely – a cultural reality, and this is 
a reality which exists only in the group’s mind.
To illustrate this intuition, consider the following declarative sentence and 
assume that it expresses a belief:
(1) Akihito is the emperor of Japan
The sentence refers to a fact (an existing state of affairs) and, hence, it is 
true. But what is its truth-maker? To answer this question, one might do 
well to distinguish between external and internal points of view, depending 
on who holds the belief expressed in the sentence. 
Following Searle’s account (see Searle 1995, 2010), the sentence is true because 
it refers to an institutional fact. This is not an ontologically objective fact (such 
as the one that Mont Blanc is 4810m high), but an ontologically subjective one. 
If mankind were to disappear, then nations, emperors and, more generally, all 
institutional facts would disappear too. On the contrary, Mont Blanc would 
still remain. 
What is then the structure of this institutional fact? What, in other words, are its 
constituents? First of all, sentence (1) suggests that the property being-emperor-
of-Japan is exemplified by an individual, i.e., by Akihito. But this suggestion is 
false, for exemplification is an objective relation which characterizes objective 
facts, whereas the fact at issue is ontologically subjective. According to this 
analysis, (1) does not linguistically depict the state of affairs at issue adequately 
and hence has to be reformulated in the following way:
3. 
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(1*) Akihito counts as the emperor of Japan
The “counting as” locution should convey the idea that Akihito is merely 
held as the emperor of Japan by someone. Still, the question now arises as to 
what kind of predicate the “counting as” locution expresses. In particular, is 
this a dyadic predicate (see Varzi 2007)? (Interestingly enough, here we come 
across a problem similar to that we discussed regarding Brentano’s theory of 
intentionality.) If the “counting as” is a dyadic predicate and if sentence (1*) 
is true, then it would follow that two objects exist: on the one hand, Akihito 
and, on the other, the emperor of Japan.
But this view is not compatible with Searle’s monist ontology. As he puts 
it regarding his preferred example of a 10 dollar bill: it is not the case 
that when I hold a 10 dollar bill in my hand, I hold two objects at the same 
time – the piece of paper and the dollar bill. One possibility to deal with 
this difficulty is to go for the idea that the “counting as” predicate is not 
primitive and has to be analyzed further. If x counts as y, then a given 
status – that is, a given label – is assigned by collective intentionality to x 
by means of an expressed or unexpressed speech act of declaration. The 
status or label is the y-term, and this status always goes with a certain 
function1. Returning to the setting of our initial example, in Japan, if you 
are the the Tennō, you can fulfill certain functions that go with this status; 
for example, you are in charge for the convocation of the Diet. Since all 
status goes hand in hand with functions, Searle introduces the concept of 
“status function” to refer to all those functions which can be fulfilled only 
in relation to a given status. As a consequence, the fact at hand consists of 
the status function “emperor” imposed on an individual (i.e., Akihito) via 
collective intentionality. 
There are two further necessary conditions that need to be fulfilled in 
order for this fact to exist. The first are the deontologies generated by the 
status function. As Searle puts it: “status functions = intentional facts → 
deontologies” (Searle 2010, 23). The emperor has the right to adjourn the 
convocation of the Diet, but he also has the obligation to perform ceremonial 
functions. Without such deontologies, i.e., without the rights and obligations 
connected with the status, there are no institutional facts.
1  But in some cases you only have the label without the corresponding x: in 2010 Searle 
extends the domain of the notion of institutional fact by including the so-called “free-standing 
y-terms” (i.e., facts constituted only by a status function; e.g., corporations, electronic money, 
blindfold chess, etc.). Accordingly, the validity of the “x counts as y”-formula is now restricted to 
a limited number of institutional facts. 
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The second condition has to do with the beliefs that the group 
entertains. If the creation of this fact goes back to the imposition 
of a status to the x-term by means of a declaration, its “continued 
existence” is secured only if a group G (for example, for argument’s 
sake, the Shinto community in Japan2) believes or accepts that Akihito 
is the emperor of Japan (Searle 1995, 117f). Here, again, if G does not 
believe/accept that Akihito is the emperor of Japan, the institutional 
fact at issue does not exist.
We have now found an answer to our initial question: to what state of 
affairs does the belief expressed by sentence (1) refer? The answer is: the 
belief is directed towards a complex entity (a status function assigned to 
an individual via collective intentionality) which exists only as long as 
the two aforementioned conditions are fulfilled. Since this state of affairs 
subsists, sentence (1) is true . Note, however, that the sentence analyzed so far 
expresses the belief of an external observer and that the state of affairs at hand 
is the intentional object of this particular belief. To make this clear, let’s have 
a look at the second necessary condition, namely, at the group’s beliefs.
What about the belief of group G? To what fact does sentence (1) refer, if this 
sentence is taken to express the belief of G? When G believes that Akihito is the 
emperor, G believes that Akihito has a divine nature. Since for G being-the-Tennō 
is co-referential with the property being an individual with divine nature (the 
senses of these predicates differ, but their objectual domain coincide), for G 
sentence (1) refers to the very same state of affairs as sentence (2):
(2) Akihito has divine nature
In other words, for G, “emperor” does not point primarily to a status function, 
but to a non-institutional concept. Hence, the belief of G and that of the 
external observer are not directed towards the same state of affairs. For the 
external observer defines the concept “emperor” only in terms of deontic 
powers and deontologies (see “[...] the [status] function is defined in terms of 
[deontic] power [...]”, Searle 1997, 451), whereas G defines this concept by virtue 
of properties which are taken to be objective. For G, to be the descendant of 
the Gods is not a socially construed fact: rather, the emperor is held to be the 
lineal descendent of the Gods by means of natural kinship (see Maraini 2003). 
2  Only sociological research can ascertain whether or not there is a Shinto community in Japan 
which bears such belief, so this example may very well be fictional. Still, this does not seem to be 
relevant for the conceptual consequences to be drawn from it.
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Thus, the object of G’s belief is not an institutional, i.e., a socially construed, 
fact: the group does not believe that (1) is true by means of social agreement. 
Furthermore – under the plausible assumption that no man has divine nature 
– there is also no objective state of affairs to which G’s belief refers.
According to this last point, if we take (1) to express G’s belief, (1) is false. 
Still, this belief contributes to the constitution of an institutional fact. Let 
me stress at this point that it is not the belief as such that brings about the 
institutional fact, but this very particular belief, namely the belief in the fact 
that Akihito has divine nature. (The group may have thousands of other 
beliefs about Akihito, but only if it believes that Akihito has divine nature, is 
Akihito the emperor of Japan.) Accordingly, the sentence 
(3) G believes that Akihito has divine nature
has to be in any case true for the corresponding institutional fact (expressed 
by (1*)) to exist. In other words, if sentence (3) were false (if G does not 
believe that Akihito has divine nature), then sentence (1*) would be false, 
too. To be sure, one could try to get rid of the linguistic reference to the non-
existing fact enclosed in (3) by applying some sort of paraphrastic strategy. 
Following Russell’s suggestion, (3) could be paraphrased into:
(3*) There exists an x such that (i) G has a belief about x, (ii) x has 
divine nature and (iii) there is only one such x 
But since x has no values, sentence (3*) is obviously false. Here I am not 
concerned with those cases in which individuals instead of collectives 
are mentioned in clause (i): it may very well be that the paraphrase 
works for this kind of case. Still, in the scenario at issue (3*) cannot be 
an adequate paraphrase of (3) since, as Searle points out, (3) captures a 
necessary condition for the existence of the corresponding institutional 
fact. Indeed institutional facts exist only in virtue of the beliefs of a 
community. But then, if (3) has to be true, what does G believe, when it 
believes that Akihito is the emperor?
As suggested earlier in the paper, I contend that the object of G’s belief is a 
fact which (subjectively) exists only as long as the corresponding experience 
exists. This entity exists in the group’s mind and nowhere else and can be 
characterized as “immanent” in a pseudo-Brentanian terminology. Just 
as Dornröschen and Rotkäppchen have their own reality (their “definitely 
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contoured traits [seine fest umrissenen Züge]”), but these figures existentially 
depend on the experiences of a group and not of that of an individual (in this 
case: on the fantasies of the German Volk), so the divine emperor of Japan (or 
more precisely: the fact that someone is the divine emperor of Japan) exists 
only in relation to the beliefs of a group.
This idea leads to an important consequence. Remember that immanent 
realism holds that immanent entities may or may not correspond to 
transcendent entities and that this does not make any structural difference 
for the belief of the individual. This idea can now be exploited in the 
case of group beliefs: immanent entities can correspond to transcendent 
(institutional or natural) entities, but this does not make any difference for 
the group’s experience. Nothing in the experience varies if its object does or 
does not exist. Let’s discuss this point a bit further.
We have already dealt with the scenario in which the group believes that 
being-the-emperor and having-divine-nature are natural properties of 
Akihito. Here the immanent fact does not correspond to an objective or 
natural fact – for no such facts exist at all. But it does not correspond to an 
institutional fact either: although the institutional fact (subjectively) exists 
and although the immanent fact (together with the concomitant belief) is 
a necessary condition for its existence, G’s belief is not concerned with this 
institutional fact. For what G intends, when it intends that Akihito is the 
emperor, is not what an external observer intends, when s/he intends that 
Akihito counts as the emperor. As we saw, sentence (1) is true if it expresses 
the belief of an external observer, but it is false if it expresses the belief of G.
So now one can modify this scenario by assuming that there is a group 
of social scientists (G’) and that G’ agrees with Searle’s theory. Assume 
furthermore that G’ knows that “emperor” is a status function and that it 
assigns this status function to Searle himself. In this example it happens 
to be the case that the immanent fact believed by G’ corresponds to an 
institutional fact. In other words, the fact believed by G’ corresponds to a 
given segment of institutional reality. As a consequence, the sentence
(4) Searle is the emperor
is true if we take it to express either the belief of an external observer or the 
belief of G’. Still, the immanent and the institutional facts at issue are and 
remain ontologically different. This last point also tells us that the existence 
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of a transcendent fact (be it institutional or objective/natural3) does not 
make any structural difference for the belief of the group and that the group 
can be acquainted only with immanent entities. At this juncture, the central 
question raises as to how the term “belief” is employed here and whether 
the beliefs of individuals have the same features of group beliefs. I would 
answer this second question in the negative, i.e., beliefs of individuals can be 
acquainted with transcendent entities, but a discussion of this aspect would 
exceed the scope and purpose of this paper.
To conclude: in addition to institutional facts, in this paper I claimed that 
there is a further class of social entities which presuppose neither the 
assignment of functions nor the generation of deontologies, but which 
do presuppose collective beliefs (or group beliefs) for their existence. As 
these are merely the ontological precipitates of intentional experiences, 
as it were, such entities taken per se are not causally active. Only together 
with their corresponding beliefs do these facts have social effects. Being 
so intrinsically related with the first person plural perspective, they play 
an important role in what we may call the “cultural layer” of social reality. 
And indeed they constitute – at least an important domain of – this layer. 
To repeat the intuition that lead this analysis, we can say that the beliefs 
of individuals cannot create reality, but that of groups can. However, rigid 
ontological limits have to be set here as the only entities that these beliefs 
may create are “immanent” entities, i.e., entities which exist only in the 
group mind.
3  Obviously enough, the scenario at hand can be again modified by taking natural facts into 
account. If G believes that there is snow on the Mont Blanc, the immanent object of this belief 
corresponds to a natural fact if there actually is snow on the Mont Blanc.
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In present paper I investigate the relation between types and tokens, and its peculiar 
relevance for the ontology of institutional phenomena. I distinguish cognitive (or 
analogical) types and normative (or katalogical) types: while cognitive types are 
constructed a posteriori from analogies among pre-existing tokens, normative types are 
the prius of their tokens, tokens whose identity and effects are determined in the type.
Direction of fit, essential effects, and atypicalness in relation to normative types are 
investigated, and the hypothesis is ventured that the ontology of institutional phenomena 
(contrary to the ontology of natural phenomena) is primarily an ontology of types.
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The multiple impressions [ἐκτυπώματα ektypōmata] of a seal [σφραγίς 
sphragis] participate of their archetype seal [ἀρχέτυπος σφραγίς 
archetypos sphragis], and in every single impression the seal is present in its 
entirety and identity, without being part of any of its impressions. 
Dionysius the Areopagite, De Divinis N ominibus, 644a, 7-9.
In Art and Its Object, 1968, the British philosopher Richard Wollheim [London, 
1923-2003] poses the following question: “What are the characteristic 
circumstances in which we postulate a type?” and he gives the following 
answer: 
A very important set of circumstances in which we postulate types […] is where 
we can correlate a class of particulars with a piece of human invention: these 
particulars may then be regarded as tokens of a certain type. (Wollheim 1968, 94)1
Wollheim employs the “type vs. token” paradigm in his investigations on the 
ontology of works of art, so he thinks notably of some kinds of works of art, 
such as operas, ballets, poems, etchings, etc.
Another important context in which we postulate types surely is the 
context of institutional phenomena, one of the main fields of investigation 
in social ontology.
In present paper, I shall investigate some important aspects of the role of 
the “type vs. token” paradigm in social ontology and in the philosophy of 
institutional phenomena.
Investigations in social ontology and on the nature of institutional 
phenomena often resort to the “type vs. token” paradigm.
It is, indeed, a fundamental cognitive process of the intellect to sort 
phenomena into different types; a process which is common to every field of 
knowledge.
In social ontology, though, and particularly in the ontology of institutional 
phenomena, the type-token relation may play a different role from the mere 
1  Wollheim sets here types against other generic entities, like classes and universals. For 
an analysis of the peculiarities of the concept of “type” as opposed to other generic concepts in 
categorization, see (Passerini Glazel 2005).
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cognitive one: it can play a specific normative role, which has a fundamental 
import not only at the epistemological level, but also (and maybe primarly) at 
the ontological level.
In Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, 1906, the American philosopher 
and semioticist Charles Sanders Peirce [Cambridge (Massachusetts), 
1839-Milford (Pennsylvania), 1914] introduced a conceptual paradigm 
doomed to have a great relevance in semiotics and in investigations on 
social and institutional phenomena: the dyadic “type vs. token” paradigm.
Peirce elucidates the paradigm “type vs. token” through the example of 
word count:
A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a manuscript or 
printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about 
twenty the’s on a page, and of course they count as twenty words.  
In another sense of the word “word,” however, there is but one word “the” in 
the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on 
a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or 
Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a 
definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. (Peirce 1960, 4.537, vol. IV, 
423)
A “Type” thus, in Peirce’s definition, is a significant “Form” that “determines 
things that do exist”, though it doesn’t itself exist as a single thing, as an 
ídion2.
The single actual concrete occurrences of a Type are named “Tokens” by 
Peirce:
A single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one 
happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one 
instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just 
when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single 
page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. (Peirce 1960, 4.537, 
vol. IV, 423)
The relation between a type and its tokens is a relation of instantiation:
In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall 
be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to 
2  The adjective ἴδιος idios in ancient Greek means “proper, peculiar, particular, singular”.
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call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty 
Instances of the Type “the” on a page. (Peirce 1960, 4.537, vol. IV, 424)
It is quite obvious that, in attributing a predicate to an object, to an act, or 
to an event, we may refer either to the type of object (of act, of event), or to 
a single, concrete occurrence of that type of object (of act, of event), to a 
single token in its individuality.
To distinguish the attribution of a predicate to a type from the attribution of 
a predicate to a token, I propose to adopt Amedeo Giovanni Conte’s [*Pavia, 
1934] “eidographic vs. idiographic” paradigm.
A predicate which is attributed to a type qua type (to a type as an eîdos in Conte’s 
terms) is an eidographic predicate3.
A predicate which is attributed to a token qua token (to a token as an ídion) is 
an idiographic predicate4.
When I say, for instance: 
[1] Dog is man’s best friend, 
I am making reference to the type of animal “dog” in general (in comparison 
to other types of animals): this is an eidographic predication.
But when I say:
[2] The dog Jack is John’s best friend,
I am making reference to a single dog, Jack (in comparison to other dogs, or 
to other John’s friends): this is an idiographic predication.
Similarly, when I say:
[3] In the game of rugby, a try is worth five points,
I am making reference to the (institutional) type of event “try”: this is an 
eidographic predication.
But when I say: 
[4] In last rugby match England v. Ireland, the try scored by Ireland at 
the beginning of second half turned the tide of the game,
3  The Greek word εἶδος eidos means “idea, form, species, type”.
4 “Eidographic” is a neologism of Conte’s; “idiographic” is borrowed by Conte from the 
German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband (“idiographisch”).
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I am making reference to a single event, to a single token of the type of event 
“try”: this is an idiographic predication.
Again, when I say:
[5] In Italian law, in the absence of contrary stipulation, from 
marriage derives the community of property between the spouses,
I am making reference to the (institutional) type of act “marriage”: this is an 
eidographic predication.
But when I say:
[6] Andrea and Francesca’s marriage took place on September 29th, 
2012,
I am making reference to a single marriage, to a single token of the type 
“marriage”: this is an idiographic predication.
Between eidographic and idiographic predicates there is an asymmetry.
Let’s consider examples [3], [4], and [5], [6], which are examples of 
institutional phenomena.
What is (eidographically) predicated of the type “try” in example [3] (the fact that a 
try is worth five points) can be predicated salva veritate of the token “try scored by 
Ireland etc.” (Ireland’s try surely was worth five points). 
But the contrary doesn’t hold: what is (idiographically) predicated of the 
token “try scored by Ireland etc.” in example [4] (the fact that that particular 
try turned the tide of the game) cannot be predicated salva veritate of the 
type “try”.
Similarly, what is (eidographically) predicated of the type “marriage” in 
example [5] (the fact that from marriage derives the community of property 
in the absence of a contrary stipulation) can be predicated salva veritate of 
the token “Andrea and Francesca’s marriage”. 
Again, the contrary doesn’t hold: what is (idiographically) predicated of 
the token “Andrea and Francesca’s marriage” in example [6] (that it took 
place on September 29th, 2012) cannot be predicated salva veritate of the type 
“marriage”.
The foregoing examples show that, on the one side, some essential 
eidographic properties of institutional types are necessarily “transmitted” 
to its tokens: a token of a try is necessarily worth five points, because the 
type “try” is conventionally stipulated to be worth five points; a token of 
marriage necessarily constitutes the community of property in the absence 
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of a contrary stipulation, because that is stipulated for the type “marriage” 
in Italian law.
On the other side, idiographic properties of the tokens (some properties 
which belong to the tokens as ídia) cannot (by definition) be transmitted to 
the type5.
The same doesn’t necessarily hold for natural types: the fact that we say that 
“Dog is man’s best friend” depends on the fact that most dogs (most tokens 
of the type “dog”) are friendly and useful to humans, and not vice versa.
Sub 1.2. (Eidographic vs. idiographic predicates) I have drawn a distinction 
between predicates which are attributed to a type qua type (to a type as an 
eîdos) and predicates which are attributed to a token qua token (to a token as 
an ídion).
But what is the relation existing between a type and its tokens?
Generally speaking, the relation existing between a type and its tokens is 
a relation of conformity: a type and its tokens must correspond one to the 
others, they must fit each other, to be, respectively, the first, the type of 
those tokens, the second, the tokens of that type.
But this relation of conformity may take up one of two opposite directions.
In some cases, it is the type that has to fit the tokens; in other cases, on the 
contrary, it is the tokens that have to fit the type.
To the relation existing between types and tokens, thus, applies the concept 
of “direction of fit”, introduced by the American philosopher John R. Searle 
[*Denver, 1932] (and inspired to him by British philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe 
[Limerick, 1919-Cambridge, 2001])6.
Searle in (Searle 1975) distinguishes two directions of fit: 
(i) a “word-to-world” direction of fit, 
(ii) the opposite “world-to-word” direction of fit7.
A prefiguration of the concept of “direction of fit” is in Thomas Aquinas’ 
[Roccasecca, 1225-Fossanova, 1274] Summa Theologiae: 
5  An investigation on what kind of properties are necessarily transmitted, what kind of properties 
can be transmitted, what kind of properties cannot be transmitted between types and tokes (and in 
which direction) is beyond the purposes of this paper. A first investigation on this subject has been 
carried out by British philosopher Richard Wollheim: see (Wollheim 1968).
6  See (Anscombe 1957), (Searle 1975), (Searle 1985).
7  More recently, (Searle and Vanderveken 1985) considered cases (such as the case of 
declarations) in which there is a double direction of fit (“world-to-word-to-world”), and cases in 
which there is a “null or empty” direction of fit.
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Veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei […]. Intellectus autem qui est causa 
rei, comparatur ad ipsam sicut regula et mensura, e converso autem est de intellectu 
qui accipit scientiam a rebus.  
Quando igitur res sunt mensura et regula intellectus, veritas consistit in hoc, quod 
intellectus adaequatur rei, ut in nobis accidit, ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, 
opinio nostra et oratio vera vel falsa est.  
Sed quando intellectus est regula vel mensura rerum, veritas consistit in hoc, 
quod res adaequantur intellectui, sicut dicitur artifex facere verum opus, quando 
concordat arti. Sicut autem se habent artificiata ad artem, ita se habent opera 
iusta ad legem cui concordant. Iustitia igitur Dei, quae constituit ordinem in rebus 
conformem rationi sapientiae suae, quae est lex eius, convenienter veritas nominatur. 
Et sic etiam dicitur in nobis veritas iustitiae. (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, part I, 
Question 21, art. 2)8
This passage from Summa Theologiae suggests promising connections 
between the idea of two opposite directions of fit and investigations on the 
type-token relation, on de dicto and de re truth, on “normative truth” and 
“truth of norms”. 
I’m not going to pursue all of these inspiring connections in present paper. 
I shall restrict here to the distinction of two kinds of types (cognitive types, 
normative types) according to their respective direction of fit.
2.1.1. In some cases, I said, it is the type that has to fit the tokens.
This is the case, for instance, with zoological types (such as “dog”, or 
“canis lupus familiaris”) and botanical types (such as “apple tree”, or “malus 
domestica”): more generally, this is the case with what I propose to call 
“cognitive types”.
Cognitive types have the function of reproducing (in the sense of 
representing) and synthesizing what the (typical) properties of the tokens of 
that type are.
8 “Truth consists in a correspondence between the intellect and reality. Now, an intellect that 
is a cause of the relevant real thing is related to it as a rule and measure, whereas the converse 
holds in the case of an intellect that takes its knowledge from the thing. Thus, when, as happens 
with us, the things are the measure and rule of the intellect, then truth consists in the intellect’s 
correspondence to the thing. For, it is because reality is (or, respectively, is not) such-and-such 
that our beliefs and statements are true (or, respectively, false). By contrast, when the intellect 
is the rule or measure of the things, then truth consists in the thing’s correspondence to the 
intellect. So, for instance, the craftsman is said to produce a true work when that work agrees 
with his craft. Now just actions are related to the law with which they accord as artifacts are 
related to their craft. Therefore, God’s justice, which establishes among things the order that 
conforms to the measure of His wisdom, i.e., His law, is appropriately called “truth”. And this is 
why, even among us, one speaks of the truth of justice”.
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It is because most singular tokens of the type “dog” are friendly and useful 
to men, that we use to say that “Dog is man’s best friend” (not the opposite).
Cognitive types thus have a “type-to-world” direction of fit: the type has to 
reproduce and reflect the world as it is, and so it is the type that has to fit the 
tokens.
2.1.2. If there is no conformity between type and tokens, it is the type that is 
inadequate.
Here is an example (a well-known example in modern and contemporary 
epistemology): a predicate of the type “swan” used to be, up to the end of 
XVII century: “Swan has white plumage”9.
The discovery of black swans in Australia at the end of XVII century led to 
rectify the type: now we know that “Swan can have white or black plumage”. 
(I guess nobody tried to “rectify” the colour of Australian swans.)10
2.1.3. As the examples of black swans shows, with regard to cognitive types 
we usually have what the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung [*Oslo, 1930] 
called cognitive expectations: i.e. expectations that we are prepared to revise 
in case of dissonance between our expectations and reality11.
2.1.4. Another term I propose for cognitive types is “analogical types”: the 
type, indeed, is here (a posteriori) constructed through the recognition of the 
analogies existing among the tokens; the tokens are the prius, the type is the 
posterius12.
2.2.1. In other cases, it is the tokens that have to fit the type.
This is the case, for instance, with conventional and institutional types 
(such as “try” in rugby, “marriage” in law, “10 euros banknote”, the word 
“the” in English), and, more generally, with what I propose to call normative 
types.
Normative types have the function of determining what something in the 
world shall be like to have a certain conventional or institutional value.
Through a normative type we do not reproduce what the properties of the tokens of 
the type are; on the contrary, we determine what the properties of the tokens shall be.
9  Cfr. Juvenal’s famous verse: “Rara avis in terris, nigroque simillima cygno” (Iuvenalis, Saturae, 
VI, 165).
10  I remind that in the gender Cygnus, besides white and black species, there is also a black-
necked species, native to South-America.
11  See (Galtung 1959).
12  I set analogical types against katalogical types: see infra § 2.2.5.; my paradigm “analogical 
types vs. katalogical types” is inspired by the distinction between ana-logical and kata-logical in the 
thology of Hans Urs von Balthasar [Luzern, 1905-Basel, 1988]: see (von Balthasar 1985).
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It is because the type “try” in rugby is conventionally and normatively 
stipulated to be worth five points, that we can say that the particular try scored 
by Ireland, was worth five points (and not the opposite).
The direction of fit of normative types, thus, is a world-to-type direction of 
fit: it is the tokens that have to fit the type, it is the tokens that have to 
reproduce (in the sense of replicating), to reflect the type.
2.2.2. If there is no conformity between type and tokens, it is the tokens that 
are inadequate.
A try scored during half-time in a rugby match, or a try scored by a player 
in his own in-goal area, are no try at all, and no point will be awarded to any 
team.
2.2.3. With regard to normative types we usually have what Galtung called 
normative expectations: i.e. expectations that we are not prepared to revise in 
case of dissonance between our expectations and reality13.
2.2.4. That types (may) have a normative function with regard to tokens is 
an idea which is not alien to Peirce’s semiotics. In a former formulation of 
the “type vs. token” paradigm, Peirce used, for “type”, the term “Legisign” 
(defined as “a law that is a sign”), and, for “token”, the term “Replica”.
Here is Peirce’s passage from A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, 1903:
A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by men. Every 
conventional sign is a legisign. It is not a single object, but a general type which, 
it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through an 
instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it. Thus, the word 
“the” will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all 
these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance 
of it is a replica. The replica is a sinsign. Thus, every legisign requires sinsigns. 
But these are not ordinary sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are 
regarded as significant. Nor would the replica be significant if it were not for the 
law which renders it so. (Peirce 1998, 2, 291)
2.2.5. Another term I propose for normative types is “katalogical types”: the 
tokens are derived (they descend) from the type; the type is the prius, the 
tokens are the posterius.
In § 2. (Two opposite directions of fit between a type and its tokens: cognitive 
13  Galtung’s “cognitive expectations vs. normative expectations” paradigm is fruitfully applied 
by Luhmann in his view of norms in sociological perspective: see (Luhmann 1969).
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types vs. normative types) I distinguished normative types (katalogical 
types) from cognitive types (analogical types), and I adduced as examples of 
normative types some conventional and institutional types.
Conventional and institutional types of objects, of acts, of events, are among 
the main subjects of investigation in social ontology.
In present § 3., I shall focus on institutional types of acts, and I will 
underline a peculiarity of institutional types of acts, as opposed to non-
institutional types of acts14.
Baptizing, entering into a sale contract, marrying, scoring a try, are all 
examples of institutional acts: acts that can be performed only within, and 
in virtue of, a particular institutional frame.
Running, opening a window, felling a tree are non-institutional actions: 
actions that can be performed independently of any institutional frame.
In following § 3.1. (Extrinsic consequences of non-institutional acts) and § 3.2. 
(Intrinsic effects of institutional acts), I will show an important difference 
existing between
(i) the relation between the tokens of a non-institutional action and 
the type they are tokens of
and
(ii)  the relation between the tokens of an institutional act and the 
type they are tokens of.
3.1.1. Non-institutional actions like running, opening a window, felling a tree, 
may produce some consequences: whenever one runs, a translation of his body 
in space takes place; whenever one opens a window, the window gets open, and 
fresh air gets in; whenever one fells a tree, the tree falls on the ground.
All of these consequences are produced by every particular action in its 
individual singularity, by virtue of mechanical cause-effect relations: all of 
these consequences are produced by every action in its ídion, independently of 
the fact that anybody recognizes them as tokens of a particular type of action.
3.1.2. All of these cause-effect consequences of non-institutional types of 
actions are extrinsic consequences: they are not inscribed in the essence of 
a type, or at least they are not determined by the type: they are merely and 
immediately actual at a token-level.
Cause-effect relations exist between tokens, between ídia, not between types: 
14  In philosophy of institutional phenomena, institutional facts are usually opposed to brute 
facts. Brute facts are facts that, in Searle’s words, “can exist without human institutions”; on the 
contrary, institutional facts are facts that “require human institutions for their very existence”.
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despite their universalization by induction in natural sciences, causal laws of 
nature “operate” at token-level, not at type-level.
3.2.1. Institutional acts like baptizing, entering into a sale contract, marrying, 
scoring a try, produce some specific institutional effects.
Whenever one baptizes somebody, whenever one enters into a sale contract 
with somebody, whenever one marries, whenever one scores a try, some 
institutional effects, specific to every type of act, are produced in the world.
Whenever a player scores a try in a rugby match, for instance, his team 
is awarded five points. This effect isn’t produced by virtue of mechanical 
cause-effect relations; it is produced by virtue of the fact that it is ascribed 
to (and inscribed into) the (normatively constituted) type of event “try” that 
it is worth five points.
Every token-try in rugby produces the effect of earning five points to the 
scoring team only by virtue of it being a token of the type “try” in rugby15.
As Maria-Elisabeth Conte [Soest in Westfalen, 1935 -Pavia, 1998] suggests, a 
token of an institutional act merely triggers [löst aus] the effects of the type; 
but the triggered effects are effects of the type, they are effects which are 
intrinsic to the type.
In other words, the effects of an institutional act are produced through the 
tokens, but in virtue of the type.
3.2.2. Unlike the extrinsic consequences of non-institutional acts, thus, the 
effects of an institutional type of act are intrinsic effects specific to every 
type of institutional act: these effects are ascribed to (and inscribed into) 
the type, the eîdos, of every act.
In the world of institutional phenomena, institutional norms generally 
operate at a type-level, not at a token-level.
3.2.3. Adopting the lexicon of Scholasticism, the type of an institutional act 
is the (necessary) causa prima of the effects of its tokens, while the tokens are 
but a (contingent) causa secunda of those effects.
To the relation between type as causa prima and tokens as causa secunda of 
the effects of an institutional act suit the following words of Aquinas (Iª-IIae 
q. 19 a. 4 co):
Effectus plus dependet a causa prima quam a causa secunda, quia causa 
secunda non agit nisi in virtute primae causae. 
15  See (Peirce 1903, 291): “Nor would the replica be significant if it were not for the [Legisign] 
law which renders it so.”
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The effect depends more on the first cause than on a secondary cause, since a 
secondary cause acts only in the power of the first cause.
In § 3. (Intrinsic effects of institutional acts vs. extrinsic consequences 
of non-institutional acts) I pointed out that (unlike non-insitutional 
acts) institutional acts produce their specific effects by virtue of their 
correspondence to a type.
Let’s now focus on cases of dissonance, of non-conformity between type and tokens.
I propose to distinguish two different kinds of “non-conformity to a type”, 
modelled on Aristotle logical distinction between negation (ἀπόφασις 
apophasis) and privation (στέρησις steresis)16:
 
(i) a relative, and privative, non-conformity to a type, which I call 
“privative (or steretic) atypicalness”;
(ii)  an absolute, and negative, non-conformity to a type, which I call 
“negative (or apophatic) atypicalness”17.
I call “privative (or “steretic”, from Greek στερητικός steretikos, “privative”) 
atypicalness” the atypicalness which consists in a partial non-conformity of a 
token to a type.
Two examples:
[7] The atypicalness of a lease contract in which something else from 
money is the consideration for lease, is privative atypicalness.
[8] The atypicalness of a counterfeit ten euros banknote, is privative 
atypicalness.
Both the lease contract and the counterfeit banknote are atypical (not 
because they are completely alien to a type, not because they don’t have any 
type, but) because they partially deviate from their type, because they don’t 
fully fit the type of which they are (atypical) tokens.
I call “privative” this kind of atypicalness because it consists in a (scalar, 
progressive) deficiency of typicalness (of conformity) to a type18.
I call “negative (or “apophatic”, from Greek ἀποφατικός apophatikos 
“negative”) atypicalness” the atypicalness which consists (not in a partial 
16  See Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1056a 29.
17  See also (Passerini Glazel 2005, 223-228) and (Passerini Glazel 2012).
18  Privative atypicalness is privative as well as privative is the gnostic and neoplatonic 
conception of evil: evil is an imperfection, a deficiency of being, a lack of good.
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non-conformity to a type, but) in irreducibility to any type, in the absence of a 
corresponding type.
Three examples:
[9] The atypicalness of a 27 euros banknote is negative atypicalness.
[10] The atypicalness of castling in draughts is negative atypicalness.
[11] The atypicalness of scoring a try in football (soccer) is negative 
atypicalness19.
A 27 euros banknote, castling in draughts, scoring a try in football are 
atypical not because they deviate from a type, nor because they don’t fully 
fit a type: they are atypical because there is no corresponding type at all: 
there is no type “27 euros banknote” in European monetary system, there 
is no type “castling” in the game of draughts, there is no type “try” in the 
game of football.
They are not tokens of a type, because there is no type, because a 
corresponding type doesn’t exist.
Example [10] (castling in draughts) is inspired by the famous Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s passage:
Statt “Man kann nicht im Damenspiel nicht rochieren”, sage: “Es gibt im 
Damenspiel kein Rochieren”. (Wittgenstein, 1967, § 134, 315)20
I call “negative” this kind of atypicalness because it consists in a (non-scalar, 
binary) absence of typicalness: there is no typicalness because there is no type21.
Privative atypicalness and negative atypicalness have opposite presuppositions.
19  The game of rugby is quite provocative for philosophers of institutional phenomena: 
according to a tradition, indeed, the game of rugby originated on November 1st, 1823, on the 
grass of Rugby Public School, when, according to a memorial tablet that lays there, William Webb 
Ellis “with a fine disregard for the rules of football as played in his time, took the ball in his arms 
and ran with it, thus originating the distinctive feature of the rugby game”. It was properly by 
not fitting the rules and types of the game he was playing, that Webb Ellis originated a new game, 
with its new rules and types. It was the (negative) atypicalness of Webb Ellis act that inspired the 
types of a new game: the game of rugby.
20  Not: “One can’t castle in draughts” but ˗ “There is no castling in draughts”. Wittgenstein’s example 
is quoted as an example of “absence-impossibility” (impossibility due to the absence of certain 
rules) by Amedeo Giovanni Conte and Paolo Di Lucia in (Conte and Di Lucia 2012, 138). I think that 
my paradigm “privative atypicalness vs. negative atypicalness” may be fruitfully confronted 
with Conte and Di Lucia’s “presence-impossibility vs. absence-impossibility” paradigm, as well 
as with Conte and Di Lucia’s “nomophoric impossibility vs. non-nomophoric impossibility” 
paradigm.
21  Negative atypicalness is negative as well as negative is the Manichean conception of evil: 
evil is other than good, it is absence of good.
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Privative atypicalness, consisting in a partial deviation of a token from a type, 
presupposes the presence of a reference type (with regard to which privative 
atypicalness of a token is predicated).
The type “ten euros banknote”, for instance, is presupposed by a counterfeit 
ten euros banknote.
On the contrary, negative atypicalness, consisting in irreducibility to any type, 
presupposes the absence of a reference type.
The paradigm “privative atypicalness vs. negative atypicalness” illuminates 
(and is itself illuminated by) the phenomenon of normative impossibility.
Normative impossibility is any form of rule-related impossibility (of 
nomophoric impossibility, in Amedeo Giovanni Conte’s and Paolo Di Lucia’s 
[*Milano, 1966] lexicon)22.
Normative impossibility (rule-related impossibility) may be the result of three 
different normative situations.
(iii) A first kind of normative impossibility derives from the presence 
of deontic rule of prohibition: it is normatively impossible, in Italy, to 
smoke in public premises because there is a legal norm that prohibits to 
smoke in public premises.
(iv)  A second kind of normative impossibility derives from the 
presence of an anankastic-constitutive rule that poses a necessary 
condition that cannot be fulfilled: it is normatively impossible for a 
40-year old person to participate to a competitive state exam if an 
anankastic-constitutive rule poses as a necessary condition to enter the 
state exam being younger than 35.
(v) A third kind of normative impossibility derives from the absence of 
an eidetic-constitutive rule that constitutes a particular type of act or 
event: it is normatively impossible to castle in draughts because there is 
no constitutive rule of draughts game that constitutes the type of move 
“castling”.
In the game of chess, it is possible to castle: it is possible in virtue of the rules 
of the game; the possibility of castling is thus a normative possibility.
On the contrary, in the game of draughts, it is impossible to castle: it is 
impossible 
(i)  not because of the presence of a deontic rule that forbids it,
(i) not because of the presence of an anankastic-constitutive rule that 
22  See (Conte and Di Lucia 2012, 136-137).
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poses a necessary condition that cannot be fulfilled;
(i) but because of the absence of a rule: the absence of an eidetic-
constitutive rule that constitutes the type of move “castling”, and so 
makes it possible to instantiate an infinite number of tokens of “castling” 
in draughts. It is impossible, here, to produce a token of a type that 
doesn’t exist.
The third kind of normative impossibility (the normative impossibility to 
castle in draughts), which is seemingly the most radical kind of normative 
impossibility, is a normative impossibility due to the absence of a type, due to 
negative atypicalness23.
The impossibility due to the absence of a type recalls Stanisław Jerzy Lec’s 
words: 
Many things didn’t come to existence due to the impossibility to give them a 
name.
5.1. In the foregoing §§ 1., 2., 3., 4. of this paper I showed:
(ii) that some essential eidographic properties of institutional types are 
necessarily transmitted from a type to its tokens;
(iii) that conventional, institutional, and, in general, normative types 
have a world-to-type direction of fit;
(iv) that the effects of an institutional act are produced through the 
tokens, but in virtue of the type;
(v) that there are cases where some institutional phenomenon is 
impossible due to the absence of a corresponding type.
5.2. These considerations suggest the idea that types in social ontology, 
and notably with regard to institutional phenomena, do not play a merely 
cognitive role, but a normative one, and they arise a question: Can there exist 
institutional phenomena without types? In other terms: Can there exist an 
institutional reality at all without types?
5.3. This normative role of institutional types has an import not merely at 
the epistemological level, but chiefly at the ontological one.
While in natural phenomena a token is what it is independently of the type 
23  Conte and Di Lucia call this impossibility “absence-impossibility” (impossibility due to the 
absence of a certain rule), as opposed to “presence-impossibility” (which is due to the presence of a 
certain rule): see (Conte and Di Lucia 2012, 138).
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it is ascribed to, in social ontology a token of an institutional phenomenon is 
what it is only in virtue of the type which it is an instance of.
Types, in social ontology and notably with regard to institutional 
phenomena, seem to be not only condition of conceivability, but also 
condition of possibility of their tokens.
Reformulating an idea formulated by the Italian legal philosopher Amedeo 
Giovanni Conte about norms, types are not merely epistemologically 
transcendental: they are also ontologically transcendental with regard to 
their tokens24.
The hypothesis I formulate here is that the ontology of institutional 
phenomena is primarily an ontology of types, while the ontology of natural 
phenomena is primarily an ontology of tokens25.
24  See (Conte 1962) and (Conte and Di Lucia 2012).
25  A similar suggestion has been (provocatively) envisaged by the Scottish legal philosopher 
sir Neil MacCormick: MacCormick states that “at least the world of legal institutions is a world 
safe for Platonists” (MacCormick 1986, 55).
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The paper deals with the problem of delimitation of regulative and constitutive rules. I 
argue that while regulative rules are and remain a genus of their own, they do have a 
constitutive import, because they (i) define new forms of behaviour (behaviour compliant 
with them), (ii) take constituted entities as “input”, (iii) redefine old forms of behaviour 
as such to which a deontic modality applies and (iv) help to carve out new possibilities of 
behaviour from a continuum of only potentially distinguishable possibilities.
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In a not yet so remote past, it was an unwritten rule of decorum on Polish 
public transport means to offer one’s seat to an elderly or handicapped 
person standing in the aisle. Now no longer: you occasionally see whole 
rows of seats occupied by teenagers or persons in their twenties with 
sexagenarians or septuagenarians humbly standing in the aisle. Bend over 
to one of the young sitters and suggest to her the idea of giving up her 
seat to this lady or that gentleman and you will see eyes resplendent with 
innocent perplexity and a facial expression, not of a defiant “who are you 
to tell me that?” or “why should I?” but of sheer wonder at the very idea. 
Apparently, the idea has never crossed the young person’s mind1, strikes 
her as utterly eccentric, and does not exist to her as a human possibility, a 
Lebensform, in the Wittgensteinian2 nor Thomas-Mannian3 sense.
But let us begin from the beginning.  
Constitutive rules are often defined by oppositions to other kinds of rules. 
Amongst these oppositions that to “regulative rules” (that is, rules that 
say that someone must, must not, need not, may or may not, do or abstain 
from this or that) is probably the best-known. Searle has, in part, defined 
constitutive rules as in so far distinct from the regulative ones as they, as he 
put it, do not just regulate but also define new forms of behaviour4. On the 
face of it, the distinction seems clear-cut. (Except that it is not clear whether 
the distinction be ex- or, much rather, merely intensional5.)
Yet, on reflection one easily realises that regulative rules do, them too, define 
new forms of behaviour—namely, behaviour compliant with them. For instance: 
“Smoking aboard of this aircraft is prohibited”: clearly, while not smoking as a form 
of outer behaviour is just not smoking, whatever its motive, taken jointly with its 
true motive—if, that is, the desire to comply with the norm in question is its true 
motive—it is different from, for instance, not smoking for lack of desire to smoke.
1 To be fair to Poland’s younger generations, different behaviour is still observable, every now 
and again… . Yet, it is typically persons over forty who vacate seats for those over sixty or the 
handicapped.
2 On “form of life” in Wittgenstein and in general (including Thomas Mann and the concept’s 
philological history), see (Conte 1995a, 317f. footnotes 4-6).
3 (Mann 1926).
4 (Searle 1970, 33). Actually, Searle says “create or define”, as if this were the same. This 
sloppiness does not remain without consequences, as I shall show later on.
5 Searle himself suggested (Searle 1970, 186f.) that in a sense even the Decalogue is a set of 
constitutive rules. I shall return to this issue later.
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The Italian philosopher Gaetano Carcaterra has suggested to speak of a 
“constitutive force” of a norm (rule)6, rather than of “constitutive norms” 
(rules) per se. This is close to the idea that all norms partake of constitutivity 
to a degree. The border-line between the two kinds of norms may then come 
out blurred, or in any event not so clear-cut. Or maybe it is clear-cut, but 
only conceptually (intensionally), not extensionally? Or perhaps the matter 
is even more complex?
This essay is an investigation into this issue.
I presuppose this premise (which I consider incontrovertible): motives (true, 
as distinct from pretended ones, I stress) of a behaviour are part of the 
behaviour’s identity, that is, if they change, a different behaviour results. A 
person abstaining from smoking for a while is not “doing the same thing” 
whether she acts out of respect for the law7 (in this case, a norm which 
prohibits smoking at the person’s spatio-temporal location) or whether she 
simply has no wish to smoke (e.g. as a habitual non-smoker).
As long as only the outward aspect of the behaviour is considered, both 
actions (actually, omissions) look identical, but this is an illusion. Depending 
on what the motives are, the behaviour can take different courses and 
often does. For example, once the “no smoking!” rule has been abrogated, 
the temporarily non-smoking habitual smoker may well light a cigarette, 
while the one who has no desire to smoke will not in the least be affected. 
Also, one who observes rules out of a desire to observe them may have a 
further “pharisaic” desire, namely, to be seen as one who observes rules, 
and consequently his behaviour may be ostentatious or pronouncedly 
conspicuous, whereas a person who has other motives to behave as the 
rules say he or she should cannot have a desire like that. This is perhaps 
not frequent with omissions but think of the dignified immobility of one 
who refuses to cross a street on red at a crossing where most everybody is 
crossing the street regardless of the lights. Generally, depending of what 
our motives are, we shall react differently to new stimuli and modify our 
behaviour in a different way.
It will, perhaps, be responded that from the point of view of whoever 
6 (Carcaterra 1979). On p. 137 he speaks of a “sostanza costitutiva” of certain rules in a sense 
close to “being costitutive purely and simply”.
7 The Kantian “Achtung fürs Gesetz”, Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals, Akademie-Ausgabe 
IV, 400. Or out of fear of the punishment; in any case, a behaviour done “in function of” the law 
(Conte 2000).
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lays down regulative rules it makes no difference what motives those 
who comply with them are guided by. Even if not smoking out of respect 
for the law is a new form of behaviour, it is, from the point of view of the 
legislator, equivalent to the old forms, even though not strictly speaking 
identical with them.
While this is, in a sense, true, it is also true that the legislator is not, and 
cannot be, quite indifferent to the motives of those whose behaviour she 
attempts to regulate. If she had been, she would not have cared to lay down 
any rules, hoping that people will behave the way she wants them to “for 
whatever motive”. Yet, she knows only too well that this won’t work: among 
“whatever motives” people happen to have there are, alas, great many 
which push them to behave in an undesirable way, for instance, to smoke 
on aeroplanes. The legislator knows this, so she provides a motive to behave 
the way she wishes, namely, the desire to comply with a rule, and this rule 
is precisely the regulative rule “Smoking is not permitted aboard of this 
aircraft”. Saying that the legislator does not aim at provoking a kind of 
behaviour “out of respect for the law”8 but a class of behaviours agreeing 
in the outward aspect only but done for “whatever motives” is nearly as 
adequate as saying that a buyer does not really will buying the commodity 
she is buying but only wills “acquiring” it (in “whatever way”)—as if the 
purchasing act were performed unbeknownst to her and without her 
consent. It is true that a buyer is interested primarily in the object or service 
she is buying but it is also true that the immediate object of her willing is 
the act of purchase, qua the preferred way of acquiring the good or service.
Yet still, it is, in a sense, true that the new forms of behaviour that 
regulative rules give rise to are less interesting to those who draw up and 
enact these rules than are the new forms of behaviour constitutive rules 
give rise to in the eyes of their respective legislators. To the former, it is 
only essential that people behave as the rules say they ought to; they are 
ultimately interested in the “legality”, to speak with Kant9, of behaviour, 
just like a buyer is ultimately interested in acquiring the object and would 
welcome being given it for free. To the latter, and also to the “custodians” of 
constitutive rules (referees, etc.), it is, too, crucial that people should behave 
in conformity with constitutive rules for the sake of, among other things10, 
such conformity. A person who, due to her mimicking talents, or by sheer 
8 See footnote 2.
9 Metaphysics of morals, Akademie-Ausgabe VI, 219.
10 Though, in most cases, not exclusively.
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coincidence, behaves like everybody else during a religious ceremony or a 
session of a secret organisation, without knowing the rules, and without the 
intention to follow them, will not be considered to be “playing the game” 
and will be treated with distrust11.
This is perhaps the most salient respect in which constitute and 
regulative rules differ. Nonetheless, because they give rise to a new form 
of behaviour in the sense here set out, regulative rules can be said to 
have a constitutive force.
However, even if in the final analysis it be conceded that regulative rules 
do, them too, define new forms of behaviour, it can be objected that these 
new forms of behaviour are not as radically new as the ones defined 
by constitutive rules. (Which, too, makes it unlikely, for most classical 
examples of constitutive rules, that anyone should behave in conformity 
with them while not knowing them.) How new is not smoking on board 
of an aeroplane for norm-related reasons? Clearly, it is not radically new: 
there is (and has been for long) the well-defined (outward) activity of 
not smoking, there is the deontic modality “you must not”, very well 
known too, the two combined form a rule, there is the human ability 
to do something because of a rule (either for the Kantian Achtung fürs 
Gesetz, or for fear of punishment) and that is it, it seems. The new form of 
behaviour is new in the sense in which a sentence which nobody has cared 
to formulate is new once it has been formulated, but no more: old words, 
old grammar, new sentence. Perhaps the sentence “the windows were open 
as the warmth had come”12 has never before been formed in the English 
language, yet obviously it is just known words laid out in a known array, 
thus new in a rather weak sense.
Behaviour conforming to constitutive rules, by contrast, is not just so 
weakly new. In them, that which the deontic operator (if any) is attached 
to is not understood apart from the rules. A good example is “castling” 
in chess. Chess rules forbid castling if the king has already moved. But as 
distinct from forbidding smoking on board of a plane, the forbidden action 
11 This presupposes, obviously, that somebody knows the rules. Which is why (as Guglielmo Feis 
M.A. of Milan University has brought to my awareness) in occasions where empty rituals are 
practiced and (next to) no-one remembers the underlying rules, there is a general uneasy feeling 
and an equally general tendency to treat one another with distrust. The Reader may pick his/her 
favourite example.
12 It is, actually, a translation of a Swedish sentence from a short story by Strindberg: “Fönstren 
stodo öppna, ty värmen hade kommit” (Strindberg 1913, 23).
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is unintelligible (we do not know what it is) unless certain other rules 
specify its essence, and those rules are, again, constitutive. They constitute 
castling13.
It is crucial, here, that the definition of castling is given in the same 
set of rules as that which contains the prohibition just mentioned. 
Many regulative rules forbid, command or allow actions which are not 
immediately understood, but are defined and explained (constituted) 
somewhere else, not within the same body of rules.
For instance, the Ten Commandments would seem to be a classical example 
of a system of regulative rules. The commandment “Thou shalt not kill”14 is a 
clearly regulative rule since it forbids a type of action which we understand 
immediately, without need for any “constitution”15. But the commandment 
“Thou shalt not commit adultery”16 is not so immediately understood. What is 
“adultery” (the root “נאפ” (nʔp))? Clearly, it is not simply every sexual activity 
whatever; it is a particularly “constituted” form of sexual activity, it can 
even be extended to inward activity of the mind17. Yet what matters is that 
it is not defined in the same body of rules, the Decalogue, as distinct from 
“castling”, which is explained in the same body of rules as that in which it is, 
in certain circumstances, prohibited, viz. the rules of chess18. This sets this 
commandment apart from typical examples of constitutive rules.
Arguing in this way, however, one runs the risk of making what must 
seem rather arbitrary decisions. Certainly, the concept of adultery is not 
explained in the text of the Decalogue itself19, but it is explained in the Bible 
(e.g., in the famous story of king David and Bath-Sheba, Uriah’s wife20), of 
which (both formulations of) the Decalogue are a part. Why consider only 
13 It is remarkable that in this sense the syntax of the verb “to constitute” is different from 
what it is in non-constitutive-rules-related contexts, where it is basically an elaborate or “fancy” 
variant of “to be”. For instance in “This European project will constitutes [sic] a significant 
breakthrough” (https://www.zsi.at/attach/PlakatA0_neu-1.pdf), where “will constitute a 
breakthrough” means just “will be a breakthrough”. Constitutive rules, in contrast, that 
constitute (in the sense relevant here) something-or-other (e.g. castling) are not that thing. 
(Rules of castling are not castling.) There is an “obiectum constitutum” or “effectum”, to use a word 
fittingly invented by Maria-Elisabeth Conte, see (Conte 1995, 282f., footnote 38).
14 The fifth or sixth, depending on which division of the Commandments you employ.
15 Abstraction made from the question whether “to kill” is really the best translation of the 
Hebrew “רצח” (rṣḥ), rather than “to murder” or something else.
16 The sixth or seventh.
17 Mt 5, 28.
18 Art. 3, 8.b.(1).a of the FIDE Laws of Chess, http://www.fide.com/fide/handbook.html?id=124&view=article.
19 Ex 20, 1-17, Deut 20, 4-21.
20 2 Sam 11.
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a part of a text, rather than the whole, or rather this part than that part? 
It would be unwise, it seems, to expect that every system of rules should 
be as compact and surveyable as the rules of chess. But on the other hand 
it will be awkward to regard the whole of the Bible, and perhaps other 
Jewish and Christian texts, as one huge formulation of the Decalogue, and 
after all, some limits must be drawn… . So the Commandments may, with 
some plausibility, be regarded as a set of regulative rules, even though they 
presuppose a set of constitutive rules, which are given elsewhere (viz. in the 
Bible less Ex 20, 1-17 and Deut 20, 4-21).
To give another, perhaps more tractable, example: the German constitution 
(Grundgesetz, Basic Law) assigns various duties and rights to the “German” 
(Deutscher) in a series of what must seem (at least in its first part) undeniably 
regulative rules. For instance, it assigns to every German the right of 
freely choosing one’s profession21. But who or what is a “German”? There 
is, certainly, an intuitive concept of a German person, which implies such 
traits as being of German parents, having lived in Germany since one’s birth, 
holding German citizenship, speaking German as a mother-language, or a 
combination of such-like. Yet this intuitive concept is insufficient for the 
purpose of defining the subject of all the duties and rights laid down in a 
Constitution; therefore, the German Basic Law defines, in article 116 (1), the 
concept of a German as: … a person who possesses German citizenship or who 
has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the boundaries of 31 
December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or 
descendant of such person. Here, it is not possible to say that the regulative 
rules of which the German constitution in part consists presuppose 
constitutive rules specified elsewhere.
Thus, it must be said that regulative rules turn out to have, in this case not 
a constitutive force, but a constitutive support, in the sense that they take as 
“input” entities constituted by constitutive rules on an earlier stage or a 
deeper-lying level of the same system of rules.
At the latest here, though, the reader might start thinking that I have, 
from the outset, left out of account an important point, without which all 
attempt at delimiting regulative and constitutive rules is bound to remain 
fruitless. This point is the presence (in regulative rules) and the absence 
21 Art. 12 (1). Compare the view ascribed to a former prime minister of Italy, Mr. Silvio 
Berlusconi: “a working class kid should stay working class” (il figlio dell’operaio deve fare l’operaio), 
http://www.flcgil.it/rassegna-stampa/nazionale/unita-evviva-il-figlio-dell-operaio.flc.
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(in constitutive rules) of deontic operators, such as “may”, “must”, “ought 
to”, “has the right/duty to”, “is prohibited”, “may”, “may not” and the like. 
In fact, many prominent constitutive rules do not contain such operators. 
Also, because of this difference, the way of giving rise to behaviour, 
whether old or new, would for the two different kinds of rules be quite 
different. Regulative rules would give rise directly to—causally create—
actual behaviour (if anyone cares to observe them), while constitutive 
rules would only define possibilities. This is because constitutive rules are 
grammatically descriptive sentences and while they need not describe 
anything that has actually occurred, they “describe” possible behaviour.
These are well-placed objections. A third one that could be added is that 
regulative rules with their deontic operators cannot be (easily) squeezed 
into the Searlean Procrustean bed of the canonical form of all constitutive 
rules, “X counts as Y in context Z”22.
Yet, as research has convincingly shown, it is not true that rules containing 
deontic operators cannot be constitutive23. Amedeo Conte has distinguished 
a whole class of what he has called “deontic constitutive rules”24. The 
mentioned rule restricting castling to situations in which the king has not 
yet moved is one of them25. Also, all deontic sentences with operators like 
“may (not)” or “must (not)” can be understood as so-called “spurious deontic 
sentences”26, i. e. descriptive propositions saying that a regulative rule is 
in vigour; then, regulative rules would be interpretable as constituting 
certain forms of behaviour as an object of duty, or other deontic modality, 
with respect to which they are not posterior. Searle is right27 in claiming 
that (while stealing as such is old,) stealing as something you must not do is 
(comparatively)28 new, and is created or defined by “Thou shalt not steal”29. 
I think it is quite common human experience to be amazed on learning 
that what we thought to be a neutral activity we have innocently indulged 
in is a bearer (in the given normative context) of a deontic modality; most 
22 (Searle 1970, 35).
23 The view that they cannot is sometimes met with in popular discussions, the reason being 
the presumed Humean gap between “ought” and “is”. This is ironic, since the very distinction 
between the two kinds of rules was introduced by Searle for the purpose of bridging that gap 
(Searle 1964).
24 (Conte 1989, 243).
25 (Conte 1989, 244).
26 (Åqvist 2002, 154).
27 See footnote 4.
28 In the perspective of the entire history of humanity the proclamation of the Decalogue is a 
recent event.
29 The seventh or eighth Commandment.
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typically: is prohibited. For instance, this writer was once dumbfounded to 
find out that taking photographs of consenting adults was prohibited in the 
main building of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Gdańsk. 
“Why should anyone issue a prohibition like that?” That is: why has this new 
form of behaviour: “photographing consenting adults in the said premises 
as prohibited” come into being? This is yet another way in which regulative 
rules may be said to have a constitutive force.
There seems then to be a perfect analogy between (constitutive) deontic 
rules governing the constituted entity called “castling”, and (regulative) 
deontic rules governing the equally constituted entity called “a German” 
(Deutscher), in the rules of chess and the German Constitution, respectively. 
Why not call them both “constitutive”? Why insist that the various rights 
and duties of a German are given in rules which, although they have a 
constitutive support, are themselves regulative?
Because, a reply would go, that kind of deontic modality as that governing 
castling is essential part of what castling is. If this should seem of little 
convincing force (as, after all, castling is what it is, i.e. the king and a rook 
switching fields, all restrictions come afterwards): the chess-bishop’s “duty” 
to move diagonally, the prohibition of touching the ball with one’s hands in 
association football (soccer) are quite distinctly essential to what the chess-
bishop, resp. the game of football, is.
But is the prohibition of adultery not equally essential to a pious Jew or 
Christian? Is the freedom of choice of profession or occupation not essential 
to a (Federal Republic’s) German? The correct answer is, I propose, a “yes” 
when the pious Jew/Christian, or the German are considered qua such, and a 
“no”, when they are considered qua human beings. A pious Jew or Christian 
stops being such while committing adultery, yet obviously does not—human, 
all too human—stop being a human being. A modern German who believed 
to be legally bound to choose a profession or occupation and acted upon 
this belief would not immediately lose his citizenship but would count as 
seriously out of tune with his status as a German citizen30. As a human being 
such a person, by contrast, would be intact.
Yet analogously, it will be objected, a chess-bishop moved horizontally 
30 Candidates to German citizenship are obliged to pass a test of, among other things, their 
knowledge of the German Basic Law. A person like that would not pass this test (if carried out 
seriously).
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or vertically would stop being a bishop, all the while remaining what it is 
outside of the chess context, viz. a piece of wood. A human chess-player who 
moved his bishop in this way would, for this moment, stop being a chess-
player, all the while remaining a human being.
There is an important difference, however: The status of a chess-bishop 
lent to a piece of wood, that of a chess-player or a footballer lent to a human 
being, is not directly derivative of any essential trait of either. Pieces of 
wood have no natural propensity or inclination to become counters in a 
board game, and human beings have no such inclination to sports. There are 
human beings, to be sure, who do have such an inclination but there also are 
some who do not, and there is nothing pathological or otherwise abnormal 
in not liking sports. All (healthy and not handicapped) human beings have, 
by contrast, a propensity to, and a need of, living in a “polity”, an organised 
community of other human beings31. It is not, of course, essential to human 
beings as such to be citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany but it is 
essential to them to have a status (be it that of a citizen or subject, or the 
like) in a republic, or a kingdom, or a duchy or some other form of a state-
like entity. As Kant once noted32, even a people of demons would need a 
state33. Similarly for adultery and Jewish/Christian piety: it is not essential 
(at least from a non-believer’s or agnostic’s perspective) to have that religion 
or any religion at all, but it is essential to have an ethics (that is, to lead an 
organised, disciplined life) and again for an ethics it is essential to regulate 
the matters of sexual life in one way or another. What is condemnable 
“adultery” from the point of view of one ethical system may be permissible 
or even highly laudable “polyamory” from another’s, but some “line” on, and 
some structuring for, sexual love is necessary.
Thus, systems of regulative rules do contain constitutive elements, such as 
rules pertaining to “a German” or “adultery”, yet they are set apart from 
systems of “normal” constitutive rules because the constituted elements 
are articulations of basic traits and needs of human nature34. Of course, such 
articulations contain and cannot help containing, given the limitations 
of the human mind and will, a large amount of arbitrariness35; hence 
different forms of polity and different ethical systems. Yet they all contrast 
31 Aristotle’s “πολιτικὸν ζῷον” (“politikon zoon”, “social animal”), Politics I, 1253a, and III, 1278b.
32 Perpetual peace, Akademie-Ausgabe VIII, 366.
33 As reminds us (Cortina Orts 2003, 16).
34 As set forth by Cotta in his (Cotta 1991). See my (Żełaniec 2011). Or sometimes of non-human 
nature, such as in the definition of a “built-up area” in the Highway Code.
35 Which is why my position is not simply a variant of jusnaturalism.
WOJCIECH ŻEŁANIEC University of Gdańsk
ON THE CONSTITUTIVE FORCE OF REGULATIVE RULES
125
with systems of constitutive rules (which, in their turn, have regulative 
elements), because these latter give form to accidental propensities of 
human beings, and define non-essential (though often interesting and 
useful) entities36.
And finally, there is yet another way in which regulative rules can be 
weakly constitutive or have a constitutive force. Consider the young 
sitters on Polish trams and buses. That which more traditionally-minded 
passengers think is their obligation (viz. vacating their seats for the benefit 
of the elderly and handicapped) does not exist to them as a possibility 
to contemplate even though it is conceptually very simple and not at all 
“constituted”. Yet it is not obvious, in a way in which occupying a free seat 
during a ride is, it does not suggest itself to your tired body as “the most 
natural thing to do”—quite on the contrary. It has to be “carved out” from 
a continuum of most diverse possibilities (to vacate a seat just for a stop, 
for one minute, for some other time, getting someone else to vacate hers, 
waiting till the elderly person asks you to be allowed to rest on your seat37, 
making that person to sit on your knees, and so on) none of which is obvious 
and none of which suggests itself to you on a merely psycho-physiological 
basis. And exactly that “carving out” (constituting in a weak sense) was done by 
the rule of decorum I mentioned at the beginning of this paper—when it was 
still in vigour.
36 This does not apply to the Kelsenian Basic Rule, if it be a constitutive rule, that is. See 
(Azzoni 1988, 71-78).
37 Which, as Guglielmo Feis M.A. of Milan tells me, is the Italian method, at least amongst the 
young.
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According to Searle (1969) a constitutive rule creates the very possibility of the entity 
it rules. Later on, other scholars - such as Benoist (2003), Conte (1983), Guastini (1983) - 
pointed out the inviolability of constitutive rules.
In this paper we want to challenge the inviolability dogma by asking the following 
question: is it possible to have violations of constitutive rules? We will argue that a 
parametrical approach to constitutive rules can do away with the inviolability dogma. As 
a result, our approach allows for violations and introduces two different ways of exiting a 
game (semantic exit vs. practical exit).
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This paper concerns the problem of the inviolability of constitutive rules 
(CRs). The problem of constitutive rules inviolability is the unavoidable 
fallout of what we call the standard theory of constitutive rules1.
Several rhetorical devices are usually employed in order to justify the 
standard theory and its fallout against the criticisms that is possible to move 
against them to the extent that is possible to deem “dogmatist” the position 
of those who employ those devices. This paper has two main aims: firstly, it 
tries to debunk the dogmatist position by showing the ontological problems 
that such a position entails; secondly, it tries to put forward an alternative 
theory of constitutive rules that does away with the inviolability fallout.
This paper has 4 sections: in section 1, we introduce the main concepts and 
theories that we are going to deal with: constitutive rules, the inviolability 
dogma and some criticism and rejoinders on both side of the debate (in 
support and against the dogmatist position); in section 2, we challenge 
the dogmatist position by sketching our parametrical theory and we try 
to understand whether or not our parametrical theory of constitutive 
rules can replace the standard theory of constitutive rules; in section 3, by 
comparing the two theories, we analyze some of the positive consequences 
of our proposal (i.e. when and how violations occur and a theoretically 
meaningful new division between different ways of exiting a game). A 
conclusion in which we acknowledge the possible criticisms that such a new 
approach may raise will follow in section 4.
By inviolability dogma (ID) we mean the thesis according to which changing 
something regarding a constitutive rule is not a violation of the rule but the 
creation of another rule-constituted type that has no relation with the first type.
We want to show that the issue of violation is twofold: on the one hand 
it is possible to violate the codified constitutive rule of a game by way of 
1  We will call standard theory the way of approaching the constitutivity issue along the line 
of Searle (1969) according to which constitutive rules create the very possibility of new behaviors 
- as in the rules of chess. The Italian legal philosopher Amedeo G. Conte exploited a full and 
complex taxonomy out of the Searlean and Rawlsian - see Rawls (1955) - intuition of constitutive 
rules. His main idea was to investigate CRs both as conditions of possibilities and as conditions 
of conceivability of the objects they rule. He further articulated his taxonomy working out 
different kinds of conditions. See his volumes of collected papers Conte (1989, 1995, 2001).
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modification (think about playing soccer 12 vs. 12 instead of 11 vs. 11); on 
the other hand, certain modifications can run so deep that it is possible 
to say that the original practice has been “left behind”, i.e. we exited the 
game. Scope of our paper is to explain when modifications are deep and to 
distinguish two different ways of exiting a game (semantic and practical).
We claim, against the ID, that violations as modifications occur and that, 
when a theory of CRs reconstructs two games as unrelated types - i.e. the 
classic move of the standard theory to deny that CRs’ violations happen - 
there is a much more complicated story to dig into that concerns different 
ways exiting a game2.
The debate whether constitutive rules are inviolable or not is a consequence 
of two different characteristics of constitutive rules. On the one side CRs 
are, as the name itself suggests, rules, i.e. they display a prescriptive element 
that tells how a certain entity, object or person, has to act or behave. On the 
other side, CRs are constitutive, i.e. the object ruled by the constitutive rule 
essentially depends on it and cannot be shaped otherwise.
As rules, CRs, prescribe a certain behavior as something that ought to 
be followed as opposed to something that ought to be avoided. This fact 
entails, at least prima facie, that there could have been a different stipulation 
according to which the constituted object X could have been characterized 
by property P1 instead of property P2. In this sense - i.e. as rules in general 
- CRs, are breakable because once a certain property is chosen, you prevent 
the ruled object from having some other properties that are not the ones 
you are ascribing to it through that CR.
As constitutive, CRs are not ordinary rules, like “do not smoke” or “drive on 
the left side of the road”, indeed, they are sort of stipulative definitions, they 
do not only rule over a certain entity but they create that very entity out of 
nothing. Take for example the CR “the bishop moves only diagonally”, this 
CR does not only tell us how the bishop should move, it tells us also how the 
bishop should move in order to be a bishop. In this sense, then, CRs cannot be 
broken because not following them means failing to create the very entity 
the rule is supposed to rule over.
The inviolability dogma poses major challenges; all the more if we use CRs 
2  It is far beyond our scope to state that there was an Ur-game that has been modified several 
times in order to create all the actual games we may experience nowadays.
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in order to explain rule-based social practices or if we want to explain social 
practices by means of reference to the rules that constitute and regulate 
them. Constitutive rules are constitutive as a whole - i.e. it is the totality of 
the rules that is constitutive of a practice - so, different sets of rules end up 
constituting different practices. If a practice like “giving a lecture as plenary 
speaker” is determined by inviolable constitutive rules, then we end up with a 
practice that is too rigid, i.e. every minor departure from the constitutive rule 
results in a practice that is no longer “giving a lecture as plenary speaker”. 
Imagine that one of the CRs that creates the practice “giving a lecture as 
plenary speaker” is that the speaker has to lecture in front of her audience. 
Assume now that the speaker, for the whole duration of the talk, speaks from 
behind the audience: given this situation, would we say that she is still “giving 
a lecture as a plenary speaker”? Probably not. However, if she goes talking 
from behind the audience only from time to time (maybe because she is a 
nervous walking-speaker), then our perception would be different.
Closely related to the rigidity of a practice, comes the problem of the 
multiplication of the practices that are too rigid. Given the link between the 
set of CRs and the object constituted, we are forced to claim that there 
are a lot of different unrelated types for all the spectrum of the very 
similar lecturing practices.
Here we will refer to single CRs as “constitutive”. Nonetheless, in the theory of CRs, this 
is somehow controversial because, properly speaking, CRs are constitutive only in a 
certain context of rules, i.e. it is the system of rules that is constitutive as a whole.
Taking this observation seriously will involve sorting out whether there are 
rules whose constituted object is more or less dependent on the rest of the 
system in which the rule is embedded. This research has never been carried 
out. Take the two following constitutive rules inside their system:  “castling” in 
the game of chess and the article that constitutes the Italian flag (art. 12 of the 
Italian Constitution) in the Italian Constitution. We think that, if we analyze the 
dependence of those single rules within the rest o f the system, castling appears 
more connected to the rest of the system than the Italian flag.
Note as well that this assumption of “constitutivity relativized to systems” 
dramatically diminishes any presupposed constitutive powers of CRs and 
decreases the possibility of the existence of anything such as eidetic-
constitutive rules (i.e. rules that defines the essence of a rules-dependent 
object): essences are not supposed to be related to a system of rules!
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Summing up: a dogmatic CRs theory cannot reject our proposal using a strict 
“constitutivity relativized to systems” approach because the same approach, 
literally taken, will demolish many of the achievements of the CRs theory.
The most intuitive reply to the inviolability dogma is the observation that 
you can actually cheat in CRs-based game. Take the abused example of chess: 
what if I move the bishop as a queen and you do not recognize my move? Can 
we say that there was a violation of a CR?
The standard reply to that from the dogmatist will run as follows: “Strictly 
speaking”, the inviolabilist says, “we are not playing chess when cheating 
occurs but something else” - for example (Ross 1968, 54)3 - without any detail 
on what this “something else” is. Further, as we have seen, this reply has 
compromising ontological consequences related to type multiplication.
Despite this, we think the following reply makes a good point against the 
strictly speaking mysticism: suppose we are playing chess, I try to cheat 
and you spot me. You will probably say that what I am doing is something 
illicit related to a CR and not that I am trying to move into a different game 
(without your consent)4.
Another way to back up the strictly speaking reply is to develop a theory of 
what the “something else” is. Amedeo G. Conte developed the concept of 
nomotrophism or acting-with-reference-to-rules5. The idea is that, even 
when we cheat, we are guided by some (other) CRs, especially the rules of 
the game constituting the victory in that game, i.e. the rules that makes it 
worth for us to try to cheat.
The issue of nomotrophism is really interesting but it fails to prove that a 
violation of a constitutive rule has never occurred: even if we admit that I 
am cheating because of some other CRs, this fact is not enough to say that 
there was no violation of the CR I violate in order to have an act of cheating.
It seems, from the examples of the previous section, that the thesis 
according to which CRs are inviolable has some major flaws that not only 
3  This passage is quoted by (Roversi 2007, 101) as well. He then observes that (Ross 1968, 24) 
contradicts himself by claiming that “to cheat in any game is to make a ‘move’ which violates 
the constitutive rules of the game, with the intention that the other players, unaware of the 
violation, should take it as a regular move”.
4  This sort of reply is to be found in (Żełaniec 2003, 164-165).
5  Conte’s first work on the topic is Conte (2000).
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jeopardize our ontology (type explosion) but also our grasping of what 
really goes on in the social practices (rigidity)6.
We need to take seriously into account the somehow paradoxical question: 
are there breakable constitutive rules?
Our proposal is then to do without the ID and elaborate a different theory of 
constitutive rules according to which it is possible to violate CRs. Our theory 
will revolve around the concept of parameter.
Considering that CRs are the products of human acts, and therefore, 
subjected to human creativity, discussion and agreement, we think it is 
likely that there will be more ways to implement CRs.
Intuitively speaking, for the time being, it is possible to play soccer even if 
we are not 11 vs. 11, the different ways can be sorted out through a variable 
in which different value can be entered. Some values (12 vs. 12) will comply 
with the CR performing its task, some will not (0 vs. 0)7.
Here we sketch how the parametrical constitutive rule theory works in 
order to deal with the problems of the standard theory outlined above.
The main argument runs as follows8:
1. In the standard theory, every value not complying with the 
range set by the parameter is “out of the game” (it defines another 
game) – and this is a problem, because in this way games and social 
practices are too rigid and too many. The standard theory sees an 
excess of conceptual economy using only types and tokens. We 
would like to add a third element to the theory: a structure derived 
from the recognition of the elements of the game disciplined 
through parameters.
6  In a forthcoming paper we tackle in more details all the problems of the CRs standard 
theory and give more details about our parametric approach. Here we want to go further 
showing how this approach can be used against the ID, enabling us to have breakable CRs.
7  We think that our proposal can be seen as the first step of a full development of Snyder’s 
intuition according to whom “The notion of somebody breaking the rules constantly but yet 
playing chess does not make sense. We can make no sense of the notion of a chess player who 
always makes illegal moves. (But, of course, occasional failure to observe the rules is not a ground 
for disqualification as a player)”. See (Snyder 1971, 171, emphasis added).
8  For a better development of our parametrical theory see our forthcoming paper Structuring 
constitutive rules: a parametric shift. Creating a new game vs. Modifying a game.
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2. We should rather conceive the possibility of violating the rules 
while standing “within the game”.
3. Hence, let us introduce the new concept of a parametrical 
constitutive rules that, through different values that can be assigned 
to a parameter, enables a lot of different practices which would seem 
deviant to be accounted as standing within the game because they 
are in accordance with the parameter and hence with the rule.
4. Violations here arise only when (i) we are not playing according 
to the codified CR and yet (ii) we do not fall outside the range of 
possible values for a certain parameter.
5. Outside the range of values the game changes. However, this is 
not a problem anymore for two reasons: (i) when we fall outside a 
game, according to the parametrical CRs theory, it will be a different 
game and not only a variation of a previous game starting from its 
codified CRs; (ii) given the empirical imprinting of our theory, we 
are nonetheless able to cope also with the historical evolution and 
the comparison of different games  rather than considering them 
different unrelated token as the it was in the standard theory.
Now consider the rule (officially codified by FIFA) related to the number of 
players (call it “N° CR”):
(N° CR) soccer is played 11 vs. 11.
Now, we try to isolate its parameter. From (N° CR) we obtain:
(*N° CR) soccer is played X vs. X.
In (*N° CR) the variable X stands for a range of possible values according to 
which we are still allowed to say that this game is soccer.
The arguments in favor of such a revision come mainly from the ontological 
perspective: we claim that, with our modified parametrical CRs theory, you 
can avoid the rigidity of social practices and the explosion of types, i.e. the 
addition of one player does not entail – if within the parametrical range 
- the automatic creation of a new type of soccer. On the other hand, this 
approach, by forcing you to investigate dynamic games played for real (i.e. 
token of games, real life matches) brings into account more methodological 
and epistemological complexities.
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Another example is the following: consider the rule that constitutes the size of a 
tennis court: in case you have a rule saying that the surface of the tennis court is 
the same as the universe you are not (only) constituting another game – universal 
tennis – but you are going into a new game by entering the wrong value into one 
of the parameters of a CR (i.e. the CR that rules the tennis court size).
Our new parametrical framework enabled us both to modify a game without 
exiting the type by way of changing the value of the parameter according 
to the range and to allow for violations of CRs (i.e. for breakable CRs). The 
theoretical move is to say that violations occur when the value that we choose 
does not fall out of the range of the parameter itself but is different from that 
value of the parameter that is specified by the codified constitutive rule.
This feature of the theory enables us not only to allow for CRs’ violations 
but also to classify the possible ways of exiting a game. From the standpoint 
of view of the gaming practices, we will distinguish a semantic exit vs. a 
practical exit.
Consider again the rule concerning the numbers of the players in soccer in 
its parametrical form:
(*N° CR) soccer is played X vs. X.
Now consider the following examples:
(1*) soccer is played 1 vs. 1;
(2*) soccer is played 100 vs. 100;
and compare them with what, in our theory, is a violation of the codified 
soccer rule concerning the number of the players (11 vs. 11), e.g.:
(3*) soccer is played 12 vs. 12;
(1*) is a semantic exit from the game of soccer because it goes against the 
definition of soccer played as a team sport9. 
(2*) is a practical exit. Suppose we manage to play something like a soccer 
9  You may still say that 1 vs. 1 can be training to play soccer and so is 1 vs. 0 (say when you 
practice shooting corner kicks). Nonetheless, in order to say this, a theory to explain training as 
a subgame is needed.
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game: all the FIFA official rules apply except for the fact that we play in 
100 vs. 100. The game will be much different from the FIFA soccer as we 
know it, dribbling will become less useful and the whole game will be much 
more “crowded”, a sort of scrum in rugby. Playing the game in 100 vs. 100 is 
not impossible nor it goes against the definition of soccer as a sport team, 
but it will create many physical and practical problems in order for the 
game to go on as we expect it to go. We label such a way of stretching too 
far a parameter, practical exit. Practical exits lead to a new an interesting 
question: what are the right parameters for soccer (and the other games in 
general)? How do we recognize them10?  
(3*) is, as we know already, a violation of the codified 11 vs. 11 soccer rule 
concerning the number of the players. Nonetheless, it is not enough to exiting 
the game. All violations, in fact, are nothing but variations of the codified 
value of the parameter, but they do not fall out of the value assignment for it.
Comparing how the different theories deal with inviolability, we can say 
that there is a violation when - in our parametrical theory - the value 
assigned to a parameter departs from the value that corresponds to the 
codified version or the most played version (in soccer 11 vs. 11).
In that way our new theory admits as a well-formed rule what was an 
impossible violation in the previous theory. Consider 7 vs. 7 soccer: this 
was not a violation in the standard theory, it was not even soccer but 
another new type of game with no connections to 11 vs. 11 soccer. In our 
parametrical theory 7 vs. 7 is soccer and, given the historical prospective 
our methodology opens to us, we can see it as a violation of the original rule 
of 11 vs. 11 that is now included in soccer.
We agree with the standard theory that, in some cases, we go too far and 
exit a game. With this regard, our theory distinguishes a semantic exit from 
a pragmatic exit.
We showed that a framework in which CRs are breakable and we provided 
10  This is a rather complicated question deserving a whole methodological discussion. Here 
we will give just a short answer regarding soccer as a team game. The least number is 3 because 
even in 2 vs. 2 there are chances for the game not to be the real team game of soccer: the team 
will have a goalkeeper and a field player, but practically this amounts to 1 vs. 1 shooting towards 
a keeper (we may say it is 1 +1 vs. 1 + 1). So we need at least 3 players per team so that the two 
players remaining - not counting the keeper - are able to play as a team. The upper bound is set 
to 15 by way of looking at the number of players that other similar sports played on similar fields 
have: Gaelic soccer, rugby, hurling are all played 15 vs. 15 all involves having some sort of ball 
crossing a line and are played on a field with approximately the same length as the soccer pitch.
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examples for it. We also addressed the new topic of exiting a game. Now it is 
time to consider some criticisms to our account.
One of the possible objections that can be raised to our approach is that 
we did not provide examples in the domain of chess that, in the history of 
philosophy, is somehow the paradigmatic example of practice constituted by 
rules and we relied instead only on soccer and tennis11. 
We claim that this “argument” clearly misses the target. Chess are a sort 
of naturally rigid practice (they can be perfectly played in absence of any 
physical structure - i.e. blind chess) so, if you conceive all the gaming practices 
as chess-like practices, CRs will hardly have a chance of being breakable.
For the chess maniacs we can, nonetheless, provide two (thought 
experiment) examples: the first will show that there are parameters even in 
chess; the second will show that, not only there are parameters in chess, but 
that there are some value assignments that count as wrong assignments.
Imagine you are playing chess and that you are asked to play with a 7x7 
chessboard or a 10x10 chessboard. This is enough to show that there can 
be parameters in the CRs of a game (the default value for the number of 
squares is 8x8).
Now reflect on your reactions to this proposal: you may regret 7 or 10 as a 
correct the value for the parameter: this proves that there are parameters in 
chess and that some wrong assignment that may lead to a violation or even 
to exiting the game.
To reinforce the point that even in chess it is possible to have an 
assignment in the parameters that counts as a violation of a rule (and 
so, according to our theory, which does not entail exiting the game), 
consider a game of chess where both the players invert the parameter of 
the starting position of the king and the queen. King and queen have a 
starting position parameter that in official chess are – from the white’s 
player viewpoint – 1D (Queen) and 1E (King). In this new version you play 
chess with 1D-King and 1E-Queen. Despite the fact that you are switching 
parameters, it is still a game of chess where all chess moves are possible 
11  To be more accurate, chess are paradigmatic in the prehistory of the concept of constitutive 
rules and in the legal philosophy development. Searle uses pretty often examples from American 
football such as the touchdown or the realm of institutions (creating money, being a president, 
etc).
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and chess strategies are the same. You may need to adjust some of them to 
the new starting position (think about castling) but it is not the case that 
some moves are going to be impossible12.
With the new parametrical theory of constitutive rule we are proposing, 
problems of vagueness will obviously arise as a direct consequence of having 
replaced a precise value with a parameter to which we assign a range of 
values. Of course it is possible to debate on the range of values tolerated 
by the parameters before you fall out of the type of a game and it is worth 
investigating the rules of a game which are more affected by vagueness. The 
very possibility of discussing these issues proves that our work is going in 
the right direction13.
12  Compare this to playing something similar to chess where you switch the king with the 
pawn in front of it. Here you will lose any chance to castle.
13  We would like to thank the audiences of the “Workshop Society and Values” and “SIFA 
2012” conferences as well as the anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments and 
objections to our paper.
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Validity, objectivity, crisis in institutions, stability, unpredictability
Social institutions are considered as generally stable entities but, at the same time, prone 
to unpredictable and even dramatical changes. The paper draws some considerations on 
this issue by means of an analysis of the notions of validity and objectivity, seen in the 
light of the critical situations that institutions may face. Consider the case of an irregular 
election that leads anyhow to a result accepted by authorities and population at large. 
Such an election seems to be valid and not valid at the same time. These contrasting 
intuitions reflect the twofold nature of institutional reality: it depends on one side on 
what is accepted by those who are dealing with it, but on the other side also on what 
it is actually going on according to its rules. The article frames this problem in terms 
of response-dependence. In this respect, it follows, but also expands, Hindriks (2006), 
to reach the conclusion that institutions are easily prone to fall apart. Anyway, not in 
all cases this actually happens; on the contrary, institutions seem to be quite stable. 
We propose that what makes them stable, but also unpredictable, is, in a sense, a sort 
of misunderstanding among the involved agents. Explaining such misunderstanding 
amounts to analyze the notion of objectivity in social reality. We argue that objectivity 
is more a requirement than a feature of institutional systems, being institutional objects 
mind and context-dependent.
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Suppose a significant number of voters is voting in the wrong way. For exam-
ple, they make marks on the ballots that compromise their secrecy. Accord-
ing to the rules, their vote is null. But, in order to be considered as null by 
the institution, these votes must be recognized as null by some other “rel-
evant” people (poll watchers, judges of some court). Suppose that, for some 
reason, none of them recognize the violation and suppose, on top of this, 
that none of the voters realize that her/his vote was wrongly expressed by 
the poll; what we have here is a situation in which, from a god’s eye perspec-
tive, the entire election is null, but from the perspective of the considered 
group the election is valid. Valid, exactly because it appears to be valid. 
The situation is somehow surreal, but it makes a point: institutional reality is 
twofold, but in a very peculiar way. There is a significant difference between 
what is really going on according to the rules and what is believed and accepted 
by those who are dealing with the institution. Nonetheless, what is believed and 
accepted is crucial in assessing what is really going on in the institution. As a 
further complication, we cannot avoid to use some strong sense of objectivity: 
in many situations we feel that it is important to know what actually happened 
according to the rules, as we want this to have an influence on our decisions. 
What we would like to claim is that in the domain of social ontology some-
how both views are not only needed but somehow inevitable to retain. If 
we lost the former, we would have to say that what is objective has no role 
in what is ontological in social reality, and then no subsequent discovery of 
error can have any role in establishing who won the elections, if we lost the 
latter we would end up saying that what is subjective is not relevant, un-
dermining the very sense of social activities, including polls. Then, what is 
needed in order for such kinds of situations to be “fully” valid?
This seems to be a problem that is peculiar of the social domain, since ap-
parently it does not apply, at least not in the same way, to contexts such as 
the natural one, or, to be more precise, to the so-called mesoscopic level: if 
we wrongly believe that “the cat is on the mat”, such belief has few effects 
on the actual position of the cat. On top of this, the example above seems to 
clearly belong to a subdomain of the social, that is the institutional one. In-
stitutions, as many have pointed out, depend, in order to 
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exist, on rules that define some of their own relevant aspects; e.g., voting rules 
are essential for polls. 
One of the main supporters of the latter view is certainly John Searle (1969, 
1995, 2010); take as an instance his famous analysis of constitutive rules, 
that has generated an important field of studies. But one of the criticisms 
that has often been moved to Searle’s account is that it is too centered on 
positive situations in which agents quickly agree and are successful in their 
cooperation, but is less effective when analyzing critical cases, cases as this 
one, that may be puzzling, but also revealing. To be completely honest, such 
criticism was only supported by a minority1 of scholars and, in general, even 
if it seems obvious that we often face critical situations in our social and 
institutional activities, there is not much work carried out in analytic social 
ontology about this very fact.
Taking care of this “dark side” of social ontology is crucial, also because 
rules themselves may constitute a threat to the understanding of the ontol-
ogy of the world they create. Aside of their misapplication, as in our poll 
case, contradictions or faults may be part of the rules themselves and this 
makes  it difficult to assess what is valid in some specific institutional do-
main. One of the desired outcomes of this analysis is to establish some pil-
lars in order to draw a link between these two dimensions (misapplication 
and faults in the rules), as these are important assets for the understanding 
of the dynamics of institutions. Our starting point will be the notion of 
acceptance-dependence as developed by Frank Hindriks, and especially the 
version he proposes of the concept constitutional. This analysis, comple-
mented with our considerations about the “dark side”, will allow us to show 
some of those traits that make institutions so stable and, at the same time, 
so prone to sudden, unpredictable changes.
There are many possible ways of conceptualizing the problem of acceptance 
in social ontology. An interesting and somehow new way to give a stronger 
grasp of the issue is by re-describing it in terms of the recently and widely de-
bated notion of response dependence2. The term “response-dependent concept” 
was introduced by Mark Johnston, (1989, 146, footnote 8) and, in a nutshell, is 
aimed to capture the idea that there are concepts that are intrinsically, or a-
priori, determined by our responses; they “are tailor-made for creatures like us 
1  For example (Balzer 2002) and (Schmid 2009). 
2  There are many theories around on this notion, for recent reviews of the literature see (Yates 
2008) and (Gundersen 2010). 
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who are capable, as many intelligences may not be, of certain responses: capa-
ble of finding things smooth to the touch, bland to the taste, red to the eye”3. 
The classical example are colors4; something is red if and only if, in normal 
conditions, this very something is disposed to look this way to normal subjects. 
It is important to stress that the thing has to look red to a normal subject in 
normal conditions, since the idea is to have some kind of objectivity, suppos-
ing that all these conditions can be specified in a germane manner; that is, it is 
to select the conditions in a way “to ensure that no other circumstances could 
have given the judgment formed a greater credibility”5.
Frank Hidrinks (2006) was perhaps among the first scholars who attempted 
to make a systematic link between sociality and response-dependence, 
by introducing the notion of acceptance-dependence. To this aim, he starts 
by considering Crispin Wright’s (1988, 1992) specific approach on the issue 
(called judgement-dependence), since he sees the latter as more similar to 
acceptance-dependence than any of the other available accounts. The main 
difference between the two approaches is that judgement-dependent con-
cepts depend on counterfactual responses of individuals while, in contrast, 
acceptance-dependent concepts depend on the actual responses of groups of 
people. The counterfactual idea of judgment-dependence amounts to saying 
that the judgments of standard subjects under standard conditions are des-
tined to be correct: something is red if and only if an idealized subject has 
the red-judgment in standard situations. Instead, if we take a social concept, 
for instance popular, we have to consider the actual responses by groups of 
people. In order to assess if the concept of popular applies to Ada, we have 
to see if Ada is actually liked by a relevant number of people, rather than 
trying to find out whether an idealized subject has the popular-judgment in 
standard circumstances. Another relevant difference is the contextual char-
acter of the notion of acceptance: being popular is something generally true 
with respect to some group of people, but false if referred to another. 
Hindriks provides an interesting analysis of the concept constitutional, 
that we want to use as a scaffolding for the analysis of validity, as we men-
tioned in the introduction. But being valid in our sense is not necessarily 
being “legally valid in a specific legislation”; instead, we want  our analysis 
to be more general, we want it to encompass what is decided as the final 
outcome of an election, even if we would like this outcome also to be taken 
3  (Pettit 1991, 587). 
4  Even if it has been argued that colors may be not response dependent, e.g. in (Johnston 
1989), we will use them here just as illustration of the notion.  
5   (Wright 1992, 109). 
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into account in the analysis. The analysis of constitutional is therefore use-
ful but, at the same time, it can not be sufficient to characterize our notion, 
since, at least as it is presented in Hindriks’ account, it seems to mean some-
thing very similar to “legally valid in a specific legislation”:
Hindriks’ account moves from a criticism of Johnston’s:
Johnston claims that constitutional is judgment-dependent and offers the 
following analysis: 
“Thus the concept of a US state or federal law’s being constitutional is... the 
concept of the Supreme Court’s not being disposed to ultimately regard it as 
unconstitutional. (Being constitutional is the default condition)” (1993, p. 
104; emphasis in original). [...] Johnston’s analysis is problematic because it is 
compatibility – or rather, incompatibility – with the constitution that matters, 
instead of what the Supreme Court is disposed to do. (Hindriks 2006, 486)
As Hindriks remarks later, “constitutionality is fixed independently of what 
the Supreme Court is disposed to do” (Hindriks 2006, 487), it is what is writ-
ten in the Constitution that marks the difference between what is and what 
is not constitutional. In this case, what makes something constitutional 
is anyway non-counterfactual, being constitutional something related 
to the citizens contextual and actual acceptance of the Constitution. Actu-
ally accepting the Constitution is, indirectly, provinding actual criteria of 
constitutionality. Said that, he highlights another important point. There 
are problematic cases, where it is difficult to asses whether something is 
constitutional or not. In these cases the authority of the Supreme Court is 
what determines whether or not a law is constitutional. In these latter cases, 
anyway, actual rather than counterfactual responses are crucial for the ap-
plication of the concept constitutional. 
Now we move to consider Hindriks’ definition of acceptance-dependence. In 
his paper he provides slightly different definitions of it, but the definition 
we are interested in is the one that is best suited for the concept constitu-
tional: 
[AD*] x is F in context C ↔ in context C group G accepts a rule R or 
authority T has declared that a rule R is in force and according to this 
rule x is F. (Hindriks 2006, 492).
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For Hindriks the formulation above “explicates the relation between rules, 
our actual responses, and concepts that depend on them in an indirect man-
ner” (Hindriks 2006, 492), that is to say that it can be applied to the concept 
of constitutional, because it covers both the unproblematic cases with sets 
of accepted rules, when it is sufficient to refer to the Constitution (expressed 
in the first disjunct of the right part of the bi-conditional), and the problem-
atic ones, when we have to recur to the authority of the Supreme Court (the 
second disjunct of the right part of the bi-conditional).
We believe that even if this analysis has its own merits of clarity and it is 
quite intuitive, it is not applicable to our case, namely to define the concept 
valid6 that we would like to use in our analysis. The reason for such inap-
plicability is in the “or” in the right part of the bi-conditional. Let’s consider 
the poll example provided at the beginning of the paper. If Hindriks’ defini-
tion is correct, then we would not feel any problem in accepting the validity 
of the electoral outcome. The outcome is perhaps constitutional, but it is not 
“fully” valid, since what actually happened is against what has been fixed in 
the rules. In our intuition, in order to have “full” validity, what is fixed in 
the agreed rule and what comes as the final decision of the authority have 
to be in accordance, something like: x is valid in context C ↔ in context C 
group G accepts a rule R and authority T has declared that a rule R is in force 
and according to this rule x is valid. 
This is to say that valid is a response-dependent concept with a “stricter” 
definition than the one of constitutional, since the disjunctive formulation 
implies the conjunctive: it holds, in principle, in less cases. What are the 
consequences of this line of reasoning? Validity for an institution is the very 
heart of the institution itself. An institution that is perceived as not valid is 
bound to failure, since the mismatch between what the rule, if significant, 
says and how it is applied, makes the whole system unable to coordinate 
people’s action and then no more acceptable for them. If, in the example 
above, everyone involved in the poll woke up and realized that the outcome 
of the election, established by authority, did not reflect what actually hap-
pened, then there are good chances that the whole system would fall apart. 
This is, we believe, something inherent to every institutional system and 
also, so to speak, one of its most problematic “dark sides”7.  
6  Some of the criticisms that we will provide for valid hold also for constitutional, but 
we will not concentrate on them in this work, due to space limitations, but also because 
consitutional is not the focus of the paper, for reasons expressed earlier in this section.
7  There are other elements in this dark side; for example rules can be contradictory, as in the case 
of the Discursive Dilemma (List and Pettit 2004), but we will not deal with such elements in this paper. 
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This dichotomy between rule and authority manifests itself very often in the 
life of an institutional system, but anyway not in all cases everything falls 
apart. On the contrary, institutions seem to be quite stable8. We believe that 
what makes them stable, to put it in a provocative way, is misunderstanding.
What we have established so far is that there is a certain requirement 
of objectivity of rules and their application. This is to say that, for some 
institutional entity to be considered as valid in the full sense, rules have to 
be correctly applied in accordance with what they say. Then, we suggested 
that breaking this link between rules and application is potentially harmful 
for the institutional system as a whole: if members of the community 
perceive that the system is not valid anymore, they cease to accept it and 
this will very likely make it fall apart, or will force a substantial change. Let 
us elaborate a bit on this to conclude, from the following considerations, 
that it is exactly because agents involved do not have a clear idea of what is 
going on in their institutions that institutions are generally stable and, at 
the same time, prone to unpredictably end up in critical situations. 
Objectivity in our view is more a requirement than something that is effectively 
and always present in our institutional world. But before going into that, we 
have to illustrate why objectivity is important. The main reason is that what 
is believed can have a crucial effect on what is accepted. Acceptance and belief 
are often considered, by philosophers, as distinct9. Normally, you can cheat in 
a game only if I don’t know that you are cheating. This is not entirely correct, 
since I can go on playing even if I believe that you are cheating. Among the 
various points made to support the distinction between belief and acceptance, 
(Cohen 1992) says something interesting: belief and acceptance differ in that 
acceptance arises from adopting a policy to achieve a particular goal. I accept 
that p if I have the policy of postulating that p. In our game, I can accept your 
cheating because I will gain some advantage by doing it, for example, I simply 
can be happy to let you win. If I accept your cheating, it means that what we 
both accept is the fact that we are playing regularly, but each one of us believe 
that the game is not valid, or, better, that it is not fully valid, since the cheating 
has not been declared10 and accepted yet. But if I discover the cheat I can halt the 
game, in the sense that I have good arguments to make you accept, for example, 
that the game is null or that you ought to be sanctioned.  
8  This point is quite accepted in literature, from the first studies in sociology (Weber 1968) to 
the latest in philosophy of sociality (Searle 2010).
9  For example (Cohen 1992), (Bratman 1999) and (Tuomela 2000).  
10  The underlying idea is that collective acceptance is carried out by means of declaratives. 
For some recent work on declaratives see (Searle 2010) and (Tuomela 2011). 
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There are other motivations that can force agents to declare the 
misapplication and try to convince the others to accept it and, then, to act 
accordingly. Aside malicious interests, one of the main motivations is the 
understanding of the fact that, in some cases, the misapplication could be 
harmful for coordination. For example, I can realize that my opponent is 
misapplying the rules in such a way that I do not know how to reply with 
another move. If I feel that I am in a deadlock and I cannot go on playing, we 
can say that I feel forced to declare the misapplication. 
This is enough for arguing that objectivity, as we intended it here, plays 
a crucial role in institutional systems as a requirement. But this does not 
mean that this is also a necessary condition for an institutional system 
to be an institutional system, this just tells us that agents can use this 
requirement in order to make other agents accept that some misapplication 
has taken place and change their behavior accordingly. 
For some theorists we have a sort of objectivity in our knowledge of social 
reality. The debate is very complex 11, and we will suggest just two quick 
lines of attack to this position.  The first line deals with the relationship be-
tween the ontological and the epistemological dimension. 
According to Searle, the institutional reality is ontologically subjective, i.e. 
it depends, for its existence, on agents’ mind. On a par with this thesis, we 
have the other one, namely that the institutional reality is also epistemically 
objective. This means that “it is, for example, an epistemically objective fea-
ture of this thing that it is a screwdriver; but that feature exists only rela-
tive to observers and users, and so the feature is ontologically subjective.” 
(Searle 1995, 10). 
 We believe that this objectivity is not as firm as Searle would want it to 
be. The dependence of social entities on agents’ minds, rules and their ap-
plication makes things less objective than one could think and leaves room 
for misunderstandings or lack of proper knowledge of what is going on in 
the institutional system. To see it, let’s go back to the comparison Searle 
makes with artifacts on one side, like screwdrivers, and social entities on 
11  See (Searle 1995, 2010), but (Thomasson 2003) has even a more extreme position on that. 
(Guala 2010) labels this position as infallibilism, meaning that, being social kinds a product of 
stipulation, then at least some (relevant) members of the community that makes such stipulation 
cannot be wrong about them: “we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own 
institutional [...] kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error (Thomasson 
2003, 580).”
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the other. Suppose we accept that there is something like “an objective 
feature” that allows us to classify this thing as a screwdriver. Nonetheless, 
screwdrivers can be used in different manners, not even imagined by the 
users and the creators of  the screwdriver. This could happen in such a 
way as to make it difficult to recognize this thing as a screwdriver: it is so 
out of context that we cannot understand anymore what it is. This holds, 
in principle, for all the things we were willing to classify as screwdrivers, 
but, actually, these different uses pose a threat neither to the new nor to 
the old context. There is just a new concept for classifying things with the 
same old shape. This  boils down to say that I can use the very same thing 
as a screwdriver and as a nail. But to deal with the institutional world is 
a different matter. Institutional entities have rules that concur to define 
them, we can say that the former have a content that establishes their use, 
since they are themselves made up of rules, not out of physical matter as 
screwdrivers. On top of this, they are related to a context of other rules 
and such context is much stricter. If we go out of the original context, 
there is always the possibility that we cannot understand what is the new 
application anymore, as we also suggested when talking about objectivity 
as a requirement and its role in coordination. 
The second line of attack is that acceptance and belief have to be considered 
as spreading all over an institution, especially through the agents involved, 
who are, in the end, those that put social reality into existence. As we said 
for the chess example, each “move” of each agent involved in the institution 
has to be accepted by the other agents. But this means that in order to asses 
what is valid in the full sense and what is not, we should check every agent’s 
action, epistemic attitude and act of acceptance. Moreover, institutions as 
states have a huge amount of rules and dispositions and they perform, via 
they relevant members, a vast amount of institutional actions. It is then 
very likely to imagine that each agent has a limited amount of knowledge on 
what is going on in the institution.
How do members of an institution cope with this state of ignorance or mis-
understanding? There are many possibilities that need to be explored, a 
tentative solution could be that they rely on trust. They somehow trust each 
other and the authority for the application and control of the application of 
the rules and for resolving difficult matters. But also authorities (as relevant 
members) have a limited, even if, maybe, greater, amount of knowledge of 
what is going on in the system, and they are also forced to trust the system. 
The fact that we trust that, at the end of the day, rules are more or less ap-
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plied in the correct way, exactly because we don’t have a precise way to 
establish it, is what makes institutions stable. But this can enhance the pos-
sibility, for some of the perviously mentioned reasons, of a serious divorce 
between rules and their application. Normally, this divorce has no dramatic 
effects on the institutional reality, as it is not even recognized by its mem-
bers and agents tend to rely more on the application than on the rules them-
selves. We said also that the system is unpredictable for the same reasons. 
This is to remark how unlikely it is that the agents realize the effective sta-
tus of the system, in this case that there is a problem in the rule-application 
axis. And also when they realize it, it could be that they have no interest in 
making this explicit or accepted. Even when explicitly accepted, they can be 
happy with it, meaning that it can have no interference with their policy.  It 
is only when there is a convergence of this very complex chain of beliefs and 
acceptances with some specific crucial interests, like the need for coordina-
tion, that the system falls apart. 
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Rakoczy and Tomasello follow Searle in claiming that rule games need status function 
assignment and constitutive rules. But, in the case of pretend play, it is not easy to put 
together these notions with the natural world knowledge necessary to engage in it. If we 
consider the pretended scenario as a possible world, metaphysically possible, then, how 
can we abandon the natural necessity implicit in it? The rules of pretend-inference can 
have a robustly objective status. On this view pretence stands to pretending as truth 
stands to belief. 
DOES ONTOGENESIS OF SOCIAL 
ONTOLOGY START WITH PRETENCE?
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Gelman and Byrnes told us, in Chomsky’s terms, that “[w]e can determine 
how languages and conceptual systems are constrained by examining the 
forms and meanings that children construct, and which errors they fail 
to make” (Gelman and Byrnes 1991, 3). Thus Billman suggested that we 
should compare and test psychological models of structure and processing 
of concepts by examining the function from “learning instances plus the 
target items to categorize” to “the set of possible category judgments” 
(Billman 1992, 415). Then the actual extension of the category is taken to 
be determined by how the learner is inclined to classify new examples. But 
I believe that experiments need to be designed and interpreted with it in 
mind that the cognitive systems are designed by evolution and tuned by 
experience to find real-world substances, not random logically possible 
ones. I think pretence is a special case of conceptual tracking. Pretending is 
changing the nature of perceptual inputs at will. I suggest the exercise of 
this kind of agency can enable subject to experience the “refractoriness” 
of reality, experience the constraints that the reality sets on what they 
can experience. 
According to Hannes Rakoczy and Michael Tomasello the ontogeny 
of social ontology starts with pretend play. This is the voluntary 
transformation of the here and now, the you and me, and the this or that, 
along with any potential action that these components of a situation might 
have. Thus, pretence presents a cradle for children’s development into 
institutional life, but, in order not to be confused by a parent’s pretend 
acts, the child must interpret pretence events as what they stand for. 
According to Rakoczy and Tomasello (R&T) this is so because on embryonic 
form these phenomena exhibit the logical structure of the conventional 
creation of institutional facts. Following Searle, they recognize that, in 
contrast to brute facts “out there”, institutional facts hold only by virtue 
of a social, conventional practice and have the logical form “x counts 
as y in a contest C”. Every stipulations of the pretence scenario involve a 
status function assignment. So children do not get confused about reality 
because of the symbolic nature of status function. Quoting Searle “The 
sense in which symbolization in [a] broad linguistic sense is essential to all 
institutional facts is that the move from x to y in the formula ‘x counts as y 
in C’ is already a symbolic move” (Searle 1999, 155). 
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I agree with R&T that pretence, if it is an institutional fact or not, involve 
normative aspects, that is, what is appropriate, what is a mistake, or highly 
inappropriate, in a given context. For example, Rakoczy has shown that 
children from around 2 years old not only are proficient at acting according 
to jointly set-up fictional stipulations in the context of shared pretend 
play, but when a third party confused pretence identities and thus made 
mistakes, children leveled protest and critique (see Rakoczy 2008). But we 
don’t have a conclusive evidence that early pretence involves the symbolic 
function. Some evidence stems from old studies showing correlations 
between early acquisition of words—symbols for referents— and use of 
pretence gestures (e.g., Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni,  and Volterra 
1979). On the contrary, in a recent research, Angeline Lillard claims that 
young children’s understanding of pretence is heavily guided by their ability 
to read gestures out of context, perhaps only in the face of supportive social 
signals indicating pretence rather than by employing a symbolic function 
(Lillard 2001). I don’t think that symbolic function is always a necessary 
condition for an institutional fact. In fact, we can give an independent 
account of normativity and not-contradiction in pretence, without the 
symbolic function. 
If pretending is a case of “thinking of x as y”, y is the way x is described, but, 
if we follow Roger Scruton’s account of imagination, broadly conceived, 
then pretence involves thinking of these descriptions as appropriate in some 
way to the primary object (see Scruton 1974). Pretending may be compared 
with uttering a sentence, as distinct from asserting it. We know that not 
everything that is said is also asserted. I may practice my pronunciation and 
simply utter a sentence, so I represent a state of affairs, but I don’t thereby 
assert that the state of affairs is real. I merely represent a possibility without 
asserting it, and we know, as empirical evidence tells us, that children don’t 
believe what they pretend. Nor do I hesitantly assert what the sentence 
says. Pretending cannot be analyzed in terms of belief. The content of my 
belief can be expressed by a sentence, in this case sentences are being used 
to say something. In a secondary case, as in elocution, sentences are being 
treated more as patterns of sound than as verbal symbols. If pretending 
is a case of “thinking of x as y”, then to think of x as y at least involves the 
entertaining of the proposition “x is y”. So, if someone pretends that a 
banana is a telephone, then he has a disposition to say “I think of the banana 
as a telephone”. But, it is not sufficient for the truth of his pronouncement 
that he should have a disposition to entertain this proposition if he always 
immediately rejects it as false. Actually, I may think of x as y while knowing 
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that it is untrue. On the other hand, with symbols we are limited to the 
dimension of falsity. By definition it’s always false that x is y if the first is 
a symbol for the second. And, clearly, marking the pretend representation 
as false does not even begin to capture the semantics of early pretence. In 
a “mark as false” account a child infers that “mummy pretends that (this 
banana is a telephone)false’. Then she gives him the banana and says “the 
telephone is ringing”. The child represents this as “mummy pretends that 
(the telephone is ringing)false”. But, which telephone? This problem does not 
arise if we merely entertain the proposition “x is y”. The failure of reference 
in the speech-act is a consequence of my entertaining unasserted the 
existential proposition whose truth is a necessary condition for the truth of 
“this banana is a telephone”. Of course, we know that the pretence scenario 
is not true, but, on the other hand, there are precise true-conditions to 
decide if pretending P is a case of pretence. In my opinion, to say that P is 
pretence is to make a normative rather than a descriptive claim, and children 
are sensitive to what is pretence. In this way I reject the contrary view that 
a child can understand what is pretence only by understanding that someone 
is pretending something. Pretence, I think, is a rational activity, then, what 
is to judge an unasserted description to be appropriate to a certain object? 
Pretending is a way of going beyond the “given”, the primary object, and 
producing descriptions which one is unprepared to assert. But this is not 
sufficient. It is necessary that the description be entertained because of his 
appropriateness.
It is true that pretence does involve treating objects as if they were 
something else, and R&T quote Searle “In the limiting case, we can use the 
object itself to represent the y status function” (Searle 1999, 155), but this 
cognitive activity is more sophisticated. For example, following Alan Leslie 
(1987) we can recognize three basic forms of pretence, with their semantic 
properties:
1. Object substitution (referential opacity) 
2. Attribution of pretend properties (nonentailment of truth-
falsehood)
3. Imaginary object pretence (nonentailment of existence)
It has been argued that pretending 2-year-olds understand four features of 
pretense: pretend stipulations, causal powers, the suspension of objective 
truth, and an unfolding causal chain. The current situation might contain 
a toy horse or an empty cup. Then, for example, memory systems are 
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addressed, returning information on entities that are perceptually similar 
(e.g., on horses) or on the functional properties of the object (e.g., on 
containing). This leads to pretence based on perceptual similarity or on 
functional connection. 
Markman and Abelev (2006) suggest that pretence is not unique in 
permitting 2 and 3-year-olds to recognize multiple object identities. In 
their study children were as good at recognizing unusual functional use as 
they were pretence, while still failing the appearance-reality task where 
deceptive stimuli were used across tasks. Their interpretation is that 
children understand multiple object identities better when an object’s 
intrinsic identity is contrasted with its relational role, that is an extrinsic 
object properties. So, children are able to distinguish extrinsic object 
properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better 
than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones 
(appearance vs. category-membership).
If we follow this account, then, conceptual factors, such as the intrinsic 
or extrinsic nature of the alternative identity, help shape children’s 
performance on multiple object identity tasks. 
Now we can try to answer the question Scruton posed about appropriateness 
of descriptions.
We have two options:
(i) Keil-Leslie: Anchoring is straightforward for immediate pretense; it 
proceeds by means of a best formal match between expressions in the 
pretend and current perceptual representations
(ii) Searle: The status and its accompanying function go beyond the 
sheer brute physical functions that can be assigned to physical objects  
So, we stay between Scylla of highly structured scenario and Charybdis of 
an umbrella-term that covers many different phenomena. We need to define 
our domain of search a bit more precisely. 
In these situations we are working on the identity of x and y, and, my claim 
is, if we consider the new scenario as a possible world, metaphysically 
possible, then, how can we abandon the natural necessity implicit both 
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in the stipulation and in successive possible implications1? Children’s 
understanding of the causal consequences of a pretend action is a routine 
by-product of a simple processing rule: to understand the consequences of 
a pretend action, assume that the entities or substances whose existence 
is stipulated are subject to the same causal principles as their real-world 
equivalents (see Paul Harris 2000; Alison Gopnik 2009). Normativity is 
constitutive of the scenario, but it is strongly appreciated in its possible 
consequences. This shows that children need to draw on familiar, real world 
causal principles. This evidence is not compatible with the way Searle uses 
the notion of observer-dependent fact. According to Searle the symbolic nature 
of a similar fact is not a product of physical virtues. Moreover, if we follow 
R&T in claiming that pretence is probably the ontogenetically primary factor 
for institutional life, then, should we adopt such a conclusion as: pretence 
is “a matter of status functions imposed according to constitutive rules”? 
(Searle 2005, 9) But, which constitutive rules? Even R&T recognize that in 
this case “the “y”, is not, as in the case of rule games, only understandable 
through the game” (Rakoczy and Tomasello 2007, 19).
We can try to find a third position between our two: 
If we follow Paul Harris (2000) we have two hypothesis about the relation 
between reality and pretence2:
a. In the case of pretend play, children do not set up a contrast between an 
imaginary event and an actual event
b. Pretend events are not set up as departures from actual events
We have a good reason to agree with him about the first hypothesis and a 
plausible hypothesis to reject the second.
Contrast first. Why there is not real contrast? A generic notion of symbol doesn’t 
help, but I think we can recognize that in our examples of pretence there is 
something that can be called iconic. According to Peirce a sign is an icon when it 
“may represent its objects mainly by its similarity” (Peirce 1931-1958, 2.276).
1 I follow Kit Fine in arguing that thinking about identity is a necessary condition to talk about 
metaphysical modalities, and this cannot reject physical notions. Rather than to give up the idea that 
there are any natural necessities, thinking about identity,  
I believe, should lead us to adopt a more discriminating view as to which natural necessities are 
metaphysical contingent.
2 In her review, Tamar Gendler defines Harris’ work “an extraordinarily comprehensive and 
informative book surveying a tremendous range of empirical psychological work on imagination 
in children” (2002, 414). Gopnik (2009, ch. 1) is even more generous with Harris’ work.
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The iconic device may possess certain elementary iconic markers and 
sometimes a minimal resemblance is due to the fact that the iconic sign, 
even though different in shape from its object, performs the same function. 
We can think just a stick which qualifies as a horse because one can proudly 
ride it. The only aspect that the stick has in common with a real horse is 
that it can be straddled. Hence the child has rendered emergent one of the 
functions permitted by the horse. Now, contrary to what is sometimes said, 
communication need not come into this process at all3. He may not have 
wanted to show his horse to anyone. It just served as a focus for his fantasies 
as he galloped along.
But our stick can become the icon of a horse, a sceptre, or a sword. In all 
these objects recurs the same element, that is the feature of linearity 
(vertical or horizontal). But we haven’t a case of imitation. Insofar as 
the vertical quality is a feature of both a stick and a sword it is the same 
verticality. Then, a linear dimension has been used as an expressive feature 
in order to substitute for the linear dimension that equally characterizes 
a horse as such. Or, in other words, a part of the referent is used as a sign-
vehicle. We can quote Kant. In the first Kritik space, like time, is a pure 
intuition, the elementary form that we confer upon experiential data so as 
to be able to perceive them and place them within the categories. Therefore, 
verticality and horizontality are the intuitive mode within which we frame 
our perceptions, not intellectual abstractions. The spatial dimensions are 
not an intellectual construction, but the structural conditions for a possible 
object, and as conditions they may be reproduced, equal to themselves, in 
varied circumstances. Whereas geometrical figures are already objects built 
under the framework of such conditions, and they cannot be reproduced 
as equal to themselves, but only as abstractions similar to previous 
constructions. This doesn’t stop the stick from standing for the horse, 
but this happens because the linearity of the stick is not a construct but a 
condition of every other possible construction, and thus an intuitive artifice 
able to determine a space. We can concede that a toy horse or a stick is a 
sign, but we need to better distinguish the imitans from the imitatum, that 
which stands for something from that for which something else stands. 
So, according to this analysis, iconism makes no appearance, and, as they 
say in semiotics, we have only intrinsically coded acts. So, to try to better 
understand the nature of pretence we are allowed to put aside symbolism.
3 Here I agree with Ernest Gombrich (1951). It seems that Searle’s insistence on the inescapable 
role of language goes beyond what is justified by the facts. Early pretence is just an example of this 
problem.
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We can consider the second argument: a possible hypothesis about possible 
departures from reality. 
Episodic memory involves re-experiencing situations. Kant argued that 
for the experience of objects (inner or outer) to be possible at all space 
and time must precede and structure all experiences of outer and inner 
states. Our experience must be grounded in space and time as pure “forms 
on intuition”. If experience has a spatial content and if episodic memory 
is re-experiencing then episodic traces must have spatial content. The 
claim is that for there to be episodic memory in any creature, what 
makes it an experience is something non-conceptual. According to Robert 
Hanna “The thesis of Non-Conceptualism about mental content says that 
representational content is neither solely nor wholly determined by our 
conceptual capacities, and that at least some contents are both wholly 
and solely determined by non-conceptual capacities and can be shared by 
human and non-human animals alike” (Hanna 2008, 42). Kant developed 
in the Transcendental Aesthetic the idea that space and time are a priori 
subjective forms of sensibility. However, sensibility was supposed to include 
not only sense perception but also the “inner sense” imagination, pleasure, 
pain, desire. Infact, we should think of the representation of space and 
the representation of time as the necessary a priori subjective forms of 
egocentrically centered human and non-human animal embodiment. 
Following these premises we claim that memorial re-experiencing is a form 
of inner sense, akin to the imagination. In the case of pretence I think that 
the non-conceptual image might be identified with what we have seen as a 
minimum image that is still sufficient to release a specific reaction. 
Imagining intends absent objects; perceiving intends present objects. Same 
objects, different intentional relation. So, is it possible to see something 
and, in the same time, to image something else that negates it? Here 
with “to image” I simply mean an episode of imagery, a mental image. Or, 
starting from a more basic question, is it possible to see and to image the 
same thing? For example, while we are looking at our mother we can try 
to visualize her face, and we need the same content in the very same way. 
But this exercise is not easy at all. It is known that there is overlap in the 
regions of the brain that are activated in seeing and visualizing. According 
to Kosslyn the same cerebral mechanism in our neuroanatomy must be 
involved, the Visual Buffer. In Zettel, Wittgenstein says “while I am looking 
at an object I cannot imagine it” (§621). This means that I cannot imagine 
the very object I am looking at. I can surely be looking at my mother from 
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the back, not even realize I am looking at my mother, and still imagine 
her from the front. De re seeing does not prevent de dicto imagining. So our 
minimum image is projected into the real situation and it helps to imagine 
alternative metaphysically possible situations, that is real departures. I 
suggest that the child who pretends productively is tracking the world. He 
is responding to the world in something like the way one responds to the 
world with one’s beliefs. Rules of pretend-inference have a robustly objective 
status, as demonstrated by Greg Currie (1998). On this view pretence stands to 
pretending as truth stands to beliefs. 
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On the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the role of emotions in moral 
judgments, new sentimentalist approaches to metaethics have been proposed. Nichols’ 
theory of sentimental rules, in particular, associates the emphasis on emotive reactions to 
the relevance of a normative body of rules that guide our judgment on actions. According 
to Nichols, the emotive mechanism of concern explains the acquisition of the moral 
capacity and, together with the evidence on psychopaths and autistic children, shows the 
implausibility of a) moral rationalism, both as a conceptual and as an empirical thesis; b) 
motivational internalism; and c) moral objectivism. However, if we distinguish between i) 
the initial acquisition of morality in children and ii) the adult experience of it, we can see 
that to accept a central role of the emotive mechanisms in the first is not to have shown 
their centrality in the second. In particular, it is not possible to account for the normative 
theory in purely emotive terms, even though we accept that their emotive connotation 
favours the evolutive success of the norms. A moderate rationalist view, grounded on the 
notion of reflective endorsement and on the cooperation between emotions and rational 
capacities seems quite compatible with the empirical evidence and can justify plausible 
forms of internalism and objectivism.
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Recent research in moral psychology and on the neural bases of moral 
judgment has highlighted the relevance of automatic reactions of an 
emotive kind in human morality. This research has empirical character, i.e. 
it aims to provide a reliable description of how our moral capacity actually 
works; according to some, it also has normative relevance, that is, it suggests 
how we should (or should not) use our moral capacities as well (Greene 
2003 and 2008; Singer 2005). To say that neuroscientific research has such a 
normative bearing is however highly controversial, as it seems to imply a 
problematic derivation of “ought” from “is”: and some commentators have 
rightly insisted that in order to reach any such normative conclusions we 
must always presuppose certain moral intuitions, while the neuroscientific 
results are in fact doing no real work in the argument (Berker 2009). 
It is much more plausible, however, to say that this research has some 
direct or indirect implication of a metaethical kind, that is, on our 
ideas concerning the nature of ethics. Metaethical propositions are not 
prescriptive, but descriptive: they aim to explain what moral judgments are, 
and whether they can be said to have any kind of truth-value. According to 
several authors, research in moral psychology and neuroethics justifies a 
radical revision of our traditional image of the moral capacity: specifically, 
a criticism of rationalist views, according to which our moral judgments 
are essentially the work of reason, and a vindication of a sentimentalist 
approach, that considers them the expression of our sentiments and 
affective reactions. Some explicitly say that there is empirical evidence 
for an emotivist conception of morality (Haidt 2001), according to which 
moral judgment belongs to moral sense, that is, to “an innate preparedness 
to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events 
involving other human beings” (Haidt and Joseph 2004,  56). 
Although the data clearly do not show the truth of emotivism concerning 
the nature of moral language—that is, of the view holding that moral 
judgments have the logical function to express certain peculiar 
emotions (Joyce 2008)—they in fact seem to count as reasons in favor of 
a sentimentalist approach that, both from an explanatory and from an 
explicitly causal point of view, attributes a central role to emotive reactions 
and an altogether subsidiary role to rational reflection. In particular, 
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Haidt’s social intuitionist conception aims to show that moral judgments 
are caused, in the great majority of cases, by the bursting in of certain 
emotions, while the arguments offered in their favor are almost always ex 
post rationalizations, that is, clumsy attempts to give reasons to support our 
automatic responses: these attempts are generated in the context of a social 
request of justification and have no causal or explanatory role in generating 
the judgments in the first place. 
This model seems to leave no space for altogether ordinary psychological 
processes, such as first-person solitary moral reflection and deliberation, 
and must consider all moral arguing as a lawyer’s attempt to defend a moral 
truth that is simply accepted a priori. Moreover, it seems unable to account 
for the empirical fact that controlled “cognitive” processes are effective 
in (sometimes) contrasting the emotive responses, overwriting rational 
responses based on consequentialist computations (Greene et al. 2001, 2004 
e 2008). In other words, by making reason a complete “slave of the passions”, 
this emotivist view is in contrast with the empirical evidence that suggested 
the “dual-process model”.
Shaun Nichols’ model of the sentimental rules offers a much more complex 
formulation of the neosentimentalist approach: it not only establishes the 
disposition to feel certain emotive reactions, particularly with reference 
to others’ sufferings, as the fundamental component of the moral capacity; 
it also stresses the importance of some normative perspective, that is, of a 
body of rules concerning the approval and disapproval of certain kinds of 
behavior (Nichols 2002a, 2004, 2008). 
Building on the data from several psychological experiments, Nichols argues 
for the following points: a) morality—and particularly the capacity to make 
core moral judgments (i.e., judgments that actions causing suffering to other 
people are wrong) and to distinguish between moral and conventional 
violations—is explained by the affective mechanism of concern; this accounts 
for the fact that three-year old children and autistic children are able to 
make core moral judgments while still lacking a developed theory of mind; 
b) the importance of this emotive mechanism, coupled with the empirical 
data concerning  psychopaths and people suffering from focal lesions of 
the ventromedial section of the prefrontal cortex, shows the implausibility 
of moral rationalism; c) the fact that psychopaths often display an intact 
capacity for moral judgment shows that knowledge of the sentimental rules 
can be dissociated from the emotive mechanism: moreover, subjects suffering 
2.
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from focal lesions in the prefrontal cortex seem to be the living evidence 
of the theoretical possibility of amoralism (Roskies 2003) and therefore 
show the fallacy of the conceptual internalism of the rationalistic view; d) 
the cultural fitness of emotively laden rules explains why certain rules do 
survive throughout human history and are largely accepted: this makes the 
objectivist explanation of moral “progress” offered by the rationalist view 
redundant. In other words, the partial and progressive overlap between moral 
codes can be explained by the similarity between our affective reactions; we 
simply happen to evolve such sentiments and there are no deeper moral facts 
that might vindicate moral objectivism. 
In what follows, I will suggest some reasons to believe that the very fact that 
Nichols’ sentimentalist view is much more plausible and attractive than 
Haidt’s weakens his attack against moral rationalism, limiting its efficacy to 
radical or extreme forms of ethical rationalism. 
In order to assess Nichols’ basic points, let us distinguish between i) the 
initial experience of morality which is found in children and which emerged 
phylogenetically at a certain point in the evolution of the species Homo and 
ii) the much more complex experience of morality that is found in healthy 
adult humans. Nichols’ research concentrates on level i): it aims to account 
for those basic judgments which he calls core moral judgments. A direct and 
easy way to defend moral rationalism would obviously be to deny that such 
judgments — that, according to many moral psychologists are found in 
three-year old children—are in fact authentic moral judgments.  We might 
say that the moral faculty presupposes a much larger mastery of moral 
concepts and of complex moral reasoning and that, therefore, the data from 
moral psychology do not undermine moral rationalism. However, Nichols 
appropriately notes that children’s moral judgments resemble the adults’ 
ones in many ways; moreover, a considerable part of our daily normative 
experience is in fact based on those same mechanisms that are at work in 
core moral judgments. 
It seems sensible, then, to accept these judgments as integral to the moral 
capacity and to find in them the essential elements contributing to moral 
judgments in adults. Nonetheless, the fact that core moral judgments 
depend on emotive reactions at level i) does not necessarily imply a 
sentimentalist explanation of level ii); that is, it does not demonstrate that 
emotive reactions to the others’ suffering are the decisive element of the 
moral capacity, as it is possessed by adults, or that all moral judgments 
3.
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depend on the concern mechanism. In effect, although Nichols considers 
highly implausible that the concern mechanism should have a merely 
evolutionary role, so that adult moral judgment could function in its total 
absence, he deems just as much dubious the “on-line hypothesis”, according 
to which the making of a moral judgment would always presuppose the 
activation of the affective mechanism: thanks to the normative theory, it 
seems very likely that adult moral judgments can often be made without any 
such activation.
Thus, even accepting that the emotive mechanism of concern is essential for 
the starting of the moral faculty (Nichols’ point a), we need to have a clearer 
view of the relationship between this mechanism and the normative theory 
in order to see whether the model of the sentimental rules can count as a 
refutation of moral rationalism (Nichols’ point b). Now, both elements seem 
necessary, according to Nichols: the ability to feel certain emotive reactions 
is a necessary presupposition of the moral judgment—since individuals with 
congenital frontal lesions never acquire the moral capacity; but the emotive 
reactions are not in themselves sufficient to characterize morality and to 
distinguish it from other normative spheres. In fact, on the one hand, in 
cases of natural disasters, or of human interventions causing suffering with 
a view to larger benefits (for example, in the medical field), we can observe 
emotive reactions similar to those linked to core moral judgments, but 
no moral judgment is generated. On the other hand, Nichols’ experiments 
themselves show that prohibitions relative to disgusting behaviour, which 
are reinforced by strong emotive reactions, acquire the same weight of 
moral prohibitions, even though common sense clearly distinguishes 
between the two kinds of prohibitions. (Nichols 2002a). This suggests that 
the emotions are insufficient to distinguish the moral from the non moral 
sphere, and that the normative theory does not simply embody those 
emotive reactions. As a matter of fact, some non moral prohibitions relative 
to disgusting behaviour may be supported by negative emotions that are 
even stronger than those relative to some moral prohibitions, for example 
those tied to rules of justice and fairness in distribution, or those relative to 
promises: however, our normative theory considers the second as a clearly 
distinct kind of violation, and one much more serious than the first. 
It seems therefore highly plausible to say that the normative theory that 
structures our emotive reactions reflects a relevant work of rational reflection 
as well. It is not the case that our set of rules simply expresses our emotions; it 
also reflects the work of rational reflection, a work which can partially shape 
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our emotive reactions. This work manipulates specifically moral concepts—not 
only harm and physical suffering, but also injustice and unfairness, disrespect 
of others’ dignity, humiliation of others, and the like—and on the basis of 
these concepts attributes a particular degree of importance to specifically moral 
violations; the acknowledgment of the peculiar importance of moral violations, 
on its turn, generates new emotions and sentiments that were not involved in 
core moral judgments. The very fact that Nichols’ theory attaches a relevant 
role to the normative theory, therefore, shows that sentimental reactions 
are insufficient in order to give a complete explanation of morality and of its 
distinction from other forms of normativity. If this is so, it is very likely that also 
in the initial acquisition of the moral capacity an essential role is played by the 
normative set of rules that enable to judge the appropriateness of feelings and 
actions; without the aid of the normative theory, children would never be able 
to distinguish between the moral from the non moral sphere, and would never 
learn the distinction between rules forbidding actions that are malicious or 
unfair and those forbidding actions that are simply disgusting. 
A possible sentimentalist rejoinder is to insist that the normative theory 
is itself the product of our emotive reactions: it is the emotive mechanism 
that accounts for the rules we have, and the normative theory is simply the 
systematization our sentimental responses. Nichols himself proposes the 
“affective resonance hypothesis”, according to which the annexing of a rule into 
our normative system is considerably favoured by its cultural fitness, which 
in turn depends on our emotive reactions: that is, the more a rule is tied to a 
behaviour that in itself generates a remarkable emotive reaction, the more it 
is likely to be permanently adopted and handed down to future generations 
(2002b; 2004). However, we must note that the fact that being emotively 
reinforced favours the evolutionary success of a rule is quite compatible with 
the hypothesis that the normative theory is not a mere systematization of 
our spontaneous affective reactions. And Nichols himself does not deny that 
rules can be preserved from one generation to the next, even though they are 
not emotively laden. He writes: “obviously there are other important factors in 
cultural evolution. The hypothesis is only that affective resonance will be one 
of the factors that influence cultural evolution” (Nichols 2008,  270). It is clear, 
therefore, that the normative system cannot be explained exhaustively in 
terms of emotive causes: in particular, it is very plausible to suggest that some 
of our rules can be explained with reference to the aims that they serve, their 
favouring social cohesion, or their being supported by reasons that can be 
widely shared. In other words, lacking any proof of the fact that all our rules are 
based on an emotive sanction, it is likely that some (implicit or explicit) rational 
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mechanism exists that, along with our emotive reactions, helps to account for 
our normative theory. It is this supplement of rational reflection that allows to 
distinguish between the moral rules and other rules, such as those relative to 
disgust, that are supported by emotive mechanisms as well. 
This shows that one of the factors explaining the adoption of the rules—
even of those rules that are in fact supported by the emotive mechanism 
of concern—may well be the acknowledgement of objective reasons for 
their adoption, e.g. reasons consisting in the desire to protect people from 
unnecessary suffering and the like. In this picture, the emotive perception 
of others’ suffering would merely favour and support the perception of 
these reasons: the reasons themselves, however, could not be reduced to the 
emotions, being rather their causes. The fact that we have the normative code 
that we have would thus partly be explained by a mechanism of reflective 
endorsement, in which several normative reasons—including those that are 
brought about by our automatic emotive responses—are reviewed in a process 
of rational deliberation. If this is so, the core moral judgments themselves 
are generated by emotions that have been shaped by the normative theory 
governing the process of education; and this normative theory carries the 
traces of a complex cultural process. Moreover, it is clear that the moral 
experience of adult individuals decisively depends on a normative theory 
that is no longer simply received, but self-consciously accepted and critically 
discussed. At this level, moral judgments may be partially independent from 
the actual activation of emotive responses, as in fact they generally are: it is 
a datum of experience that many of our ordinary moral judgment are not 
associated to, nor in any way generated by, the on-line activation of moral 
emotions.  
The conclusion to be drawn is that, while Nichols’ criticism seems to be 
effective against extreme rationalistic views, according to which reason 
provides a full explanation of morality, quite independently of emotive or 
sentimental reactions, it does not rule out more moderate rationalistic views. 
In fact, a) scientific evidence concerning the moral capacity of children and 
of psychopathic or “acquired sociopathic” individuals shows that some basic 
emotive capacity is a prerequisite of “the moral point of view”, which is partly 
defined by the capacity to be emotionally tuned in with what happens to 
other people; and b) the normative theory that defines which emotions to 
have and which not, seems to be partly shaped by our emotive reactions. This, 
however, is compatible with a view according to which morality is, at root, 
the space of reasons, and in many cases (though not in all) moral judgments 
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depend on some rational (and fallible) deliberation on the reasons that we 
have. More precisely, in young children’s core moral judgments the reference 
to reasons is implicit and indirect, since it is mediated by the normative 
theory, which, though represented internally, is not explicitly present to the 
consciousness of the judging individual. In adult individuals’ more complex 
judgments, on the other hand, there is almost always some direct reference 
to our reasons. In fact, according to Nichols himself, an individual who lacked 
any normative theory would not make real moral judgments, but would 
limit herself to express her emotions, as if uttering an interjection. In other 
words, contrary to XXth century emotivists, Nichols’ neosentimentalism 
does not treat emotions as in any way part of the content of moral judgments; 
emotions simply “play a role in leading us to treat as distinctive certain 
violations, including many of those we consider “moral”, like violations of 
harming others” (Nichols 2008,  263). This, however, is quite compatible with a 
rationalistic view according to which emotive reactions are primary sources 
of reasons to act, and moral judgments are the reflective endorsement of our 
best reasons, mediated by the normative theory. 
Let us now move to Nichols’ thesis c), that is, the objection to motivational 
internalism: this is the view according to which there is a conceptual link 
between accepting a moral judgment and having some motivation to act 
accordingly. Nichols believes that empirical evidence on psychopaths shows 
the possibility to make moral judgments without acquiring the corresponding 
motivations in the least degree; however, it is far from obvious that the moral 
judgments of psychopaths should count as authentic. On this issue, Nichols 
is happy to rely on the empirical evidence of general opinion: he simply 
says that most people do believe that these moral judgments are authentic 
(Nichols 2002c e 2004). Even though we should accept this conclusion, it could 
hardly count as a decisive refutation of rationalistic internalism: according 
to this view, in fact, it is a conceptual truth concerning moral judgments 
that they provide reasons for action, which in turn provide motivations to 
act, so far as we are rational (Korsgaard 1986; Smith 2004 and 2008; Joyce 2008). 
And rationalistic internalism acknowledges the existence of many reasons 
that may restrict the motivational capacity of moral reasons: for one thing, 
weakness of the will, or the fact that, acknowledging the existence of a reason 
to do x, we acquire a motive to do it, but we are pulled by a stronger motive 
to do y; and other forms of practical irrationality, on account of which we 
fail to acknowledge the practical implications of what we sincerely declare 
to believe. Doubtless, psychopathy is itself a motive inhibiting the normal 
functioning of practical rationality; as long as they constitute blatant 
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examples of irrationality, psychopaths cannot constitute an objection to the 
view that to accept a moral judgment and not to have any corresponding 
motivation is to be irrational, even if we should accept that their moral 
judgments are authentic. 
On the other hand, to affirm the authenticity of these judgments is scarcely 
plausible. The very fact, stressed by empirical research, that practical reason 
is not a cold calculation of means and ends, but a cooperative enterprise 
between emotive responses and reflective processes, shows that the moral 
judgments made by psychopathic individuals are not authentic. As a matter 
of fact, they do not adequately distinguish between conventional and moral 
norms and therefore, in contrast to three-year old children, do not possess 
the moral capacity, according to Nichols’ criterion1: we might say that they 
but quote socially widespread moral beliefs and rules. These patients lack 
the mechanism of concern that helps understand the seriousness of moral 
violations and that motivates moral behaviour. In the standard terms of 
contemporary metaethical discussion, the moral judgments of psychopathic 
individuals are paradigmatic examples of an “inverted commas” use of 
moral language. In any case, the fact that psychopaths make real moral 
judgments might be an argument against “simple motivational internalism”, 
according to which moral judgment guarantees moral motivation, but not 
against the form of internalism peculiar to moral rationalism (Joyce 2008).
Similar considerations can be offered with reference to patients with 
ventromedial lesions of the prefrontal cortex. Since these patients do make 
moral judgments, but lack any motivation to act correspondingly, they 
have been considered concrete examples of amoralism and direct proofs 
of the falsity of motivational internalism. As noted by Adina Roskies, they 
are “walking counterexamples to this internalist thesis” (Roskies 2003,  
51). Again, how authentic these moral judgments can be, is a matter of 
discussion: and if they are, the fact that rational and emotive areas of their 
brain are unrelated justifies the conclusion that VM patients’ practical 
rationality is compromised; therefore, it is difficult to see how they could 
undermine the peculiar motivational internalism of the rationalistic view. 
On the other hand, it must also be stressed that there is a radical difference 
between making moral judgments in third and in first person: VM patients 
may be able to make “abstract” moral judgments from a spectator’s point 
of view, but are definitely unable to make first person moral judgments, 
1  Of course, one could deny that the capacity to distinguish between the moral and the 
conventional is constitutive of the moral faculty, as suggested by Roskies (2008). 
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since this would imply a commitment to act accordingly that they are 
unable to adopt. In this sense, although it may be incorrect to say that VM 
patients who are able to reason abstractly on moral dilemmas in Kohlberg’s 
style make “inverted commas” moral judgments—for they seem seriously 
convinced of the truth of what they say—it is nonetheless incorrect to say 
that they make authentic moral judgments. To do this, they should have the 
capacity to decide in first person, that is, to assume the agent’s perspective 
and to understand that action x is what is required from me in these 
circumstances (Kennett and Fine 2008).
One last word on the issue of moral objectivism (Nichols’ thesis d), or the 
idea that the sentimental rule approach and its story concerning the 
cultural fitness of emotively laden rules undermine moral objectivity. 
For one thing, it must noted that moral rationalism is committed to moral 
objectivism, but not necessarily to moral realism: for example, a rationalist 
view such as Greene’s or Singer’s affirms the necessity to reformulate our 
evolutionary-biased normative theory in a consequentialist shape to reach 
moral objectivity, but does not embrace moral realism, nor justify any belief 
in objective moral facts (Singer 2005; Greene 2003; Greene 2008). 
On the other hand, we cannot exclude that emotions might point out moral 
facts: they might not be contingent evolutionary facts, but means to acquire 
knowledge of some independently existing moral reality. Of course, the 
plausibility of this view depends on how such a “moral reality” is conceived: 
if to accept that there are moral facts is to say that, in each situations, there 
are objective moral reasons to act, to claim that the emotions we have are the 
“right” ones because they point out the moral facts is simply to claim that 
in the emotive reactions accompanying the consciousness of some other’s 
suffering or being treated unjustly, we have access to objective reasons to 
avoid that suffering or injustice: reasons, that is, that can be acknowledged 
and shared by everyone. Rational reflection can detect these reasons and 
decide whether to adopt them, that is, whether to transform them in maxims 
of action and possibly in general principles of our normative theory. This does 
not alter the fact that emotive reactions are major sources of such objective 
reasons that our reflection can sanction. 
In other words, the rationalistic view affirming the practical character of 
reason does not necessarily (nor generally) maintain that moral statements 
refer to purely objective facts, utterly independent of any emotion or 
6.
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practical interest of the agent. It claims that they express the reasons 
for action that are highlighted both by our emotive reactions and by our 
rational reflection, while facing practical situations. Moral choice, therefore, 
expresses both our emotive and rational nature, namely, the embodied 
nature of our moral agency.
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In recent years, philosophers, political scientists and sociologists have witnessed a 
renaissance of the concept of the common good in political discourse: political agents such 
as parties, civic networks and courts increasingly refer to this concept to justify their 
actions. This development gives rise to the question whether normative political theory 
can provide a sensible definition of the common good which is compatible with pluralistic 
democratic society and which allows the identification of a specific range of well justified 
policies. The most influential account in this field is the theory of proceduralism which 
holds that the common good consists, by necessity, in the output of a political system 
whose procedures grant each citizen an equal say in collective decision-making. This 
account derives its initial plausibility from acknowledging citizens as agents who 
autonomously shape the welfare of their community on the basis of their subjective 
interests. However, it falls short of explaining how democratic decision-making good 
could possibly authorize actions that are detrimental to the common good. This problem 
is solved by a modification of the proceduralist paradigm that complements procedural 
criteria with objective and substantive standards that serve as limiting values for 
admissible policy outputs.
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For more than a decade, philosophers, political scientists and legal theorists 
have witnessed a “renaissance of the idea of the common good” (Offe 2012: 
3) in political discourse: political agents such as parties, civic networks and 
courts increasingly refer to the concept of the common good in order to 
justify their actions or criticize the actions of political antagonists (Amitai 
2004; Riordan 2008). The revitalization of this political concept is largely 
due to a growing discontent with the classical liberal model of political 
legitimacy advocated by theorists such as Rawls (1971, 2005) and Dworkin 
(1977). Contrary to classical liberalism, it is argued that legitimacy cannot be 
reduced to a just consideration of individual claim-rights on certain divisible 
goods (e.g. rights, societal positions, income, health services) but that it 
must as well account for the collective interests of society as a whole (Taylor 
1995, 2003; Freeman 2000).
This renaissance of the common good, however, is also met with skepticism 
by many theorists: First, the very concept is considered inimical to a 
pluralistic democratic society. Assuming a normative entity such as the 
common good of a community, critics argue, amounts to prescribing a pre-
existing “common way of life” (Kymlicka 1997, 226) to which all citizens 
must adhere. This common way of life would severely restrict the scope 
of admissible political decisions, factually rendering democratic decision-
making, which allows all citizens – regardless of gender, religion, or sexual 
orientation – to assert their interests in an equal fashion illegitimate. 
Second, it is questionable whether the concept really “points to a clearly 
definable range of considerations in support of a policy” (Barry 1964, 1). 
Rather, the suspicion suggests itself, that appeals to the common good are, 
as Barry aptly puts it, nothing but “a handy smoke-screen” (Barry 1964, 
1) employed by political agents to ensure support for their particularistic 
goals; apart from this merely rhetorical function the concept is too vague to 
serve any normative role in political discourse.
If political philosophy is to provide a sensible definition of the common 
good – thus taking account of the discontent with classical liberalism 
by expanding its model of political legitimacy –, it must deal with this 
criticism by showing, first, that the concept of the common good, properly 
understood, is not inimical to pluralistic democratic society; and, second, 
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that it serves to identify a specific range of policies and hence fulfills an 
important role in political discourse. In the following, I will argue that the 
paradigm of proceduralism which is advocated by several contemporary 
democratic theorists comes close to fulfilling these two requirements but 
must be modified in significant respects to provide a convincing definition 
of the common good.
The central thesis of proceduralism which, in its modern form, harks back to 
the works of Schubert (1960) and Fraenkel (1964, 1991) is the following:
The common good consists in the output of a political system whose procedures 
meet specific normative 
and functional standards of adequacy.
Normative standards of adequacy are generally defined in terms of 
democratic conditions that guarantee the fair and equal participation 
of all citizens in collective decision-making processes (Offe 2012, 16); 
the functional adequacy of a political system is determined by its 
responsiveness to the citizens’ asserted interests and by its effectiveness 
and efficiency in implementing them through policies (Putnam 1992, 
63-73)1. The basic model of proceduralism is best understood as an input-
output structure: the input into the political system consists in the 
citizens’ interests that are asserted via participatory procedures (elections, 
referendums, petitions etc.). The asserted interests are received by the 
system’s institutions and implemented through policies (laws, budget 
resolutions, executive decisions etc.) which – taken as a whole – constitute 
the system’s output.
Two aspects of the proceduralist paradigm are of special significance for 
its assessment: First, proceduralists claim that a sensible theory does not 
require any substantive concretization of the common good itself (e.g. in 
the form of a list of collective goods) but must only specify formal criteria 
for political procedures; if the latter are fulfilled by a political system, 
that system’s output necessarily constitutes the common good. This thesis 
is encapsulated in Gutman’s & Thompson’s claim that “once the right 
procedures are in place, whatever emerges from them is right” (Gutman and 
1 The question of how to specify exactly these criteria and how to balance them against each 
other in cases of conflict is of course a pressing matter for normative democratic theory that has 
engendered a vital debate. Since I am interested in assessing the plausibility of the proceduralist 
paradigm as such – and not in its concretizations – I shall not delve into this issue; for an 
overview see Christiano (2006).
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Thompson 2004, 24). Consequently, proceduralists deny that the output of a 
system can be criticized as detrimental to the common good by any criteria 
other than the standards of normative and functional adequacy themselves.
Second, proceduralists tend to argue only negatively for the plausibility 
of their paradigm by claiming that any substantive, i.e. non-procedural, 
concept of the common good is unsustainable: If political theory sought to 
provide a substantive definition of the common good (such as “the common 
good consists of collective goods x, y, z and must be realized by actions p, 
q, r”), it would undermine the legitimacy of democratic governance by pre-
empting the output of collective decision-making (Fraenkel 1964, 1991, 300f.; 
Gutman and Thompson 2004, 25). Put in less technical terms: If there was 
already a substantive definition of the common good (offered by political 
theorists), there would be no need for citizens to engage in voting or public 
deliberation; the reasonable consequence would instead be a paternalistic 
governance by political theorists, because the latter would ensure that the 
common good is indeed realized. Since this inference, however, is clearly 
unacceptable for ethical reasons, substantive theories must be rejected – 
and proceduralism remains as the sole alternative.
This brief sketch illustrates the advantages as well as the indeterminacy of 
the proceduralist paradigm. On the one hand, proceduralism appears to be 
the ideal candidate for fulfilling the requirements of a sensible theory of the 
common good: Not only does it provide a definition that is compatible with 
a pluralistic democratic society by positing that the common good must 
be understood as the output of fair and functional democratic procedures 
in which each citizen – irrespective of gender, sexual orientation, or 
religion – has an equal say, it also allows the identification of a specific 
range of policies, since for determining whether a political action is indeed 
conducive to the common good, we must simply ascertain whether it has 
been authorized by fair and functional democratic procedures. On the other 
hand, the fact that proceduralists argue only negatively for the plausibility 
of their paradigm gives reason for concern about a positive corroboration of 
proceduralism. Even if the negative argument was sound and substantive 
theories of the common good were unsustainable, there would remain 
the possibility that the proceduralist paradigm itself contains (tacit) 
premises that are indefensible. In the following, I will hence reconstruct 
the normative premises to which proceduralism ought to be rationally 
committed and determine, whether those serve as a convincing basis for the 
central thesis of proceduralism.
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The most promising normative basis from which to reconstruct the 
proceduralist paradigm is, in my view, the theory of metaethical subjectivism 
(Wiggins 1987, 1998; Sumner 1995)2. This theory is based on the thesis that 
the ethically good (in our case, the common good) consists in the realization 
of the actual interests of individuals (in our case, the citizens of a political 
community). The notion of interest refers to a class of conscious mental 
states in which persons desire, prefer or seek certain states of affairs that 
are considered valuable by them. Since interests, thus understood, are 
accessible introspectively by their bearers, they can be intersubjectively 
communicated in the form of truth-apt propositional statements and 
asserted via participatory procedures. The punchline of metaethical 
subjectivism is that states of affairs derive their value exclusively from 
the fact that they are valued by individuals. This implies, in turn, that 
any statement according to which a collectively valued state of affairs is 
unethical is not simply false but meaningless.
The appeal of metaethical subjectivism with regard to the personal level is 
that it takes persons seriously as autonomous authors of their individual 
welfare and closes the door on paternalistic interventions (Arneson 2005). 
With regard to the political level, metaethical subjectivism helps to make 
sense of the notion of popular sovereignty that is central to democratic 
societies. According to this notion, democratic citizens must be understood 
as agents who autonomously shape the welfare of their community on the 
basis of their collective will3.  The subjectivist foundation of proceduralism 
can be summarized by a principle that I call the sovereignty principle:
sovereignty principle: the citizens of a political community possess 
defining power over the common good.
2 This does not mean, of course, that proceduralism necessarily implies metaethical 
subjectivism. Following Condorcet (1785, 1972), one might also argue for an objectivist version of 
proceduralism. This approach would have to assume the following premises: (1) the common good 
is constituted by objective ethical criteria that are epistemically accessible; (2) political systems 
serve the purpose of identifying said criteria and implementing them through policies; (3) it is 
possible to specify formal standards of adequacy which guarantee the reliable identification and 
implementation of said criteria. From these premises, it follows that the common good necessarily 
consists in the output of an adequate system because that system’s procedures are sufficiently 
reliable so as to always identify and implement the criteria that constitute the common good. 
I think, however, that this account is vastly implausible. For one, I am skeptical of any theory 
which holds that the notion of welfare (be it individual or collective) can be defined in purely 
objective terms, but I shall not dwell on this issue here. It should be evident that the third premise 
is untenable. Apart from logical inference-forms there is no epistemic procedure that guarantees 
success. But this is exactly the assumption which defenders of the objectivist approach must hold, 
since otherwise the above-mentioned conclusion would not follow.
3 This conception of popular sovereignty that seems so familiar and almost trivial to us nowadays 
harks back to the writings of Rousseau, particularly to his Social Contract (Rousseau 1762, 2008).
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By the expression “defining power” I simply mean that the common good 
of a given society is defined by the interests of that society’s citizens and 
that the latter are conceptually and metaphysically prior to the common 
good. Accordingly, the positive value of a certain political action for the 
furthering of the common good is a function of the respective valuing of 
that action by the members of society themselves.
Even though the sovereignty principle constitutes the foundation of 
the proceduralist paradigm as I understand it, it is – taken by itself – 
underdetermined. The reason is that one cannot assume a priori that all citizens 
always and immediately agree on the states of affairs that are conducive to the 
common good. On the contrary, it is more realistic to assume a high degree of 
dissent on this issue in modern pluralistic societies. The sovereignty principle 
thus only stipulates that the citizens possess defining power over the common 
good; it does not specify, however, how this defining power is to be realized and 
how to deal with the problem of dissent. This question is answered by a second 
principle which I call the procedural principle:
procedural principle: the citizens of a political community exercise 
their defining power over the common good through political 
procedures that allow them to assert their interests and that meet 
certain normative standards of participatory equality and functional 
standards of effectiveness and efficiency.
The introduction of procedures that facilitate the citizen’s defining power 
over the common good gives rise to two new questions that are reflected in 
the above mentioned standards: first, there is the normative question of how 
much weight to accord to the respective interests of the various citizens 
that constitute the community. Second, there is the practical question of how 
to design the procedures to ensure that the citizens’ asserted interests are 
indeed implemented through policies.
The normative standards of participatory equality can be justified in two 
steps. First, we can posit as a default assumption that the interests of each 
citizen must be considered equally in the political process of determining the 
common good. Christiano argues with great force for the inevitability of this 
assumption by stating that “[t]his equality proceeds from the importance of 
interests as well as the separateness of persons. […] No one’s interests matter 
more than anyone else’s.” (Christiano 2004, 269) This premise, however, 
does not necessitate a claim on participatory equality by all citizens. If one 
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assumes, realistically, that some citizens possess more political knowledge 
than others, one might well argue that the equal consideration of interests is 
best served by a regime of paternalistic experts (Estlund 2008, 30f.). To arrive 
at the standard of participatory equality it is thus necessary to provide, in 
the second step, a sound argument against paternalism. The most convincing 
argument proceeds from the anthropological fact that most persons are 
struck with a “cognitive bias” (Christiano 2001, 205) in regard to their own 
interests. Even citizens who are benevolently inclined towards others and 
who possess superior knowledge are at risk of misrepresenting the desires of 
others because of their necessarily limited individual perspective. To obviate 
these negative effects of cognitive bias on the determination of the common 
good it must be ensured that all citizens receive the same rights to assert their 
interests through political participation.
Compared to the normative standards of equality, the justification of 
the standards of functionality requires far less argumentative effort. If 
political procedures are to serve the purpose of facilitating the exercise 
of defining power, they must ensure that the citizens’ interests do not 
simply “seep away” or are distorted by political decision-makers but 
are indeed realized through adequate policies. They must be, in other 
words, effective. Furthermore, one must assume that political procedures 
generally operate under conditions of relatively scarce material and 
temporal resources. This leads to the requirement that procedures must 
make optimal use of the available resources in the implementation of 
policies, i.e., they must be efficient.
Now that the sovereignty principle and the procedural principle have been 
established, there is a normative foundation to substantiate the central 
thesis of the proceduralist paradigm: the common good consists in the 
output of a normatively and functionally adequate political system because 
it represents the fair, effective and efficient realization of the citizens’ 
asserted interests which, in turn, determine the content of common good 
itself. On this reading, the political system fulfills the function of realizing 
the citizens’ defining power over the common good, and accordingly its 
output represents the result of the exercise of that defining power.
Although the central thesis of proceduralism can be positively corroborated by 
the theory of metaethical subjectivism it is, as I now shall argue, open to severe 
criticism – a fact which necessitates a critical re-evaluation of the proceduralist 
tenet that the common good can be determined exclusively on the grounds of 
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formal procedural standards. The flaw of the proceduralist paradigm based on 
metaethical subjectivism is that it cannot explain how citizens could be in error 
about the common good.
The decisive argument has already been put forward by Rousseau in the 
Social Contract where he states: “Our will is always for our own good, but we 
do not always see what that is.” (Rousseau 1762, 2008, 66). Rousseau’s point is 
that citizens’ political interests may be fundamentally misguided and hence, 
when realized, not conducive to the common good but irrelevant or even 
detrimental to it. The reasons for such misguided interests are manifold: 
citizens may be misinformed about politically relevant states of affairs, 
they may lack significant information, or they may draw inconsistent 
inferences from accurate information (Schumpeter 1976, 262; Caplan 2007). 
Thus, it appears intuitively plausible that even political actions which are 
collectively authorized by fair and functional democratic procedures may 
fail to ascertain the common good because their underlying interests are 
deficient in the above mentioned respects. In the terminology of the input-
output model from section 2, we might say that in such cases a deficient 
input generates a deficient output.
The flaw of proceduralism, as I have reconstructed it, is that it categorically 
denies this possibility. It claims that in order to determine the common good 
we must simply implement and observe the standards of fair equality and 
functionality because the latter guarantee an adequate realization of the 
citizens’ interests which, in turn, are deemed constitutive of the common 
good. If it is, however, implausible to assume (for the above reasons) that 
the citizens’ interests necessarily constitute their common good, then the 
implementation and observance of the procedural standards guarantees by 
no means that their output is indeed conducive to the common good.
Now the defenders of proceduralism might resort to what I call an idealization 
strategy. They might say: “Of course we do not mean that that common 
good consists in the output of a system whose members are ill-informed 
about relevant political matters. That would be absurd! We rather mean 
that it consists in a system’s output as it would result if its members were 
fully informed and rational.” In my view, this strategy which has been 
employed e.g. by Dahl (1989) and Cohen (1989) constitutes a pyrrhic victory 
for proceduralism. If one substitutes the actual citizens’ defining power over 
the common good by the defining power of hypothetical agents (who possess 
all the skills and information that their actual counterparts lack), one 
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severs the proceduralist paradigm from the normative foundation that has 
lent it its plausibility in the first place – the notion of popular sovereignty. 
By arguing that the common good ought to be understood as the output 
of procedures that are observed by hypothetical agents, the defenders of 
proceduralism deny that the actual citizens are fit to determine the common 
good themselves via democratic decision-making. From this point it seems to 
be only a short way to justifying a paternalistic regime, which is a conclusion 
that proceduralists have firmly sought to avoid in the first place.
It appears that the defenders of proceduralism are caught in a dilemma: 
either they stick with their central thesis, but then they must deny, rather 
implausibly, that actual citizens could be in error about the common good. 
Or they supplant the actual citizens’ defining power over the common 
good with the theoretical construct of the input of counterfactually fully 
informed and rational agents, but then they are on a straight path towards 
paternalism and forego the initial advantages of their approach. I find both 
alternatives equally unsatisfactory which is why I will propose a significant 
modification to the proceduralist paradigm in the final section.
Since traditional proceduralism as based on the theory of metaethical 
subjectivism fails and since I do not see another way to corroborate its 
central thesis, I propose a modification to the paradigm that restricts the 
original tenet described in section 2 according to which the common good 
can be defined exclusively on grounds of formal, procedural standards. The 
alternative definition that I suggest is the following: 
The common good consists in the output of a political system if and only if (a) 
that system’s procedures meet specific standards of normative and functional 
adequacy and (b) that output does not violate specific substantive and 
objective standards of adequacy that are determined by experts.
The difference to traditional proceduralism is that in my qualified version 
the procedural authorization of a political action is only a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for its conduciveness to the common good. This 
modification allows the preservation of the citizen’s defining power over 
the common good (though in a bounded sense) while solving the problem of 
error that I have addressed in section 4.
Let me start by saying what I consider to be the valuable point of traditional 
proceduralism as I have reconstructed it: proceduralists posit correctly, as I 
5. 
Qualified 
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Standards
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think, that the populace of a democratic community must be acknowledged 
as a group of agents who autonomously shape their collective welfare via 
democratic decision-making. In my view, the flaw of proceduralism is not 
that it acknowledges the citizens’ defining power over the common good; the 
problem is that it overstates the point by making the common good exclusively 
dependent on the citizens’ asserted interests and thus denies the possibility of 
error. Consequently, the challenge consists in developing a theory that takes 
into account the citizens defining power and acknowledges that they might 
still be in error about the common good. This twofold requirement, however, 
cannot be met by the defenders of traditional proceduralism as they find 
themselves caught in the dilemma that I have sketched at the end of section 4.
In my view, the only rational solution to this problem is to scale down the 
status of democratically exercised defining power from a necessary and 
sufficient condition to a merely necessary condition: on this account, it is 
necessary for an action’s conduciveness to the common good that it reflects 
the citizens subjective interests which are asserted via normatively and 
functionally adequate democratic procedures; it is, however, not sufficient, 
since those interests may still be ill-conceived in regard to certain standards 
that transcend the citizens’ subjective perspectives. Such standards must 
fulfill two conditions. First, they must be objective in the sense that they 
are independent of the citizens’ actual interests as well as epistemically 
accessible, so that they can serve to identify and criticize interests that are 
misguided (i.e. irrelevant or detrimental) with regard to the common good. 
Second, they must be substantive (i.e. non-procedural), for the simple reason 
that they must serve the purpose of criticizing the value of outputs that 
otherwise satisfy all standards of procedural adequacy.
Now the question emerges as to how to concretize these objective and 
substantive standards of adequacy beyond the rather abstract indications 
that I have given here. I think, however, that this is not a task for political 
philosophy but for empirical experts who deal with specific areas of political 
interest. Here is a short example to support my point. In recent years, 
there has been a heated debate in Germany about the legal instrument of 
preventive detention (Flaig 2009). The supporters of a stricter criminal law 
who held the majority in both legislative chambers argued that it would 
serve the common good to pass a set of laws that allow the indefinite 
detention of imprisoned criminals if psychological evaluation indicates 
that they will pose a threat to the public once they are released. According 
to traditional proceduralism, the respective laws, which were eventually 
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passed in 2004 with great public approval, would have had to be considered 
conducive to the common good for the simple reason that they were 
authorized by fair and functional democratic procedures.
Since then, however, empirical inquiry by criminologists has shown that the 
proponents of said laws have based their argument on a misconception: in 
fact, the psychological evaluation of imprisoned persons does not provide 
an accurate prediction of their future criminal conduct (Kinzig 2008, Alex 
2010). Thus, it must be assumed that the vast majority of persons who have 
been indefinitely detained on the basis of these laws do not pose a threat 
to the public after all and that the respective legal instrument has no 
significant impact on collective welfare. In the terminology of my version 
of qualified proceduralism this insight constitutes the identification of an 
objective and substantive standard by experts, since it serves to identify and 
criticize the output of fair and functional procedures as irrelevant to the 
common good.
Even if this example supports my argument there is one last problem that 
must be addressed. In section 2 I sketched the negative argument employed 
by proceduralists in order to buttress their account. This argument states 
that traditional proceduralism is the only ethically acceptable theory of 
the common good, since any account that provides substantive criteria of 
the common good pre-empts the outcome of democratic decision-making 
and leads to paternalism. I believe, though, that this argument does not 
undermine my account of qualified proceduralism. It would only do so if 
the stipulated objective and substantive standards were considered to be 
necessary and sufficient for the determination of the common good. However, 
I have argued that in order for an action to be conducive to the common 
good it must – apart from not violating substantive and objective standards 
– also be authorized by the populace itself, otherwise it would not reflect the 
general will of the sovereign citizens. Consequently, democratic decision-
making fulfills an indispensible function in my account of the common good; 
I merely hold that it may be based on misguided interests and hence requires 
examination by experts who possess superior knowledge in the respective 
areas of political concern.
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This paper aims to question the idea of reasonableness in Rawls’ account of political 
liberalism. My point is that reasonableness as the moral basis of the liberal society 
provides restrictions for differences – be they philosophical, moral, religious, cultural – to 
be included in the liberal society. Notwithstanding Rawls’ attempt to expand political 
boundaries and to include those people who do not share moral liberal justification to 
justice as fairness, reasonableness selects “values holders” and assigns to the so-called 
“reasonable” a place in the political debate. The others, the “unreasonable”, are expected 
to become reasonable; alternatively, they would be paid control or even coercion in all the 
circumstances in which they should represent a risk for political stability. I believe that 
Rawls gives an incomplete account of unreasonableness: there may well be persons who 
are not “reasonable” in Rawlsian terms but who do not necessarily represent a danger 
for the just society. By the fact that they do not endorse values as freedom and equality 
in which fair cooperation is grounded, we cannot infer that they will necessarily try to 
violate the terms around which cooperation is structured by imposing their values on 
others. I proceed as follows: a) I detail the Rawlsian political turn in defending justice as 
fairness; b) I focus on the idea of reasonableness as the core of political liberalism; c) I 
defend the thesis that political liberalism needs to revise the idea of unreasonableness if it 
aims to deal with pluralism as a social and political fact.
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This paper aims to question the idea of reasonableness in Rawls’ account 
of political liberalism. My point is that reasonableness as the moral 
basis of the liberal society provides restrictions for differences – be they 
philosophical, moral, religious, cultural – to be included in the liberal 
society. Notwithstanding Rawls’ attempt to expand political boundaries 
and to include those people who do not share moral liberal justification 
to justice as fairness, reasonableness selects “values holders” and assigns to 
the so-called “reasonable” a place in the political debate. The others, the so 
called “unreasonable”, are expected to become reasonable; alternatively, 
they would be paid control or even coercion in all the circumstances in 
which they should represent a risk for political stability. I believe that Rawls 
gives an incomplete account of unreasonableness: there may well be persons 
who are not “reasonable” in Rawlsian terms but who do not necessarily 
represent a danger for the just society. By the fact that they do not endorse 
values as freedom and equality in which fair cooperation is grounded, we 
cannot infer that they will necessarily try to violate the terms around which 
cooperation is structured by imposing their values on others. I proceed as 
follows: a) I detail the Rawlsian political turn in defending justice as fairness; 
b) I focus on the idea of reasonableness as the core civic value of political 
liberalism; c) I defend the thesis that political liberalism needs to revise the 
idea of unreasonableness if it aims to deal with pluralism as a social and 
political fact. 
I start by recapitulating the “political turn” from A Theory of Justice (Rawls 
2003) to Political Liberalism (Rawls 2005). Political Liberalism may be seen as a 
remedy to the problem of motivating people to endorse the principles of 
justice and to behave accordingly. Rawls says:
To understand the nature and extent of the differences [between Political 
Liberalism and A Theory of Justice] one must see them as arising from trying 
to resolve a serious problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the 
fact that the account of stability in Part III of Theory is not consistent with the 
view as a whole. I believe all differences are consequences of removing that 
inconsistency (Rawls 2005, xv-xvi).
In the III Part of Theory the problem of motivation is faced and apparently 
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resolved by adopting the argument of congruence. Rawls believes 
that people may sustain justice insofar as justice is part of their good. 
Specifically, Rawls assumes that people in a fair society have an independent 
sense of justice and aspire to do what is right for its own sake. This does 
not mean that justice is always the best thing for them to do; indeed it may 
require of them to give up any of their specific purposes1. Thus, the question 
is what kind of assurance one does have that it is realistically possible for 
people to affirm justice as fairness as part of their good. The congruence 
argument purports to show that under ideal conditions the judgements 
that would be made from the private perspective (judgements regarding a 
person’s good) and the public ones (judgements of justice) will cohere. In 
sustaining this position Rawls refers to a complicated argument grounding 
in the Aristotelian principle: the main idea here is that the sense of justice is 
among human higher capacities and involves an ability to understand, apply 
and act on and from requirements of justice (Rawls 2003, 372-379). 
I am insisting on motivation as motivation for justice is an indispensable 
condition of stability: a social order is hardly stable if people incline to pursue 
their particular good in place of the right for all. To be motivated for justice 
is the first assurance of stability. Stability is the central issue of the Rawlsian 
theory: it is here meant as an indicator of the feasibility of any political 
theory. “We checked to see [...] if justice as fairness is a feasible conception […]; 
this forced us to raise the question of stability” (Rawls 2003, p. 508). A theory 
of justice should be feasible to be desirable: a theory that cannot be applicable 
is undesirable2. A conception of justice is stable when its realization by the 
social system tends to bring about the corresponding sense of justice that 
induces citizens “to develop a desire to act in accordance with these principles 
and to do their part in institutions that exemplify them” (Rawls 2003, 119). 
In Political Liberalism the issue of feasibility becomes more relevant. Rawls 
gradually became dissatisfied with the account of the just society as depicted 
in Theory. He finds the just society as designed in Theory to be unrealistic: it is 
quite unrealistic to maintain that people have the same reasons to support 
it and that they similarly view their good as congruent with the right. 
When the veil of ignorance is raised, citizens may realize that justice does 
not correspond to their ideas of good. That means to recognize the “fact of 
reasonable pluralism”: under “the political and social conditions secured by 
1  See Weithman (2010, ch. 7).
2  I may just mention the huge problem concerning ideal theory and its role to guide actions. 
On this point see Pasquali (2009) and Zuolo (2012).  
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basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and 
irreconcilable – and what’s more reasonable – comprehensive doctrines will 
come about and persist” (Rawls 2005, 36). He adds that pluralism “is not a mere 
historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the 
public culture of democracy” (Ibid.). This clarification may be put in other 
words: pluralism is not an external constraint but it is a fact about liberalism 
and part of any ideal society. Liberal democracies promote pluralism as a 
consequence of reasoning under their institutions3. 
On the premise of the fact of pluralism, the stability of the theory is now 
evaluated with regard to its appropriateness in constituting the focus of 
an overlapping consensus among different and conflicting comprehensive 
doctrines endorsed by reasonable citizens. For this stability to be realistically 
possible all the reasonable comprehensive doctrines affirmed by reasonable 
citizens must accept and endorse its political conception of justice in an 
overlapping consensus. When such an overlapping consensus exists, then all 
free and equal citizens endorsing reasonable comprehensive doctrines agree 
on the political conception of justice on the basis of their own particular 
comprehensive reasons. The matter of motivation is here resolved by assuming 
a freestanding political conception of justice that citizens may share. They come 
to defend this political conception as a common moral ground they can agree 
upon in spite of the diversity of their moral justifications4. It means that 
citizens may adhere to the principles of justice backed by their specific 
reasons: these principles may be adopted as a module that fits into and 
can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that 
endure in the society regulated by it (Rawls 2005, 12-13). The principles 
of justice are worked up from certain “fundamental intuitive ideas” that 
are implicit in the public culture of a democratic society (Rawls 2005, 192). 
That explains why people may abide by them on the basis of different 
and even divergent views. They may be said however to converge on 
justice for “right reasons” (i.e. moral reasons), not for prudential reasons 
like opportunity or fear. Rawls stresses this point by declaring that the 
overlapping consensus on justice must not be confused with a modus 
vivendi. The modus vivendi is exactly a precarious equilibrium of forces that 
depends on “circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate 
convergence of interests” (Rawls 2005, 147). Thus, the question of stability 
cannot be addressed by a modus vivendi; it can only be addressed by 
3  On this point see Quong (2011).
4  By common moral ground Rawls means a political morality, not a comprehensive one, that 
is, a set of political moral values which may be subscribed by several comprehensive doctrines. 
See Rawls (1995).
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striving to realize an overlapping consensus on moral political values such 
that “stability is secured by sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind 
acquired under just institutions” (Rawls 2005, 142-143). 
To sum up: in Political Liberalism Rawls starts by acknowledging the fact 
of pluralism as the result of living under liberal institutions. Pluralism is 
indeed the consequence of the exercise of the practical reason under free 
conditions. Given the fact of pluralism, the moral justification for justice as 
held in Theory turns out to be unrealistic: it is unrealistic that people agree on 
the same justification of justice. Instead, justice as fairness defended in Theory 
may be sustained by each person as a political conception, independently 
from their specific reason for endorsing it. The following point is how people 
may converge on this political conception: convergence may be assured 
once they adopt a method of avoidance according to which divisive issues 
are systematically excluded from the political agenda (Rawls 1985). If the 
project of justification in Political Liberalism is similar to Theory, now Rawls 
avoids relying on controversial moral positions and counts instead on ideas 
and reasons that are widely shared in democratic culture: the method of 
avoidance means to avoid claiming to truth to defend one’s own political 
position. Truth is irreconcilably divisive for Rawls: truth and politics must 
part company if justice (the theory and the practice of justice) wants to gain 
stability. Indeed, the so-called “political turn”  consists in justifying justice 
by renouncing to defend one’s own moral justification as both exclusive and 
exclusively true5. Truth is to be replaced by reasonableness when political 
constitutionals are at stake. Reasonableness and not truth is the political 
standard of correctness: the objectivity of judgements about justice is 
characterized without reference to the notion of truth (Rawls 2005, 127). 
Lastly, avoidance of truth is not to be conflated with scepticism: to avoid 
claiming to one’s truth does not mean to deny it. It means only that we are 
allowed to use our deepest convictions in the construction of the political 
conception within certain limits, being those limits based on what people 
could reasonably accept (see Maffettone 2010, 269). 
Let me now articulate the meanings of reasonableness6. So far I mentioned 
the notion of reasonableness as if it were a sort of “device” to connect 
comprehensive doctrines and the question of stability through the idea of an 
overlapping consensus. Such an overlapping consensus among comprehensive 
doctrines may be achieved only among that class of comprehensive doctrines 
5  On the “political turn” in the Rawlsian thought about justice see Weithman (2010).
6  For a larger discussion on this point see Sala (2013).
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that are reasonable, meaning that reasonableness qualifies the group of 
comprehensive doctrines that can find common ground within a liberal-
democratic regime. In so doing, these doctrines may coexist albeit they 
diverge on truth. Then, reasonableness instead of truth may respond to 
the central question of Political Liberalism: “how is it possible for there to 
exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who still 
remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines?” (Rawls 2005, 47). Reasonableness responds to this initial problem 
of reconciling stability with pluralism: the stability of a fair society is secured 
by citizens’ ability to mediate between their competing comprehensive claims. 
This citizens’ ability is rooted in their reasonableness.
I now add further remarks on reasonableness. I firstly remind that according 
to Rawls a person is reasonable when she is willing to propose and honour fair 
terms of cooperation (Rawls 2005, xlii). Reasonableness indicates reasonable 
persons’ ethical-political ability to share public reasons in a regime of 
reciprocity. Reasonableness may be here defined as the political virtue of 
citizens who show to be reasonable as they take others to be politically 
free and equal, and equally deserving of fair terms of social cooperation. 
Secondly, to be reasonable implies also to acknowledge the fact that, when 
freedom of thought and conscience is granted, people adopt reasonable yet 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines. In other words: to be reasonable 
involves to recognize the fact of reasonable pluralism. People are reasonable 
insofar as they support freedom of thought and conscience and recognize the 
consequence of this freedom in terms of reasonable pluralism7. 
In summary: reasonableness implies two aspects – the willingness to 
propose and honour fair terms of cooperation and the willingness to 
recognize the fact of pluralism as the result of the free exercise of practical 
reasons – that substantiate what being reasonable means. 
Having said that, reasonableness explains also how and why citizens come 
to distance themselves from their comprehensive doctrines: as they are 
reasonable, they may avoid to assert the truth of their beliefs and try to reach 
an overlapping consensus on liberal values. This capacity of avoidance plays as 
the evidence of their being reasonable. I said that reasonableness is a political 
virtue: it is in the political domain that reasonableness takes the place of 
truth. Indeed, the notion of reasonableness is strictly political: that is, it does 
7  On reasonableness in Rawls: Boettcher (2004); Mandle (1999); Archard (2001); Rasmussen 
(2004).
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not have to do with the contents of beliefs and with philosophical, moral or 
religious positions. On the contrary, it does have to do only with the attitude 
to tolerate others’ positions as they are acknowledged as legitimate albeit 
different from ones’ own positions. I conclude by saying that reasonableness is 
somehow the winner of a virtual game among values: it is the common value, 
it may be called the common currency of a society that vindicates its fairness. 
Having recapitulated the meanings of reasonableness, what about those 
who do not “subscribe” to it? It seems a platitude to state that people who 
do not share the virtue of reasonableness are “unreasonable”. Rather, what 
Rawls means by “unreasonable” can be equated with planning to engage in 
cooperative schemes for the “wrong reasons” (Rawls 2005, 55). Unreasonable 
people are unwilling to honour, or even to propose, any general principles 
for specifying fair terms of cooperation. They may adhere to order not being 
properly motivated to support institutions: any adherence to them equates 
to a modus vivendi given that the reasons for adherence are prudential and 
not moral reasons. For Rawls, those people are to be kept under control as 
they would impose their beliefs on others: they are considered unreasonable 
not because their belief is thought to be false, but because they are ready to 
impose it on others8. In such cases, says Rawls, “the problem is to contain 
them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society” (Rawls 
2005, xvi-xvii). Reasonable institutions have “the practical task of containing 
them – like war and disease – so that they do not overturn political justice” 
(Rawls 2005, 64, n. 19). Notwithstanding the fact that unreasonable people 
are a fact of any liberal democracy, Rawls trusts liberal institutions in their 
capacity to educate unreasonable people to cultivate in themselves a sense 
of justice. The fair society has a kind of educational or transformative role: 
the “unreasonable” are likely to become reasonable, because of the strong 
positive effects of living under liberal institutions.
Rawls hopes that in this way political stability increases and that the 
benefits assured by stability will eventually motivate the “unreasonable” to 
become reasonable (Rawls 2005, 163-168).
Under actual circumstances, Rawls’ hope may be misplaced. There may well 
be persons who will not adopt public reasons to defend their positions in the 
political debate. However, this does not imply that they are ready to impose 
their beliefs on others being unreasonable in the Rawlsian terms. The fact that 
they do not share values as freedom and equality in which the fair cooperation 
8  On this point see Waldron (2003).
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is grounded is not a sufficient reason to say that they will necessarily try to 
violate the terms of cooperation itself. I think instead that there may be more 
than one way to be unreasonable. Besides those unreasonable persons who 
actually represent a risk to stability, there may be people who are neither 
reasonable nor unreasonable. I call them “non-reasonable”9. Although they do 
not endorse the common values that form the overlapping consensus, they are 
ready to support liberal institutions, albeit for reasons that are not the “right 
ones”. Non-reasonable persons may support the liberal democratic order for 
their own reasons, which fall outside the domain of public reason and that may 
not be part of the overlapping consensus. 
Unlike Rawls, I believe that nothing wrong happens if liberal institutions 
are endorsed by people divided at the level of their fundamental values. 
Stability is not necessarily threatened by the fact that institutions may be 
supported also by people who are unable to find any “continuity” between 
their values and the common values, between their beliefs and the civic value 
of reasonableness, but who are nonetheless ready to engage in cooperation 
with the others. Such a cooperative attitude, however motivated, may 
provide a strong enough motive to include such non-reasonable people in the 
liberal-democratic citizenry and treat them as political equals. For example, 
non-reasonable people of this kind may recognize liberal democratic society 
as the place to accomplish their mission on earth. Although their reasons 
for cooperation are unlikely to be translated into public reasons, they may 
equally count in favour of their sincere participation in a fair system of 
social cooperation. This implies also to contradict Rawlsian thesis about the 
connection between reasonable doctrines and reasonableness as an attitude: 
people may behave “not unreasonably”, despite the fact that they hold 
unreasonable doctrines (in the Rawlsian sense) and are not ready to renounce 
them for any reason10. 
My conclusive point is that actual circumstances of politics should not 
be neglected by appealing to an ideal overlapping consensus, by which 
common moral values should be shared. Non-reasonable people may in 
fact participate in the public debate by putting forward reasons that are 
neither public nor shared by other reasonable citizens. Public debate 
9  For a more detailed assessment of non-reasonableness as alternative to both reasonableness 
and unreasonableness in the Rawlsian terms, see Sala (2013).
10  Rawls inclines to see as reasonable those people who hold reasonable doctrines. By contrast, 
not all people who hold unreasonable beliefs should be called unreasonable. See Rawls (1997). About 
the relationship between unreasonable doctrines and reasonable behaviour see the exchange 
among Kelly and McPherson (2001) and Quong (2004). A comment on it in Sala (2013).
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may be opened also to those who may offer their reasons that are hardly 
public reasons: their reasons matter from their specific point of view. 
The fact is that in realistically plural societies several groups advocate 
policies for their non-sharable personal reasons. An enlarged public 
debate is not expected to lead necessarily to an overlapping consensus 
on the basic liberal values. Instead, it allows all citizens, including the 
“non-reasonable”, to start from their respective points of view and exhibit 
their reasons publicly (Archard 2001). These “non-reasonable” people may 
thus be included in an enlarged public debate, instead of being deprived 
of such an opportunity as it happens in the Rawlsian society. Indeed, not 
all citizens are reasonable in the Rawlsian sense and the problem of how 
to deal with the ‘non-reasonable’ is not a mere accidental matter, but is 
a crucial fact of politics with which the liberal theories of justice should 
concern themselves.
What I mean is that public justification may be conceived of as a wider 
practice in which the “non-reasonable” may participate by putting 
forward their special reasons that are unlikely to be acceptable to all. 
My suggestion is that although the reasons of the non-reasonable are 
likely to be unacceptable to reasonable people, they may nonetheless be 
made intelligible to them, that is, they may be exchanged in public debate 
(Gaus 2010). Thus, the reasons of the non-reasonable people should not be 
dismissed from public debate in advance of an argument simply on the 
grounds that reasonable people disagree with them. If a political theory 
aspires to be realistic it is crucial that it takes into account the actual 
conditions in which persons may have both moral and non-moral reasons to 
accept the liberal-democratic order notwithstanding the fact that they do 
not share its essential values11. 
11  On realism in political theory with regard to Rawlsian tradition: Galston (2010), Mason 
(2010), Horton (2010), 
McCabe (2010). 
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Martha Craven Nussbaum (http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/
nussbaum/) is one of the most distinguished philosophers of our time. If 
the starting point of her practical philosophy is the Aristotelian theory 
of the good life, the study of emotions in ethics is rooted in her profound 
knowledge of ancient philosophy. She takes part in global philosophical 
debates about liberalism, feminism, multicultural political philosophy, and 
international justice. Along with Amartya Sen, she defends the Capability 
Approach in development policy.  Currently, she is researching on the 
meaning of religion and its role in society. 
As Albertus Magnus Professor 2012 (http://amp.phil-fak.uni-koeln.de/) 
Martha Craven Nussbaum gave three lectures (June 19th-21st) about her 
current research project, disclosing some of the topics of her forthcoming 
Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, Harvard University Press (2013). 
Intrigued by her inspiring talks we ask her more about her philosophical 
project.
1) The tradition of phenomenology attests that sentiments, feelings and 
emotions are intentionally related to values, which are the cognitive content of 
emotional life. How do you think that emotions, values and norms are related?
In my view emotions always contains appraisals of an object as either good 
or bad for the creature who has the emotion.  So in that sense they contain 
values. But the values might not be at all reflective, and they might or might 
not be norms, since I think by “norms” we mean a set of social agreements 
about value.  When a rat flees a predator, there is emotion, and in that 
minimal sense there is value (death is bad), but no norms, since to have 
norms you have to be capable of abstract reflection to at least some degree.
2) Does a distinction between “needs of soul” and pure desires exist? 
You’d have to explain this one to me.  I am not sure what “needs of soul” 
means.  If you mean the contrast between occurrent desires and deep 
persisting needs that express our sense of our identity, then yes, there is of 
course such a distinction. I might desire an ice cream cone, but I don’t need 
it.  I might or might not feel an occurrent desire for freedom of speech, but 
I need it, in the sense that its presence is a necessary condition for a life 
worthy of my human dignity.  
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3) In your current research project you aim to connect both pillars of your 
philosophy: your cognitive theory of emotional life and your capability 
approach as a theory of justice. Why are you convinced that social philosophy 
needs both of them and why are they deeply interrelated? 
Obviously society needs a map of where it is going.  I think that a decent 
society will frame that map by thinking about justice, and a theory of justice 
is one very important part of framing social goals well.  But to achieve those 
goals, and to keep them stably once we have them, we need to think about 
the emotions.  Some emotions help society achieve its goals and others do 
not, and we’d better understand these connections as well as we can.  
4) What do you think about the relationship between a right and the 
correlative duty? Which one exists first? Are they co-originary? If a man was 
alone on an Island, would he have rights? And duties? 
I think rights and duties are correlative, and that they both exist 
independently of political society. A solitary person has both rights and 
duties, but there is no institutional structure to guarantee the former or to 
channel the latter (as through a tax system, for example).  
5) Is the existence of good reasons for rights also a necessary, even though not 
sufficient, condition of their effectiveness?
Neither. We might have an effective rights regime for which nobody could 
articulate good reasons, although that is likely to be a rare occurrence.   And 
there have always been good reasons in favor of many rights that are not 
effective (such as the equal rights of women, or people with disabilities).  
6) Does a right exist independently of legal guarantees? 
Yes, since rights inhere in human dignity itself.
7) What basic values are presupposed in your political liberalism? Do you have 
a hierarchy of values? How are those values related to personal capabilities?
I have identified, provisionally, ten Central Capabilities that a good 
society ought to protect up to some suitable threshold level.  They are 
not hierarchically ranked: all are regarded as necessary for a life worthy 
of human dignity. All are personal capabilities, that is, opportunities 
of persons.  But though they are not ranked, we might in particular 
circumstances judge that some take priority, because they are the best 
intervention points in that context to promote, over time, the realization 
of the whole list.  Those are what Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit call 
“fertile” capabilities: the ones that engender others.
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8) What reasons bring you from a kind of social-democratic political 
philosophy to a liberal-egalitarian one? Are you committed to a kind of social 
ontology or metaphysics concerning the relationship individual-society?  
I don’t understand this. My view is both social-democratic and liberal 
(meaning allocating a large place to fundamental liberties), and it has 
not changed in those respects.  And political liberalism of the Rawlsian 
sort, which I endorse, holds that one should not ground any political 
principles in metaphysics or ontology: the principles should be justified by 
“freestanding” ethical argument. That is what I hope I have done.  
9) Referring to your political principles you underlined that they have to 
be ethically motivated and not metaphysically. Are you claiming that your 
political principles are metaphysically neutral or that you have to bracket 
them in order to bring these results of your philosophical thought in the 
political debate?
I mean that they are thin, not grounded in metaphysics of the type that 
divides people along lines of their comprehensive doctrine. People can then 
interpret them metaphysically if they want, or not if they don’t want. Take 
the idea of human dignity: it is a resonant ethical idea, but it takes no stand 
on the question whether human beings have immortal souls. Someone who 
believes in the soul can always understand dignity in connection with that 
idea, but someone who doesn’t believe in the soul is not forced to accept that 
doctrine as a condition of signing onto the political principles.  
10) In the historical part of your working project you refer to a cosmopolitan 
tradition: Rousseau, Herder, Mazzini. Particularly you defined Mazzini’s 
European patriotism as a form of pietism that tries to let people transcend 
their self-interest toward the common good. Can you say more about the way 
you link Rousseau, Herder and Mazzini’s republicanism and how do you move 
further in your political thought? 
Actually I just took 500 pages to answer this question, and I can’t imagine 
any way of doing so briefly here.  For one thing, the two thinkers I 
eventually agree with most in this tradition are J. S. Mill and Rabindranath 
Tagore, and since Tagore’s thought is virtually unknown in Europe it would 
take some time to spell it out.  So you will have to wait for the book, I’m 
afraid.  
11) An important issue of this project is to shape the idea of a kind of 
cosmopolitan civil religion, that should not be a rival to other religions or 
personal preferences: it has to be inclusive. How far away is the humanistic 
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ideal from yours? To what extend is this ideal of civic religion related to material 
values that are culturally embedded or is there a kind of telos to a civic religion 
that is most neutral to historical ones?  
Actually, I do not use the word religion, that word is used by the thinkers 
I discuss.  I think it’s misleading to use that word, except in scare quotes, 
because it suggests that agnostics and atheists are not included as equals. 
12) You focused your attention on two central emotions in human life: 
compassion and disgust. Referencing animal psychological and cultural 
research, you claim that emotions are narrow and eudaimonistic: they are 
blind to interests that are not personally anchored. Therefore you claim that 
the affective education of the person is necessary in order to shape a decent 
society. Humans have to learn to extend their compassion to others and to 
reconciliate themselves to their animality, because the power of disgust can 
be very aggressive in excluding abnormal subjects. Today, human dignity is a 
central topic in political and juridical debates. What do you think about this 
concept? What kind of relationship exists between human dignity and feelings 
of disgust and shame? And between human dignity and reserve?
Actually, my book does not focus only on compassion and disgust.  It has 
large section on love of individuals, love of country, fear, shame, envy, and 
quite a few others. Nor do I hold that emotions are always narrow: I say that 
they begin that way, but they can be broadened by education.   
Dignity is a very important concept, but it does little argumentative work on 
its own, since it is so vague and so disputed.  It should be understood as part 
of a family of political concepts and principles that should all be justified 
holistically. Moreover, we need to think about the dignity of non-human 
animals as well, and make sure that our concepts and principles show 
respect for that.
13) In the Greek tradition you discovered two paradigmatic genres of emotional 
education that relate to these fundamental human needs: the tragedy, that 
can arouse compassion and the comedy, that has the power to rehabilitate 
human bodily fragility and vivacity. Why do you think that both genres are 
fundamental to democratic societies? How can a modern liberal society follow 
these intuitions? In what extend do you belief that political liberalism needs a 
liberal education in arts and humanities? Which role does imagination play in 
political and juridical judgment?
This is another huge question, the answer to which is at least three books of 
mine … But briefly: tragic festivals cultivate extended compassion for human 
predicaments, comic festivals make us well-disposed to the body.  We can 
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pursue those goals through a variety of media: political rhetoric, public 
holidays, public music and art, memorials, parks, book clubs, and yet others.  
14) You are looking for normative criteria in order to establish a “decent 
society”, looking for the bare minimum of chance and equality for everyone. 
This project, based on the philosophical principles of political liberalism, wants 
to shape human emotions in order to let these principles be stable in modern 
societies: it suggests a more Platonic than Aristotelian policy. Why is your 
project different to Plato’s Republic? Are you looking for the minimum decency or 
for the best possible societies? 
My idea of a threshold is not an idea of a “bare minimum”.  It is an idea of 
what is necessary for a life worthy of human dignity, and that is usually 
going to be quite ample.  I don’t see why you call the project Platonic.  
Indeed Aristotle’s Rhetoric supplies essential guiding points. And since the 
heroes are Tagore and Mill, it is realized in the midst of a vigorous critical 
culture that protects spaces for dissent and individual experimentation.  
Plato would have hated almost everything I say.  
15) You work out human and animal psychology: What kind of animal do you 
think we are? To what extend do you agree with Aristotele’s definition of man as 
“zoon politikon”?
I think we are animals who are social, which is what Aristotle means, who 
are capable of great love and also terrible hatred, hatred of one’s own kind 
unknown in other species. This ambivalence derives in part from our initial 
helplessness and our contrary expectation of being in control: the tension 
between those two aspects of our humanity leads to some very difficult 
problems in human life.  There is no non-human animal who wants not to 
be an animal, who repudiates the very idea of animality and mortality, and 
this desire to control everything and transcend our finitude is a recipe for 
political difficulty.  
16) Your case studies are taken from classic Greece, modern American history 
and contemporary India. In particular you refer to Gandhi and Tagore. What 
are the most relevant elements of Indian political thought? Do they differ from 
western ones in form and content?
I’m not sure why you leave out Nehru and Mill, who are my two greatest 
personal heroes and friends. But anyway, I don’t think you’d speak of 
“American political thought” or “German political thought”. What would 
that mean? What do Heidegger and Habermas have in common?  Or Rawls 
and Nozick?  When we know a country well, we realize that it isn’t a single 
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thing and that little of interest can be said at that level of generality. Why 
should things be different with India?  I choose Tagore, Nehru, and Gandhi 
because I find their ideas valuable and illuminating, not particularly 
because they are exemplars of “Indian thought,” whatever that would mean. 
And I also love B. R Ambedkar, who disagreed strongly with both Nehru and 
Gandhi.  So one thing I value in India thought of the mid-twentieth century 
is its rich debates on matters of fundamental importance.  
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“It is important to learn to be surprised by simple things – for 
example, by the fact that bodies fall down, not up, and that they 
fall at a certain rate; that if pushed, they move on a flat surface in a 
straight line, not a circle; and so on. The beginning of science is the 
recognition that the simplest phenomena of life raise quite serious 
problems: Why are they as they are, instead of some different way?”  
(Chomsky 1988)
One of the leading intuition of Noam Chomsky’s research on language and 
cognition is that it is important to learn to be surprised by simple things. 
One can take the questions presented here as an example of this approach. 
The questions were proposed by undergraduate and graduate students, 
reorganized by us and presented to Noam Chomsky on occasion of his 
visit to the Institute of Advanced Study in Pavia on September 15th, 2012. 
Simply and spontaneously, the questions raised by the students clustered 
around a number of fundamental topics concerning the architecture 
of the language faculty, its relation with other systems. Starting from 
the mathematical properties of language, Chomsky answered students’ 
questions by discussing theoretical and epistemological consequences of 
the research on the biological foundation of language. He also posed new 
questions that such rational inquiry opens up and that can possibly get an 
answer in a future. The call for simplicity is reflected in the content of the 
answers Chomsky provided, and in the style as well. The discourse unfolds 
smoothly guiding the hearer – and the reader – through leading issues in 
the Chomskyan approach, from the foundation of the field (Chomsky 2004) 
to the ultimate synthesis (Chomsky 2011), across the milestones that made 
the scientific study of language possible in the modern era and still lucidly 
indicate where we should be heading to1.
1) Can we study evolution of language? Is there any evidence that language 
evolved?
The subject “evolution of language” is a very fashionable one. In the last 
1 This contribution contains the faithful transcript of Chomsky’s seminar. The notes provide 
some additional references. Although the contribution has been organized and revised by 
all authors, V. Bambini is responsible for questions 1-2, 8-11 and for the notes, while C. Chesi 
for questions 3-7. We would like to thank the students who participated to the initiative and 
submitted their questions, and the Collegio Ghislieri in Pavia for hosting the seminar.
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several decades there is a huge literature, libraries of books, international 
conferences, papers pouring out all the time. There are a few problems 
about it. One problem is that the topic doesn’t exist. Small problem… 
Furthermore, everyone knows it doesn’t exist. Evolution involves changes 
in the genomic characters of the organism. Languages are not organisms, 
they don’t have genomes, they don’t evolve. Languages change, but they 
don’t evolve. What evolves is the language capacity of users of language, 
i.e., human beings. So problem number 1 is: the topic doesn’t exist. Problem 
number 2 is that the work that has been done on the topic is utterly unlike 
anything that has been done in evolutionary biology. For example, suppose 
a biologist submitted a paper on the evolution of the eye. Consider that 
he has no idea of what an eye is and says that an eye is maybe something 
that you use to watch television. People would laugh. You couldn’t submit 
a paper like that. But that is exactly what the literature on the evolution of 
language is about. It doesn’t tell you what they think language is, just that 
language is something used for communication, which is about like saying 
that an eye is used to watch television. One of the many uses of language is 
communication, but that doesn’t tell you anything. Other problems arise 
as soon as you begin to look at the work. For example, a lot of the work by 
really sophisticated people argues that frozen expressions in language 
are fossils from earlier periods. They tell you something about the earlier 
stages of language. It is usually English that is studied; so take a frozen 
expression in English. If it is a fossil, it is a fossil from a couple of hundred 
years ago, maybe a thousand years. What can that tell you about the history 
of language? Nothing. That is a tiny blink of an eye in the last phase of a long 
history of language. 
The subject is one of the strangest subjects I have ever seen. Now, there is a 
subject: evolution of the capacity to use language, or to acquire language, 
the human language faculty. That is the real subject. But there is a problem 
with that subject too: we don’t know anything about it. Actually, we know 
two facts about the evolution of the language capacity. One of the facts is 
sufficient to tell you that the study of the evolution of language is mostly a 
waste of time. For example, one of the things we know about the evolution of 
the language capacity is that nothing has happened for at least 50 thousand 
years since humans left Africa. And the evidence for this is pretty strong, 
in fact very compelling. If you take an infant from an Amazonian tribe in 
Brazil, a tribe that maybe hasn’t had contact with other humans for maybe 
20 thousand years, the child first of all learns Portuguese instantly, with 
no problems, and if the infant was brought to Pavia, he would be speaking 
just like you, exactly the same. And conversely, if you take an infant here 
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and dump him in the Amazon, he would speak exactly like the children of 
that tribe. We don’t know any deviation from this: not every case has been 
studied, but such a wide range of cases have been observed that it is almost 
certain that this is universal. What that tells you is that the capacity for 
language hasn’t evolved in a way beyond historic times back to the first 
humans leaving Africa, or at least their ancestors, roughly 50 thousand 
years ago. So at least in that period there has been no evolution of the 
language capacity. 
The second fact that we know with not full confidence but kind of plausibility 
is that, if you go back quite a short period before that – a short time in the 
evolutionary time, maybe 50 or 100 thousand years before that, which is 
nothing in evolutionary time, there is no evidence that language existed at 
all. There is substantial archeological evidence that somewhere in that very 
narrow window, roughly 75 thousand years ago, there was a sudden explosion of 
evidence of creative activity, symbolic representation, indications of the phases 
of the moon, complex social organization, and various rituals, all sort of things 
that indicate that something happened in a very small group, maybe a small 
hunter-gatherer tribe, maybe a hundred people, and then spread. So, within 
again a short period of time, there was Homo Sapiens: in fact that is the origin of 
cognitive Homo Sapiens. Physical, anatomical Homo Sapiens, goes hundreds of 
thousand years back beyond that. But something happened cognitively in one 
small group and essentially took over. You can guess what the date is: within the 
last hundred thousand years probably. That tells you that some event took place, 
brief change which provided our ancestors with the creative capacities that 
we all have, and we all have essentially identically, because we are all different 
descendants from that small group who among their other talents succeeded 
in a way beyond everybody else. The human species is kind of unusual and all 
related species have been wiped out. There is no comparative evidence. There 
were plenty of other hominids – we know that from archeological evidence – 
but they are all gone. Neanderthal lasted until maybe 30 thousand years ago 
(there is a very slight interbreeding with Homo Sapiens, mostly in Southern 
Italy, incidentally), but essentially everything else was wiped out. And in fact 
it goes beyond that. If you look at the spread of Hominids, going back a million 
years or longer than that, as our ancestors spread, megafauna, i.e., big animals, 
disappeared. It was thought for a long time that it had to do with the expansion 
of the ice ages, but it turned out that, if you look at close dating, wherever proto-
humans appeared everything else disappeared. We are now in the process 
of finishing it off… The end result is that there is essentially no comparative 
evidence. There is evidence that something happened within a very short 
period, essentially suddenly from an evolutionary point of view, and nothing 
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has changed since. And that is the evidence. There is essentially no other 
evidence about the evolution of language2. 
If you take a look at the literature, what is studied is a different topic: 
language change. Undoubtedly languages changed. We are not talking 
Latin, we are not talking Sanskrit, proto Indo-European or whatever came 
before that. Undoubtedly languages changed, but that is not evolution. If 
you want to study language change, that is a serious discipline. Historical 
linguistics is a serious discipline, it has rigorous standards: you can’t 
say “maybe this happened, maybe that happened”. That doesn’t count in 
historical linguistics. But that is what the work is in so-called evolution of 
language; it is what evolutionary biologists sometime call “just so stories”: 
“maybe this happened, maybe something else happened”. That is not 
serious work. So, if there is something to learn, as I think there is, we can 
ask what small change could have taken place that could have given rise to 
something like the language faculty. There is linguistic work which I think 
shed some light on that. I won’t go into it. But we have to look for some 
small mutation that caused some rewiring of the brain that provided the 
essential properties of human language which don’t exist anywhere else. 
And I think there is work on it. Beyond that, to talk about the evolution of 
language is just cutting down forests for no purposes, as far as I can see.
2) Is there any new contribution from neuroscience to the understanding of 
language?
Yes, there is. In fact the best work I know is Andrea Moro’s work. There 
is a fair amount of interesting work. But there is one result that is quite 
far-reaching and that is what has been done here3. Cutting it down to its 
simplest form, it is something like this: taking speakers of some language, 
German let’s say, and presenting them with two kinds of non-sense 
languages, languages they don’t understand. One of them is modeled on 
say Italian: it has the properties of Italian, but non-sense words. The other 
is a language designed to violate what appear to be universal properties of 
language. The most interesting case that was studied, the one with the most 
far-reaching results, has to do with the linear order. For example, in Italian, 
if you want to negate a sentence, there is a negative particle which appears 
in a certain position in the sentence and it has to appear in that position, 
a fairly complex position: the position is defined by various structural 
relationships. You can make up a non-sense language in which negation is 
2  For a paleoanthropological perspective, see Tattersall (1998).
3  For a comprehensive presentation of this and other experiments on possible and impossible 
languages, see Moro (2008).
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much simpler: you put it in a particular linear order, maybe say the third 
word of the sentence. If you want to negate a sentence, you take the sentence 
and put the negation particle in the third word. Computationally, that is a 
lot simpler. But no human language works like that. Every human language 
puts the negative particle in some structurally defined position, and this 
incidentally generalizes. Linear distance counting doesn’t seem to exist in 
human language. There is nothing like third position or find the shortest, 
the closest word. I will give you  a simple example. Take interpretation of 
adverbs in complex sentences: you can show it also in brief sentences. Take 
the sentence “Eagles that swim fly”. Put the word “instinctively” in front of it: 
“Instinctively eagles that swim fly”. Everyone knows, every young child knows 
that “instinctively” goes with “fly”, it doesn’t go with “swim”. It doesn’t go with 
the closest verb. If it is “Instinctively eagles that fly swim”, you don’t understand 
“instinctively” to go with “fly”, although that is the only thing that makes any 
sense: you understand “instinctively” to go with “swim”. “Instinctively” is not 
finding the closest verb: it is finding a remote one and one which happens to 
be the structurally closest by an abstract notion of distance. And that holds 
for every linguistic construction, every language. Languages don’t use simple 
computational techniques like closest or third. They use complex computational 
techniques involving structural distance and structural position. Again, 
universally. Now, going back to the language modeled on Italian and the 
invented language with the simple position for negation, say third position, 
Moro and colleagues’ experiment found that normal speakers could solve the 
language modeled on Italian: they learned it very quickly. As for the language 
that uses the simple computational principle, they could solve it, but it was a 
puzzle. So, different areas of the brain were activated, not the normal language 
areas. There is comparable work with aphasics, actually with idiot savant cases, 
cases of a person who has tremendous, fantastic, language abilities, but very 
limited cognitive abilities. Neil Smith has done work on it4. Somewhat similar 
studies that are behavioral and not neurolinguistic found essentially the same 
as what Andrea Moro found with the investigation of the activation of brain 
areas. The normals could solve the invented language problems that violated 
Universal Grammar, but in a complicated way: they treated it like any other 
puzzle. The idiot savants, the one with limited cognitive abilities but excellent 
language abilities, couldn’t solve it at all. They can’t solve puzzles. This evidence 
from neuroscience compared with evidence from behavioral studies provides 
independent and very significant evidence that languages just don’t use simple 
computational procedures. They don’t use linear order, linear distance, fixed 
positions. That tells you something about the language faculty. That is the 
4  On idiot savants, see Smith & Tsimpli (1995), where the case of Christopher is described.
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kind of neurolinguistic work which can be very significant, I think. A lot turns 
on the question of whether languages use linear order: first semantics, first 
syntax, do they have rules that involve linear order, linear position? There 
is a lot of linguistic consequences to that choice. Neurolinguistic evidence 
conforms to other evidence in indicating that, if you want to understand the 
human language faculty, you have to ask what property is it that would lead 
automatically to use of structural position and structural distance, while 
ignoring linear position and linear distance. And there are interesting results 
about that, I think.
That relates very closely to the question of what small changes would have 
taken place that would have led to the sudden appearance of language in 
the first place. For those of you that know the linguistic literature, what is 
suggested in both cases is that the change that took place was the sudden 
emergence of the simplest combinatorial operation that is unbounded in 
scope. It is an operation that takes two entities already constructed and 
forms out of them the simplest possible new entity, the simplest possible 
will not involve linear order, because that is more complicated, it won’t 
involve any changes in the two entities put together, and in fact what it will 
form is just the set of the two, and that turned out to give you the basis. An 
operation like that is embedded somehow in every computational system: 
it is the simplest one possible and it does give you an unbounded array of 
hierarchical structure, and any property of the system that is emerging 
will depend on structural and not linear distance, structural and not linear 
position5. That has plenty of consequences.
3) What is the role of the notion of simplicity in modern formal linguistics, i.e., 
in technical terms, Minimalism? Is it the end or the starting point?
Simplicity is simply the core notion of science. That goes back to Galileo. He 
argued that nature is simple and it is the task of the scientist to show it. When 
you look at phenomena, they look extremely complex and diverse, and the task 
of the scientist is to show that this is a superficial misunderstanding: if you look 
more deeply, you will somehow figure out that there are simple elegant rules 
and principles. The whole of science is based on that. If you do not do that, you 
are not doing science, you are collecting data, you are flower collecting, which 
is ok, but this is not science. Furthermore, there is a substantial philosophical 
literature in this respects (Goodman6 and others) which shows that the search 
for simplicity is identical with the search for explanation, and you can see 
5  This operation is technically called “merge” (Chomsky 1995).
6  The reference is to the philosopher Nelson Goodman, broadly known for the “grue and 
bleen paradox”, introduced to highlight certain problems of induction (Goodman 1954).
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why, even superficially: the more complex your account the less deep the 
explanations. If you can make your account simpler, your explanations are 
deeper, and the whole purpose of rational inquiry is to find explanations, 
science as well. That is the driving force behind the study of language as well, 
and what is called “Minimalism” – maybe the name shouldn’t have been given 
to it – is just the latest stage in the effort to try to find simpler explanations7. 
It is a seamless continuation of everything that has been done in the study of 
language at least for the last 60 years, since the modern study took shape. In 
the early days, 60 years ago, it looked as if languages were extremely complex 
and very diverse: almost anything you can imagine could happen. Over the 
years it has been gradually found that, if you look at it properly, diversity is 
much more constrained and there are very limited options for change, and the 
things that look very complex on the surface often have deeper explanations 
that work. The case that I mentioned is just a quite interesting one: the fact that 
simple computational procedures are not used but rather things like structural 
distance and structural position. That tells you a lot: one of the things that 
it tells you is that the core operation in language is the one I mentioned, the 
simplest computational operation which could have emerged from some simple 
mutation, but here we are getting into questions about genetics and brain 
science that are not understood8. But it is quite possible that some very simple 
mutation could have rewired the brain to provide the simplest computational 
operation, which is unknown in the organic world, since it appears in the 
language and nowhere else.
4) Doesn’t memory structure constrain grammar as the sensory-motor and the 
conceptual-intentional  
external systems do?
Memory structure certainly constrains usage, in fact humans have quite 
limited memory as compared with a number of other organisms, for 
example certain birds like crows. A crow can remember where it has hidden 
10 or 20 thousand seeds, and not only where it has hidden them, but what 
quality the seed was, so that it will go first after the seeds that are going 
to deteriorate more quickly. Furthermore, the crow pays attention to 
other animals around that might see it hiding the seed and, if it sees that 
there is another crow around, it will wait that it goes away and re-bury 
the seed somewhere else. These are feats of memory that are absolutely 
unconceivable for humans: humans can get up to about 7 not 20 thousand: 
7  On the origin of the term Minimalism, which aims at reducing linguistic levels to the 
minimum number required by virtual conceptual necessity, see Moro (1996).
8  For an extensive discussion on computational operations, see De Palma (1974) and Chesi 
(2012).
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that is an order of magnitude difference. The narrowness of memory is 
so that the number 7 is almost uniform across organisms (crows happen 
to be unusual): 7 plus minus 2 is a famous formula in the study of short-
term memory that goes back to George Miller, 50 years ago9. Humans are 
in that range, a normal range, and that does constrain things you can say: 
it constrains numbers that you can add in your head, for examples. But 
that tells you nothing about language, just as it tells you nothing about 
your knowledge of arithmetic. Your knowledge of arithmetic enables you 
to add numbers of arbitrary size, and you can demonstrate that: if you 
give a person more memory and more time (say paper and pencil), there 
is no limit on the size of the numbers you can add. That tells you that 
you have an internal procedure,  technically it is called the “generative 
procedure”, which assigns a sum to any two arbitrary numbers. But 
memory constraints and time constraints limit how far you can go 
in real-time. You can go on and on indefinitely, if you have more and 
more time. Language is exactly the same. There is no indication that 
memory plays any role in the nature of language any more than it 
does in the nature of arithmetical knowledge. But of course, it plays a 
role in your use of language, just like in your use of your ability to do 
arithmetic, or any other generative process. We have to distinguish 
between the nature of the system and the use of the system: this is a very 
fundamental difference. In the study of language, this is often called 
the difference between “competence” and “performance”: your internal 
knowledge, i.e., the internal structure, and what you do. It is considered 
a controversial distinction, but this has to be a confusion, since it is a 
conceptual distinction that cannot be avoided. There is a comparable 
distinction that is so obvious that it is just taken for granted everywhere 
else in biology. Suppose someone is studying the digestive system and 
doesn’t know exactly how the digestive system works, i.e., the nature 
of the system: you don’t just look at the performance, like if the person 
has intestinal f lu or if he just ate a big meal; you don’t pay attention to 
that, you abstract away from it, if you want to understand the nature of 
the system. That is so obvious that it is never mentioned: it is just taken 
for granted in all inquiry. But when you talk about language, for some 
reasons, rational assumptions dissolve very quickly. It is typical when 
we talk about ourselves: it can be very hard to be rational. But if you use 
normal rational standards, the distinction is obvious and it tells you 
where memory plays a role as far as we know: not in the organization of 
the system but in the use of the system, of course.
9  See Miller (1956).
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5) What do you think is the most critical computational aspect of language for 
a computer program that aims at understanding it?
First of all, no computer program should aim at understanding language, 
because that is utterly hopeless. It is much too elevated goal. We don’t even 
know what understanding language means. You can’t try to construct a 
program that does something that you can’t characterize: that is not a 
feasible task. Understanding of language involves some many complex 
things that we have no grasp of: it is not a formulable task. You can 
ask narrower questions. For example, you can construct a computer 
program that will determine from the sequence of sounds or some other 
representations the internal structure of the object that you construct 
in your mind that gets interpreted in ways that we don’t understand. 
That you can do: it is called a “parsing program”, technically, and it raises 
interesting questions. Just to go back to the question of linear order that 
I have mentioned, a parsing program would be much simpler if it could 
use things like linear order: say in the sentence “Instinctively eagles 
that fly swim”, a program that will tell you that “instinctively” goes 
with “fly” will be far simpler that the one that we use that tells you that 
it goes with “swim”. But language doesn’t offer this possibility; in fact 
there is a striking conflict – we find over and over – between language 
design and ease of use of language. They are in conflict. Language is 
designed in ways that increase the difficulty of use. Put it differently, 
communicative efficiency and computational efficiency conflict in many 
cases, and those are quite interesting cases: in every single case that 
is known computational efficiency wins and communicative efficiency 
loses. So whatever language is about, it doesn’t really care much about 
communication: it cares about internal elegance, being a simple system. 
And if you think about how language must have evolved, very recently, 
that makes sense: it was an almost instantaneous emergence. Whatever 
happened at that interesting moment, 75 thousand years ago, under no 
external pressure, no selectional pressure – it just happened in somebody’s 
brain, it would naturally take the simplest possible form. Using an analogy 
that I have used occasionally and that Andrea has used, it should become 
like a snowflake: it just takes the simplest form that the proprieties of 
physics forces it to take. That is what seems to have happened: in so far 
as we understand anything about language, it seems to take the simplest 
form and not care much about the consequences for use, in particular 
for communication. There is a lot of evidence pointing to that, and it has 
many interesting consequences. To go back to the literature on evolution 
of language, it bears on that too: standard view is that language evolved 
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as a means of communication, but the evidence is overwhelmingly against 
that. It seems to have developed in a way that harms communication and 
doesn’t care about communication. It does care about elegance, which 
makes sense if you think about the two or three facts that we have about 
the conditions for the emergence of the language faculty. All this hangs 
together pretty reasonably.
 
6) What is complexity in language? And in thought?
To answer the question about either language or thought, we first have 
to say what they are. You can’t answer questions about something when 
you have no idea of what it is. In the case of language, we can say some 
things, there are some ideas about what the essential nature of languages 
is. What is complexity in language? If we adopt the Galilean guideline for 
the sciences, complexity in language is whatever we don’t understand: if 
you don’t understand something, it is complex. What you are trying to do 
is to show that it is your failure to understand that gives the impression of 
complexity: that is the nature of rational inquiry, science in particular. So 
there is plenty of complexity in language; pick anything random out of a 
page and it is very complex, which simply means that we don’t understand 
enough. But that is true of everything you look at in the world. That is why 
physicists don’t take video tapes of what is happening in the worlds and 
try to develop theories: this is way too complex. In fact, there is a standard 
joke in mathematics, that the only numbers are 1, 2, 3 and infinity, because 
anything else is just too complicated to study. In the case of physics, 
hydrogen you can study, helium maybe, but, if it gets bigger than that, you 
give it to the chemist and they will worry about it. If an organic molecule 
is too big or complicated for a chemist, you give it to the biologist; if it is 
too big for the biologist, you give it to historians; so it goes. You can study 
simple things, and when they get too complicated it gets harder, which 
means that you don’t understand enough. That is the nature of things.
That is language. What about thought? You can’t do this for thought, until 
someone tells you what thought is. What is thought? We can say a couple of 
things about those aspects of thoughts that are expressed in language, but 
then we are talking about language. What about those aspects of thought 
that aren’t expressed in language? What do we know about them? Actually 
what we know about them is mostly from introspection. I am sure that I 
am not the only person in the world who has the experience of knowing 
what I want to say but not thinking of how I can say it: “I know what I 
mean but I can’t find the way to say it”, and you try something that didn’t 
work, maybe you try something else, maybe it is a little better, maybe you 
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end up with some complicated paraphrase because you couldn’t figure 
out the right way to say it. That is a normal experience. Experience is like 
that. It tells you something: that there are a lot of things going on beyond 
the level of consciousness that we try to move to consciousness and even 
to the external world, often failing, which means that there is a lot of 
thought going on, and we have no grasp of it. Until there is some way to 
capture these things that are beyond the level of consciousness, which 
is probably almost everything in our cognitive world, there is nothing 
to say. There is other evidence about this that has been misinterpreted, 
I think. In the last couple of years ago, there were experiments showing 
that, when people make decisions, for example when I decide to pick up 
this cup, milliseconds before I make the decision, there is activity in the 
brain in the areas where you are going to act, i.e., milliseconds before I 
make the decision, the motor areas of the brain are already organized 
to pick the cup up. That evidence was used widely to conclude that this 
shows that we don’t have free will10. But this doesn’t show anything of 
this sort. This just shows that decisions are unconscious. We all know 
that, if we think for a minute: of course decisions are unconscious. Some 
of them reach the level of consciousness, some of them we can’t even act 
on, but there is a lot there going on unconsciously, probably everything 
of interest, and we don’t know how to deal with it. In principle it could 
be studied, maybe some day brain scientists reach the point where they 
can say something about this: it doesn’t seem beyond the possibility of 
inquiry. But we have to overcome some dogmas. There is one dogma that 
has hampered psychology back hundreds of years: that is the dogma 
that contents of thought are accessible to consciousness. It is hard to 
find anyone in the history of psychology or philosophy who has doubted 
this, even Freud. Freud talked a lot about the unconscious, but the whole 
Freudian system is based on the assumption that you can tease out what 
is unconscious. That is the point of psychoanalysis: they try to make what 
is unconscious, conscious. But if you try to find somebody who questioned 
that, it is not easy; the only person I have ever found is Vico. This dogma 
is almost certainly false. We know that from our own experience. Going 
back to the question, until we have something to say about thought, we are 
not going to be able to ask questions about its complexity, its simplicity, its 
properties, or anything else.
10  To this respect, see the studies of the neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet on voluntary 
movement (Libet 1985). On the implications of this type of evidence for the notion of free will, see 
Pietrini & Bambini (2009).
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7) What comes first? Language or thought? Do they share a recursive 
structure?
It is the same question: until we have something to say about thought, we 
are not going to be able to give any serious answer. The only answer we can 
give is the one I have already mentioned: you simply pay attention to your 
own internal cognitive activity, speaking, planning, deciding, and so on. 
And I think you invariably come to the conclusion that something is going 
on beyond the level of consciousness. Probably, everything interesting is 
going on there. That is thought, if you like, and, whatever it is, it is coming 
before language, before deciding, before acting: it is just going on inside. But 
what is it? Well, it is a task for the future.
8) What is the place of context in language functioning? For example, 
metaphors are context dependent. Do they lay outside the language faculty?
Interpretation of metaphors, like interpretation of everything else, is context-
dependent and lies outside the language faculty, specifically, unless by the 
language faculty you mean all of our cognitive abilities11. So, yes that would be 
true of metaphors, but it is also true of non-metaphors. Whatever you interpret 
in literal sentences goes way beyond the language faculty. Again, there are a lot 
of dogmas about this. 
9) Why is it so difficult to explain that the difference between human and animal 
language lies the syntax?
That relates to the previous question. First of all, it is difficult to explain 
anything about language, because people have religious attitudes towards 
their language, religious dogmas about their language, as about almost 
anything else that is deeply personal. So you just feel you know everything: 
“you can’t tell me anything, I can speak perfectly and I don’t have any 
problem, there can’t be any difficulties about it, so stop bothering me 
with all your complicated theories”. That is very normal. You take a look 
at modern philosophy of language and it is full of this. People spell out 
their untutored intuitions about language and think they are saying 
something, because how could it be complicated? You could say the same 
about vision. What could be complicated about vision? “I see things, I don’t 
have any problems with it”. If you try to explain to people that the way 
you see things is because of quite complex computations that take place in 
the visual system, there is interesting experimental work which with you 
can sometime convince people. Somehow this goes back to unconscious 
11  On the constellation of cognitive abilities involved in interpreting metaphor and context-
dependent meanings in general, see Bambini et al. (2011).
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knowledge. The mammalian visual system, humans and other mammals 
that have been studied, has a way of interpreting objects in motions 
as rigid12. In standard experiment, if you give a person tachistoscopic 
presentation, like a screen with a couple of dots on it, maybe three dots, if 
you give them three or four successive presentations of three dots on the 
screen, what you see is a rigid object in motion. You can’t help that: that 
is just the way the visual system works, which is kind of strange in a way. 
In the whole history of mammals, going as far back as you like, there was 
never any experience with rigid objects: rigid objects come in what is called 
“carpentered universes”, in modern universes where people construct 
things. If you are walking around in a forest, there aren’t any rigid objects. 
But our eyes and visual systems in all other mammals are constructed so 
that all of this completely unconscious activity is going on inaccessible to 
consciousness, which is giving a kind of a framework for visual perception. 
Try to explain that to somebody about cognitive abilities like language and 
they would just resist it: “It can’t be. I know everything, don’t bother me”. 
It is hard to explain anything about language, unless somebody is willing 
to take on the attitude of the standard scientist: my intuitive judgments 
don’t mean anything, maybe my intuitive judgment is that a heavy rock 
falls faster than a small rock; if I want to be serious, I put aside this intuition 
because it has been disproved. Unless you can make that leap, nothing can 
be explained.
What about the special role of syntax? The fact that matters is that human 
syntax has no counterpart in the animal world, none. No one has ever 
found any remotely like it. This fundamental combinatorial process that 
I mentioned simply appears nowhere else, at least anybody has been able 
to detect. But is that the difference between animals and humans? Well it 
is a difference, it is only one of many. If you take even the simplest word 
of language, the simplest one you like, “river”, “cup”, “person”, whatever 
it is, there is absolutely no analogue in animal communication. Animal 
communication has essentially a 1 to 1 association between a symbol and 
some physically detectable set of circumstances. Take monkey calls: monkey 
might have five calls. One of them is reflexively produced when leaves 
are moving: it is a warning call, we interpret that as meaning “predator 
is coming”. Leaves are moving, this call comes out: it is like seeing a rigid 
object in motion. Another call comes out because of some hormonal activity: 
we interpret its meaning as “I am hungry”. In every animal communication 
system that is known the symbols are like that. Human words are nothing 
12  See the work on visual perception by David Marr (1982) and Shimon Ullman (1979), and 
specifically Ullman’s rigidity principle.
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like that, not remotely even. You cannot give the physical characterization 
of what it means to be a river, or a person, or a cup. All of these concepts, 
even the simplest ones, depend on internal interpretations in terms of 
function, design, intentions, psychic continuity, all sorts of things. And 
every infant grasps this instantaneously, and in fact fairy tales are based 
on it. Standard fairy tale has some prince turned by the wicked witch into 
a frog and he stays this way until the beautiful princess kisses the frog 
that becomes the handsome prince. During the interim period the physical 
characterization of the object was a frog, with all physical properties of 
the frog. But the child understands it as the prince: it just happens to look 
like a frog. That means that the concept of person is based on an intuitive 
notion of psychic continuity, which has no physical characterization, and 
that is instantaneous: no child has ever been confused about this. That is 
true for every word you look at. So, it is true that the syntax is different for 
the humans and animals, but so it is for everything else about language, 
including the meaning of the simplest words. This is another dogma, very 
resistant to reason and evidence, which has prevented the understanding 
of this. It is sometimes called the “referential doctrine”: the idea that there 
is a relation between words and things, an association between a word and 
the thing, that runs through philosophy of language and history of inquiry 
into the subject in recent years. That is just flatly false. There is no such 
relationship. In fact that was known to Aristotle, but it has been forgotten. 
If you look back at Aristotle, he asks: what is a house? In the Aristotelian 
framework, a house consists of the interaction of two substances: the one 
is “matter” – house is something that is built out of bricks and wood and 
so on, its materials aspect – and the other is what is called “form”, design 
and function – it is used for a place for people to live in. If form and matter 
coincide, you get a house. But form is not physically detectable. And in fact 
the Aristotelian definition, though is correct as far as it goes, it just doesn’t 
begin to reach the meaning of house. But that is the right idea. That was 
understood pretty well until the 17th century, like a lot of things that were 
understood then and that are almost totally forgotten. Until those insights 
are recovered, it is going to be impossible to study this question. 
But to go back to the question itself, it is true that syntax sharply 
separates human language from animal communication, so does the 
interpretation of the simplest atomic elements, so does everything else. 
Animal communication systems are – as the term indicates – used for 
communication. For human language that just doesn’t seem to be a central 
property. It is certainly one of things you can do with language, just as you 
can watch television with your eyes. But that is not a core property and 
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there is plenty of evidence for that, of the kind I mentioned. So, in every 
respect it is just some novel thing in the organic world. I mentioned this 
morning Descartes: I think he was basically right in thinking that this is the 
dividing between humans and the rest of the organic world, something that 
happened very recently13.
10) What is the difference between syntax in music and syntax in language? If 
they are alike, is it plausible that they have coevolved?
It is very plausible. Language is universal among humans. There is no human 
group that has been found that doesn’t have a language very much like ours. 
In fact, languages are even invented by children with zero evidence. There 
are some remarkable cases. I will mention one case which is well studied. 
It is now known – it wasn’t known 50 years ago – that sign languages are 
almost identical to spoken languages: they have the same structures, same 
rules, same acquisition rate, same neural representation even, which is a 
little surprising because they are visual. There is one well studied case of a 
group of three cousins, in Philadelphia, whose parents were indoctrinated 
into the prevailing so-called oralist tradition: deaf children should not be 
permitted to use gesture, they have to learn lip reading. The idea behind 
this is crazy but it was the prevailing ideology in raising children with 
deafness. These parents were so deeply indoctrinated that they never made 
gestures, they walked around the house with their hands behind their 
backs so that the kids wouldn’t see any gesture. These three kids played 
together and it turned out, around the age of 3 or 4, that they invented a 
sign language: they developed a sign language and they were just using it. 
They were immediately taught American Sign Language, but the language 
was studied and it was about the same of any other language at that 
developmental level14.
Actually, the first study of this was one of a friend of mine, back when 
I was a graduate student, Eric Lenneberg, who went on to develop the 
field of biology of language15. When he was a graduate student, back in 
the early 1950s, he was getting interested in the acquisition of language 
under a variety of conditions, and particularly language of the deaf. He 
went to visit a prestigious school for the blind and deaf in Boston, called 
13  In the morning of September 15, Chomsky gave the inaugural lecture at the Institute for 
Advanced Study, IUSS, on Language and limits of understanding, considering also Descartes’s view on 
language and human creativity.
14  On deaf children spontaneously developing a sign system, see Goldin-Meadow & Feldman 
(1977) and Goldin-Meadow (2003).
15  On the biological foundation of language development, including the condition of 
congenital deafness, see Lenneberg (1967; 1969).
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the Perkins School16. It was oralist, like everything was: no sign language, 
just lip reading. He just sat in on a class and he noticed that, as soon as 
the teacher turned to the blackboard, the kids started signing to each 
other. Obviously the kids had invented a sign language, somehow. There 
was no way to study it at that time, but it is very likely, it is spontaneous, 
you can’t help it.
Music is the same. As far as the anthropological evidence indicates, no 
human group has been found that hasn’t developed a pretty complex 
system of music. It may not be tonal music. It might be rhythm based or 
something else. But some kind of system of music seems to be universal, 
which is very curious because what function does it have? Why should 
there be music? A similar question arises about arithmetical knowledge. 
That is also universal. This is something that bothered Darwin and Wallace, 
founders of evolutionary theory, because it seems to violate the principle 
of natural selection. How could arithmetical knowledge have evolved, since 
it has never been used? It has only been used in a tiny period of human 
history, and only among very few people. How come that everybody has 
it? And where is the good evidence that this is universal? That looked 
problematic. The only sensible answer that has been proposed is that all of 
these are offshoots of the same cognitive system. Some cognitive system 
that emerged, which led to arithmetic, music, language, and any other 
behavioral pattern that has this basic properties and is universal. There are 
some reasons to believe that the combinatorial operation that I mentioned 
before actually does underlie all of them. For arithmetic, it is pretty easy 
to show, for music it is more complicated, but there is some work on it. In 
the last 40 years there has been a certain amount of work on the syntax of 
music, trying to relate it to the syntax of language. The first major studies 
were done by Leonard Bernstein, American well known composer and 
conductor. There was a lecture in Harvard, back in the early 1970s17. Since 
then there has been a certain amount of work. One of my colleagues in my 
department, David Pesetsky, is one of the people that has done the main 
work on this18. It is an interesting topic. You can see how it ought to end up. 
But trying to show that what ought to be true is true, is never an easy task.
11) What is your position about the new theories of embodied language? In 
16  The Perkins School for the Blind was established in 1829. Famous students at the Perkins 
School were Anne Sullivan and Helen Keller. 
17  Bernstein delivered six lectures at Harvard in 1973, broadcasted in 1976 and available also 
as a book (Bernestein 1976).
18  As a representative reference, see Katz & Pesetsky (2009), which follows the path 
inaugurated by the seminal work of Ray Jackendoff and Fred Lerdhal (Lerdhal & Jackendoff 1983).
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particular, what do you think about the relationships between the motor 
system and semantics? 
That is a quick one. I don’t have any position. “Semantics” is a pretty loose 
term. If by “semantics” you mean everything involved in interpretation of 
language, then it would be pretty strange if it didn’t have some relation to 
motor systems and everything else. What that relation might be, I am not 
aware of any more than superficial observations relating them. I am afraid 
I have to say the same thing about embodied language: that is another 
popular topic. If you think about things like emotions and reactions to 
things and so on, what has that to do with language? A lot, it has a lot 
to do with the use of language, trivially, but does it have to do with the 
structure of language, the principles that determine the infinite structure 
of an interpretative expression? As far as I am aware, nobody has thought 
of a connection and it would be pretty hard to imagine one. They just seem 
quite different systems19.
19  A discussion on embodied cognition theories with respect to the language faculty can be found 
in Tettamanti & Moro (2012).
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